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Abstract: 
This thesis analyses the social dimensions of the risk of animal biopharming (the 
genetic modification of animals to produce pharmaceuticals) in New Zealand, in the 
context of a wider discussion of the social nature of risk. In doing so, it offers a 
different conception of risk and risk assessment than is currently used within the 
government policy of New Zealand. Current policy has focused on technical 
evaluations of risk, in which the technology being analysed is not assessed within the 
social context it will enter and risk is compartmentalised into quantifiable and 
standardised data. This approach both serves to legitimate ‘experts’ as the true judge 
of risk, and also isolates members of the wider public to the realm of ‘ethical’ 
discussion and participation. Such policy, I argue, does not lend itself to good 
decision-making, as risk management procedures, built on the back of risk 
assessment, often prove to be impractical when entering complex and ambiguous 
social environments. Likewise, this form of risk assessment often fails to account for 
risk that could be identified by those with in-depth knowledge of the environment, 
both social and physical, that the technology will enter.  
 
This thesis pilots aspects of an alternative approach, which aims to elicit information 
about the relevant environment. It demonstrates how one might identify and interview 
those with what is termed here as ‘local knowledge’, and how that knowledge can 
make a significant contribution to risk identification and assessment and the 
identification of social implications. The thesis concludes not only that local 
knowledge can contribute practically to risk assessment, but also that the concepts of 
risk and expertise must be widened to include social and contextual behaviour and 
knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
A note on terminology: 
The terms ‘transgenic animal’ and ‘GM animal’ are used interchangeably throughout 
this thesis; both refer to a genetically modified animal. The term ‘biopharm animal’ 
refers specifically to animals that have been genetically modified to produce 
pharmaceutical substances.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Animal biopharming, the genetic engineering of animals in order to produce 
pharmaceuticals or other medically useful substances, has been touted as a potential 
area of economic growth and advantage within New Zealand. The predicted benefits 
of the technology are many; including cheaper medicine, greater access to 
transplantable organs and foreign economic investment to name a few  (Beckman & 
Goldberg 2003; MoRST 2005). A report prepared by the Ministry of Research, 
Science and Technology (MoRST) in 2005 predicts that animal biopharming will be 
active within New Zealand by 2008, to the point that ‘factories’ of livestock will 
develop across the country. Already several field tests aimed at developing 
commercially viable animal biopharming applications have been conducted in 
‘contained’ environments within New Zealand, with varying levels of success. If 
these predictions and expectations hold true, what will the social implications of this 
technology be for New Zealand?   
 
This thesis will explicate the social dimensions of animal biopharming. This will be 
achieved primarily by identifying and exploring sources of relevant ‘local knowledge’ 
that are not typically incorporated into official risk assessment processes. ‘Local 
knowledge’ refers to the knowledge individuals or communities hold through their 
personal experiences in areas that will be affected by, or affect, animal biopharming. 
‘Social implications’ has two meanings within this thesis. Firstly, this can mean the 
implications of social practices for the safety of animal biopharming operations. 
Secondly, it can be defined as the implications of animal biopharming for common 
social practices that interact with the technology.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
Both national and international discussion has begun on the possible implications of 
animal biopharming. While much of this discussion has been optimistic (Powell 2001; 
Beckman & Goldberg 2003), some writing points to areas of potential concern (U.S 
National Research Council Committee on Biological Confinement of Genetically 
Engineered Organisms 2004). Along with this discussion, several applications to 
conduct field tests of animal biopharming have gone through the risk assessment 
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procedure within New Zealand, which suggests that it is recognised that animal 
biopharming may potentially pose some risks for New Zealand.  
 
However, risk assessment is not complete without an understanding of how the 
technology is likely to interact with the social practices it will encounter if 
implemented. Risk assessment has tended to focus either on laboratory and technical 
examination of risks, or a normative discussion of risks with the public. Although 
both of these processes are undoubtedly important, this thesis seeks to evaluate the 
risks of the technology in relation to its everyday use outside of an isolated 
experimental environment and beyond normative claims from the public. In order to 
do this, those who would be implicated in the implementation of the technology must 
be allowed to contribute their experiential knowledge and analysis of how the 
technology would play out in their context. The knowledge gained will complement 
risk assessment processes by providing additional assessment information on the 
practicalities and implications of probable regulations.  
 
This thesis is grounded on literature in the areas of local knowledge and public 
participation in decision-making on issues involving science and technology. Some of 
this literature suggests that knowledge about the implications of the technology is 
spread across society outside of traditional technical and policy-making realms. This 
knowledge, which is often based on experience within a local environment relevant to 
a new technology, can contribute to risk assessment. Firstly, local knowledge can 
contribute generally to the understanding of risks involved with a technology and its 
use, both technical and social, and to the formation of regulatory guidelines regarding 
its use. Secondly, local knowledge can specifically help us understand how the 
technologies and its regulations will impact upon members of society, culturally, 
economically and socially.  
 
Rationale 
This approach can add to the policy discussion on biopharming in New Zealand, as 
well as to our understanding of local knowledge and of risk. Current discussions over 
biotechnology in general and biopharming in particular, generally frame the issues as 
belonging to two different domains, those of the experts, and the public at large. This 
approach, although not explicitly, implies that society and the science sector can be 
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separated into compartments of opinion and knowledge. Technology experts, such as 
bio scientists, predict tremendous progress for both humanitarian health initiatives and 
economic fields, where biopharming can produce drugs cheaply and efficiently (Kues 
& Niemann 2004, p.287), whilst also holding the potential to treat as yet incurable 
diseases such as multiple sclerosis1. The knowledge of technical experts is often 
represented as constituted by ‘objective’ facts, with normative issues left out of the 
equation. On the other side of the discussion, NGO’s and members of the general 
public are represented as  holding normative concerns about biopharming, and these 
normative concerns are elicited through ‘dialogues’ and consultations, such as those 
carried out by the Bioethics Council (The Bioethics Council (c)) regarding 
xenotransplanatation. However the practical concerns that the public and NGO’s may 
hold do not have a regular avenue for expression. Thus, framing of the debate has 
created two different arenas with their own associated actors, the objective discussion 
of biopharming from experts and the normative concerns from the public.  
 
However, this division of public opinion and expert knowledge limits the risk 
assessment of biopharming’s implementation in New Zealand. By separating the two 
fields, public and science, an exchange of knowledge tends to be one way, usually 
from the ‘experts’ to the public, while occasionally the science sector is encouraged to 
take public values into account. The separation also ignores the social complexity 
within which opinions and knowledge of biopharming is formed. Representation of 
technical expertise versus public values suggests that technological facts and opinions 
are created within a vacuum outside of societal influence. Risk assessment is left to 
the experts, who often assume that risk itself is discovered within a realm that is 
testable, quantifiable and value-free.   
 
As a result of this approach, recommendations to manage risks often work upon the 
assumption of what is possible in an isolated environment. When exposed to the real 
social worlds they will enter, which includes unpredictable environments and 
unregimented behaviour, these recommendations can be revealed as impractical and, 
at times, plainly irrational. In practice, people may be likely to adopt ways of doings 
                                                 
1
 New Zealand CRI, AgResearch, is developing cows that will produce proteins to potentially treat 
multiple sclerosis (Ministry for the Environment (b)).  
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things that are familiar, or may seem to them to be easier and more efficient, but 
which deviate from what is prescribed or assumed to be controlled for. 
 
 In this way, certain individuals and communities outside the policy-making sector 
may hold more knowledge of the way a technology will be used away from an 
isolated experimental environment than ‘experts’ do (Irwin & Michael 2003). The 
theory is concerned not with what the rules are regarding technical procedure, but 
what are the actual practices that will be involved in this procedure. This point 
assumes that members outside the scientific community hold knowledge that cannot 
be obtained through isolated scientific experiment, particularly regarding social 
practices and interaction with a new technology. If this is the case, it is both possible 
and necessary to search for, and extrapolate, sources of this knowledge in order to 
better understand how a technology will affect certain localities socially and how, in 
turn, its risk should be viewed.  
 
Background information and definitions 
Animal biopharming is a technically complex topic. Several procedures can be used 
to biopharm animals (Dyck et al. 2003), however as of yet there has been no 
commercial approval of an animal biopharmed product (U.S. National Research 
Council Committee on Defining Science-based Concerns Associated with Products of 
Animal Biotechnology 2002, p.51; Pollack 2006). Thus, its development remains in 
the pre-commercial stages. This next section will not attempt a technically detailed 
explanation of animal biopharming processes and issues2. However, a general 
description and definition of animal biopharming is necessary for the sake of clarity.  
 
One of the more recent developments within biotechnology is the genetic 
modification of animals. Genetic modification refers to the process of manipulating 
genes as well as transferring them into other organisms (Mehta & Gair 2001, p.242). 
The process of biopharming is defined as genetically modifying crop plants or 
animals in order to produce pharmaceutical or medically useful substances.  Biopharm 
animals can therefore be defined as, “transgenic animals modified to produce proteins 
                                                 
2
 More detailed discussions of animal biopharming processes can be found at (Dyck 2003) and (U.S 
National Research Council Committee on Defining Science-based Concerns Associated with Products 
of Animal Biotechnology 2002). 
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for extraction, purification, therapeutic use” (U.S. National Research Council 
Committee on Defining Science-based Concerns Associated with Products of Animal 
Biotechnology 2002, p.149)3. A transgene is “a gene introduced into an organism by 
human intervention” (U.S. National Research Council Committee on Defining 
Science-based Concerns Associated with Products of Animal Biotechnology 2002, 
p.157). This has the potential to produce large amounts of expensive products at a 
relatively inexpensive rate.  
 
There are several proposed advantages of animal biopharming as documented in the 
literature. Perhaps the most attractive feature of animal biopharming is the potential to 
produce “large amounts of valuable products at relatively low expense as compared 
to” traditional laboratory-based production methods of pharmaceuticals (U.S. 
National Research Council Committee on Defining Science-based Concerns 
Associated with Products of Animal Biotechnology 2002). Cost savings are seen as 
resulting in part from enabling greater flexibility of scale- rather than building 
laboratories, one need only increase the size of the herd.  
 
The diversification of dairy production away from a high-volume commodity 
production system, toward higher value products, is considered important to the future 
economic well-being of the dairy industry specifically and New Zealand more 
generally. Animal biopharming is seen as one way to reach this goal (New Zealand 
Association of Crown Research Institutes. 2000).  
 
 New Zealand is promoted as a particularly attractive destination for biopharming 
companies because of its strong farming sector, its relative isolation from animal 
disease (particularly from Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)), and its focus 
on the ‘knowledge economy’ which is conducive to the research and development 
required for animal biopharming. Some of the proposed products of biopharming to 
be produced within New Zealand are vaccines, human serum proteins, designer milk 
and neutriceuticals and organ transplants (Beckman & Goldberg 2003, p. 11).  
 
                                                 
3
 There are other uses of GM that parallel biopharming procedures, but produce different substances. 
For instance, research is being conducted to produce industrial plastics through biopharming 
techniques. However, as little research has been conducted into this type of production within New 
Zealand, this thesis will focus on medical applications.  
 6 
There are several risks of animal biopharming already reported in the literature. The 
chance of biopharmed products or animals entering the food chain could have human 
health risks and economic repercussions for both non GM farmers and GM farmers 
alike. Examples of GM corn entering the food chain, such as the Starlink corn 
(Schmitz, Schmitz & Moss 2005), have illustrated the level of this impact and are 
discussed in chapter five. It will be necessary to avoid non-GM cows mixing with GM 
cows in order to prevent inadvertent mixing and possibly other forms of inadvertent 
transgene flow. The risk of horizontal gene transfer4 is also potentially an issue, with 
the opportunity for GM material being transferred to non GM organisms through 
animal waste or blood in the soil, or through insects, a possibility. Another risk is the 
“generation of potentially pathogenic viruses by recombination between sequences of 
the vector used to introduce a transgene and related, but non-pathogenic, viruses that 
might be present in the same animal” (U.S. National Research Council Committee on 
Defining Science-based Concerns Associated with Products of Animal Biotechnology 
2002, p.52). Obviously such an occurrence could have severe human health and 
environmental repercussions for the future.  
 
It is likely that controls will be put in place to minimise these risks if animal 
biopharming enters commercial production. For example, current field tests require 
certain controls such as two metre high fencing with buffer zones between the areas of 
fencing, as well as disposal controls and isolation (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry 1999). If these controls are extended to commercial operations, this will in 
turn affect the social practices of those producing animal biopharming. However, the 
practicalities of these controls will also be affected by the social practices of those 
engaging in animal biopharming. This thesis suggests it is necessary to use the local 
knowledge of those within the social environment animal biopharming will enter to 
understand its true implications and risks.  
 
Method 
The methodology of this thesis is based largely upon a working paper by Joanna 
Goven, Fiona Cram and Jane Gilbert which builds upon the theories of Wynne, Irwin 
and others regarding social knowledge (Goven, Cram & Gilbert 2004, p.2). The paper 
                                                 
4
 The transfer of GM material apart from mother or father to offspring.  
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develops a method to identify and collect local knowledge that is useful for 
identifying future risks and implications of new technologies. One of the challenges 
of this method is to identify individuals who may hold relevant local knowledge. As 
this type of knowledge has rarely been elicited formally, it maybe the case that those 
who hold relevant knowledge are unaware that they have something to offer. Thus, it 
is important to actively identify areas which may be relevant to social implications, 
rather than passively wait for those with relevant knowledge to present themselves.    
 
The first stage of this method follows the traditional practice of finding and analysing 
related research in the area of biopharming. This process will be referred to as 
‘scoping’ throughout the thesis.  Through scoping relevant sources, it was possible to 
locate some of the relevant areas of local and social practice which relate to animal 
biopharming. Government reports, NGO websites, public dialogues and academic 
literature are useful forms of literature on both possible areas of local knowledge and 
an understanding of the regulatory landscape regarding animal biopharming in New 
Zealand. As animal biopharming in New Zealand is at a developmental and early 
stage, much of the literature identified was not specific to New Zealand’s situation. 
Further scoping interviews with relevant policy makers, risk assessors and technology 
developers within New Zealand were necessary to identify possible avenues of 
development for animal biopharming. Five such individuals, from AgResearch, the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MoRST), New Zealand Trade and Enterprise 
(NZTE) and the Environmental Risk Management Authority (ERMA), were identified 
and interviewed. After analysing the literature and interviews, it was possible to 
identify individuals or groups who may hold detailed knowledge of these social 
practices.  
 
Dairy farmers were identified as individuals who may hold particularly relevant 
knowledge on how their practices may affect and be affected by animal biopharming 
in the future. Seven dairy farmers were interviewed, with experience in farming from 
Waikato, Taranaki and Canterbury. It was important to let the interviewee locate 
knowledge that maybe useful. The semi-structured interview technique was employed 
by the researcher for this purpose. The interview schedule contained general questions 
and themes, derived from the previous scoping activities; however, the structure of the 
interview was dictated by the interviewee’s responses. As the interviewee may have 
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had little exposure to the issues surrounding animal biopharming itself, background 
information was provided. It was also indicated to the interviewee why they may hold 
useful knowledge on the implications of animal biopharming.  
 
Structure 
The structure of the remainder of the thesis is described below. 
 
Chapter Two discusses and analyses literature regarding the key assumptions and 
concepts of this thesis. First I examine the general themes throughout the literature on 
(what is referred to here as) local knowledge. Particular focus will be placed on the 
relation between local knowledge and public participation in practical decision 
making over complex technologies and risk assessment. In this light, social critiques 
of ‘technical’ risk assessment and the move toward normative participation will be 
reviewed. The chapter also frames how this thesis approaches local knowledge and 
risk assessment in the context of current literature.  
 
Chapter Three discusses in more detail the method employed here. Particular focus is 
placed on how the thesis has actively identified, or ‘scoped’, relevant local knowledge 
in relation to a risk assessment of animal biopharming in New Zealand. A discussion 
of the semi-structured interviews follows; particularly in relation to how the method 
elicits relevant information on risks from those identified as holding local knowledge.  
 
Chapter Four offers a discussion of current regulation and risk assessment within New 
Zealand. Firstly, a brief outline of the regulatory and risk assessment framework 
within New Zealand is given. The ability of this framework to incorporate local 
knowledge and to account for social implications of animal biopharming is analysed.    
 
In Chapter Five the drivers and motivations pushing the development of biopharming 
within New Zealand are discussed, particularly in terms of how they affect future 
applications of animal biopharming. The processes of animal biopharming production 
will also be discussed and explored, as well as a discussion of the known risks of 
animal biopharming and the likely controls that will be placed on its commercial use. 
This discussion will highlight the social practices animal biopharming may affect or 
be affected by, and hence, suggest relevant holders of local knowledge in these areas.  
 9 
 
Chapter Six explores the findings of interviews with dairy farmers, identified as 
holders of relevant local knowledge, and relates these to the risks and social 
implications of animal biopharming in New Zealand. More generally the approach of 
risk assessment in New Zealand will be discussed in light of the general themes of the 
interview findings.  
 
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis with a discussion of the findings in relation to the 
risks and implications of animal biopharming in New Zealand, and the approach to 
risk assessment in New Zealand generally. Limitations of this thesis are discussed, 
and opportunities for further research are identified. 
 
Conclusion 
Finally, it should be noted that the purpose of this thesis is not to conduct a complete 
and accurate risk assessment of animal biopharming, but to pilot a new method for 
such a process. Thus, the number of interviews is too small to be considered adequate 
for risk assessment; however the interviews produced enough to show the value of 
this type of risk assessment, and gave results worthy of further investigation in 
themselves.  
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Chapter 2: Review of Relevant Literature 
There is no single, unified definition of ‘local knowledge’. The fact that the term local 
knowledge shares many of the characteristics of, and is often used interchangeably 
with other terms such as ‘traditional knowledge’ (Berkes, Colding & Folke 2000), 
‘indigenous knowledge’, ‘experiential knowledge’ (Caron-Flinterman, Broerse & 
Bunders 2005) and ‘situated knowledge’ (Lave 1993; Nygren 1999) should 
adequately indicate its vague nature within the literature (Antweiler 2004; Agrawal 
1995)5. However, despite the lack of a unified definition, general themes throughout 
the literature point towards a working concept of local knowledge. Although the other 
terms utilised in the literature in many ways share these themes, the term local 
knowledge has been chosen for the current thesis as it is considered broad enough to 
include many of the more specific qualities shared by these terms.  
 
The study of local knowledge has most often occurred within the context of the study 
of public understanding of science, decisions over complex technologies, hazardous 
materials and risk assessment, as well as the importance of public participation in 
sustainable development. It has also been used in discussions of participation in 
environmental management involving biodiversity, and can be identified in the 
literature of popular epidemiology. The issue of public participation is linked to the 
study of local knowledge because the involvement of the public in decision-making is 
contingent upon understandings of what knowledge is relevant to a decision. 
Participation is granted based on what knowledge is perceived as ‘legitimate’ 
knowledge, and who holds this knowledge (Irwin 1995, p.81). The question arises, 
what knowledge do lay members of the public hold, if any, relevant to decisions over 
science and technology? (Fischer 2000, p.10; Caron-Flinterman, Broerse & Bunders 
2005).The study of what knowledge is held by individuals and communities outside 
the sphere of formal expertise and policy decision making is an avenue to 
understanding how the public can participate, and perhaps why they have often been 
excluded. Discussion of local knowledge is in this way connected to discussion of 
public participation in complex decision making (Irwin 1995).   
 
                                                 
5
 Other terms used for local knowledge include civic, citizen, lay, and public knowledges, civic 
expertise, lay expertise, everyday knowledge, and community knowledge (Antweiler 2004). 
 11 
This chapter will review the literature on local knowledge in relation to risk 
assessment and public participation in decisions about technology. It will firstly offer 
a description of the general themes that define local knowledge. A discussion of the 
public understanding of science and the deficit model in relation to the development 
of local knowledge will then be provided. Following this, an analysis of popular 
epidemiology will be offered, concluding with a discussion of the rise of normative 
participation in science and technology. Finally, this thesis will frame local 
knowledge in terms of how it can practically contribute to risk assessment.  
 
First signs of local knowledge 
The first signs of a local knowledge theory arrived at a time when decisions over 
complex technologies were beginning to be made (Fischer 2000, p.6). In the wake of 
the development of large-scale industrial societies, some theorists began to study the 
role the public played in decisions which involved increasingly complex technical 
problems (Irwin 1995, p.10). Dewey (1927) noted that the majority of the public had 
no understanding of how everyday objects that they were using actually operated in 
terms of their technical design. As a result decisions over complex technologies were 
not open to the general public. This, concluded Dewey (1927), was a significant 
problem facing public participation and democracy in general, particularly as lack of 
participation left citizens open to political manipulation and susceptible to populist 
politics such as fascism. In order to resolve this, Dewey proposed that the role of the 
public and experts be separated. Experts would identify the social issues and citizens 
would politically pursue the needs and problems. The two processes would combine 
through debate, in which experts would not participate in any normative judgement 
but act as interpreters and analysers (Dewey 1927). 
 
Although Dewey’s theory arrives at a conclusion that legitimates experts’ superiority 
in assessing complex decisions, a conclusion many local knowledge writers now seek 
to dismiss, his book did highlight the two common questions in the local knowledge 
literature: how can the public participate in complex decisions? And, why does the 
public not participate?  
 
These questions lead to an inevitable discussion of what the nature of local knowledge 
is and, in turn, how this can make a meaningful contribution to complex decisions. As 
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stated at the beginning of this chapter, local knowledge in itself is an ambiguous term 
and different theorists have emphasised different parts of its nature (Antweiler 1998; 
Antweiler 2004; Agrawal 1995). The next part of this literature review will discuss 
the themes associated with the concept of local knowledge, after which an exploration 
and critique of current methods of public participation will be explored in the context 
of local knowledge literature.  
 
General themes of Local knowledge 
Lindblom and Cohen’s 1979 book Usable Knowledge (Lindblom & Cohen 1979) 
offers a useful beginning point for a description of local knowledge. The authors were 
interested in how professional social inquiry was performed and why such inquiry, in 
their opinion, often produced predictable and poor results. Professional social 
inquirers are the equivalent of policy makers or what is termed ‘experts’ today; they 
would study and attempt to solve seemingly ‘complex’ social issues. The perception 
professional social inquirers had of the nature of work they performed and knowledge 
they held was considered the reason for their failures. The authors believed that 
professional social inquirers considered themselves the only qualified group to solve 
social problems. They greatly overestimated the speciality of the information and 
analysis they used in problem-solving. Cohen and Lindblom argued professional 
inquiry by experts was only one of several avenues to problem-solving. Using what 
they identified as ‘ordinary knowledge’ was another useful tool in solving social 
problems. 
 
 ‘Ordinary knowledge’, as described by Lindblom, is knowledge that owes its origin 
to “common sense, casual empiricism, thoughtful speculation and analysis” 
(Lindblom & Cohen 1979, p.12) and is knowledge not exclusively held by experts. It 
is described as what we all know through everyday observation. Thus, ordinary 
knowledge is equivalent to common knowledge.  
 
As this knowledge is based on everyday observation, experience becomes an essential 
component to its development, a characteristic vital to descriptions of local 
knowledge. Lindbolm and Cohen argued that as ordinary knowledge is accessible to 
everyone, professionals waste a lot of time studying what is already known. If this 
type of knowledge were incorporated into problem-solving, professionals would be 
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free to focus on more complex areas of the problem and would use their resources and 
time more effectively. However, whilst some claim that local knowledge is more 
commonly shared than scientific knowledge (Brush 1996), others have claimed that 
local knowledge is more specialised than the concept of ordinary knowledge allows 
for (Breyman 1993). 
 
Local Knowledge: More specific than common 
Breyman (1993) suggests that local knowledge is similar to ordinary knowledge, yet 
site-specific (Breyman 1993, p.131).  Like ordinary knowledge, local knowledge is 
often developed through everyday observation and analysis, however it is not 
universally held throughout society. As Antweiler (2004) suggests, local knowledge is 
a product of universal human capability, but is situated within a specific contextual 
environment. It is knowledge that is relevant to particular experiences, often, but not 
exclusively, related to a particular locality. Local knowledge is thus often not 
“common” knowledge.   
 
Interaction within an environment 
Another important theme within the literature of local knowledge is interaction within 
a particular environment. Gladwin (1989) suggests that farmers develop adaptive 
skills through years of experience and cultural tradition that “have coevolved with 
local environments” (Fischer 2000, p.201). Van der Ploeg (1993) describes the local 
knowledge of Andean potato farmers. In selecting seeds, the farmers study the 
immediate environmental conditions such as climate and land considerations, whereas 
scientists work from an idea of an ideal seed (Fischer, 2000, p.204) and test this in 
standardized conditions. 
 
 Schmidt’s (1993) description of the experiential knowledge acquired by workers 
filling a reservoir on the Tenton River, Idaho, in the US illustrates a number of 
aspects of the importance of the knowledge acquired through interaction with the 
environment. This work led to the collapse of a dam and the killing of eleven people 
(Schmidt 1993, p.525) largely because, Schmidt suggests, experts made safety 
decisions whilst ignoring the experiential knowledge of the grouters.  The workers 
would grout holes; however as grouting was not an exact science, many of the 
workers’ decisions were based on experience and intimate interaction with the 
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environment. As Schmidt suggests “the art of grouting appears to require continuous 
attention to a host of subtle qualities” (Schmidt 1993, p.526), and these qualities 
cannot be analysed outside of the context upon which they are occurring. The 
knowledge of how to adequately grout holes is built upon over time, as each hole will 
contain different variables that will affect how the mix of grout should be applied. 
This knowledge is what Schmidt describes as a ‘feel for the hole’. As Schmidt (1993) 
suggests a tacit development of this knowledge through ‘strategies’ designed to deal 
with the environment over time, it can be argued that the knowledge is not fully 
conscious or easily describable. In this sense, Schmidt illustrates that local knowledge 
is not measurable nor easily “subjected to rules or standards”(p.526).  
 
Schmidt also describes the fragmented nature of knowledge which, if put together, 
can form more of a complete understanding of a matter. For example, grouters knew 
about the holes, whereas engineers working on the base of the dam held knowledge of 
the irregular surface of the rock they were working in. Thus, within one project there 
are different areas of knowledge and expertise that must be considered. Schmidt 
describes this collective knowledge as a ‘feel for the whole’.  
 
A third form of knowledge is passive/critical knowledge which workers held. Thus, 
workers were able to question why work on the dam stopped early, assuming it was 
because pressure at the top of the dam was lesser than at the bottom, and thus they had 
reached a level at which it was safe to stop. Unfortunately, the real reason for 
stopping was budget constraints; pressure at the top of dam was not taken into 
consideration. As a result the dam collapsed and lives were lost. Therefore, through an 
intimate interaction with their given environment each worker held knowledge that 
was useful to the overall safety of the project. Schimdt suggests by combining this 
knowledge, disasters may potentially be avoided.   
  
Wynne's (1996; 1992(a); 1992(b)) study of hill sheep-farmers of the Lake District of 
northern England who were confronted with contamination from the 1986 Chernobyl 
accident is another example of how experiential, environmental and contextual 
knowledge is important and different from purely technical approaches. Wynne 
illustrates how the farmers held important knowledge regarding their environment, 
social processes under which they operate and the ability for scientific testing to adapt 
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to these factors. For example, farmers were asked by scientists to test a product that 
aimed to help avoid recontamination of animals from grazing. In order to test the 
product, sheep were required to be fenced in on “contained fell-side plots” (Wynne 
1996, p.26). Some farmers suggested that because the sheep were used to roaming 
over open tracts of fell land, fencing them in would invalidate the experiment by 
tending to make the animals lose condition. Initially, this concern was ignored by the 
experts; however the experiment was later abandoned for the exact problem the 
farmers had identified (Wynne 1996, p.26).  
 
Beyond physical experience 
 The above examples are based around experience within a physical location, and 
often agricultural climates are used as a main case study for local knowledge (Wynne 
1996; Ploeg 1993; Hess 1997; Neufeld & Cinnamon 2004). However, as noted earlier, 
local knowledge does not necessarily relate exclusively to a physical location. An 
important aspect already identified is experience in the development of this 
knowledge. Thus, local knowledge can equally apply to experience in given situations 
and practices rather than locations (Antweiler 2004; Lave 1993; Nygren 1999). This is 
often called situated knowledge, but has its base in experiential and contextual forms 
of knowing.  As Raffles (2002) suggests, the locality in local knowledge is formed 
through the sharing of ideas and relational practices, and is not exclusively formed 
from a physical location.  
 
Beyond communally and traditionally held knowledge 
It is important to note that because of the relational and situated nature of local 
knowledge, certain knowledge may not be shared universally within a community. 
Some have criticised the tendency for local knowledge to be romanticised as a 
commonly shared unique knowledge within an isolated community (Nygren 1999; 
Raffles 2002). This is particularly the case for anthropological accounts of indigenous 
or traditional knowledge (Nygren 1999). Nygren argues that many anthropological 
studies are concerned with traditional knowledge held within “intact cultures” 
(Nygren 1999, p.270), rather than the hybrid forms of knowledge developed in 
diverse societies. Accounts have illustrated that, within communities, knowledge is 
not held universally as some individuals are considered to have more expert 
information than others (Davis & Wagner 2003). 
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In her study of the local interpretations of expertise within the Isle of Man 
community, in relation to ionising radiation, McKenchnie suggests that locals within a 
community recognise that some hold more practical knowledge than others, given 
their day-to-day experience with the relevant issue. For example, fishermen were 
considered most knowledgeable in the effects of radiation on the fishing industry 
within their community (McKechnie 1996, p.134). This illustrates further that local 
knowledge is defined mostly by its contextual placement, not by its traditional 
homogeneity. Therefore, within communities different forms of knowledge can be 
identified.  
 
Adaptability 
Another important aspect of local knowledge is its adaptability. As it is based on 
experience coping with changing local conditions, the ability to adapt to 
environmental changes and uncertainty has often been stressed by local knowledge 
writers (Wynne 1996; Gladwin 1989; Antweiler 1998; Chambers 1981). Thus, unlike 
traditionally scientific forms of knowledge, which often work off standardized 
concepts, local knowledge is argued to be more accepting of complexity and variation 
in factors affecting decisions.  Wynne (1996) illustrates the adaptable nature of local 
knowledge compared to the standardized approach of scientific research and argues 
that whereas local members of the public are willing to utilise technical knowledge in 
their everyday lives, those using technical approaches were less receptive to local 
forms of knowledge. This is ironic given that local knowledge is sometimes 
associated with traditional and unreflexive forms of knowledge (Nygren 1999; Raffles 
2002), while modern science has been described as open and reflexive. The next 
section will discuss local knowledge within the context of the public understanding of 
science literature.  
 
Public Understanding of Science and the Deficit Model 
Local knowledge, although ill-defined, has been implicated in discussion of public 
trust and participation in matters of science and technology. Many scholars, and 
policy makers, have begun to call for more public participation in complex matters. 
Recently the science community has also sought to encourage public involvement in 
decision making (Stern, Fineberg & U.S National Research Council Committee on 
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Risk Characterization. 1996; The House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology 2000).  
 
This marks a change from the commonly held perception within the risk assessment 
agencies that decisions over science and technology should remain within the domain 
of experts. This development within the science literature is perhaps a reaction to 
revelations that science itself is not trusted or understood by the ‘public’. Debates 
over issues such as the BSE crisis in Britain during the 1990s, or genetic engineering 
world-wide, have illustrated the differences between the outcome of “expert” risk 
assessment and decision-making and the attitudes the public holds on such matters , as 
well as a widespread lack of trust in experts (Jasanoff 1997).  On the back of such 
negative responses, the science community and many social scientists began to 
question the reason for such an unexpected divide between the public perception of 
science and the perception science held of its own role in research and decision-
making (Irwin & Wynne 1996; Yearley 2005; Dierkes & Grote 2000). Although 
interdisciplinary, this focus has formed a literature which is known as the ‘public 
understanding of science’ (Sturgis & Allum 2004).    
 
The initial attitude from many within the science community was that the public 
generally did not understand complex scientific issues, and thus their ignorance leads 
to negative responses (Irwin & Wynne 1996). Survey questionnaires and quizzes that 
have focussed on what the public know in relation to scientific truths are common 
within the study of public understanding of science, and seek to support the belief in 
public ignorance. For example the public knowledge of facts pertaining to 
biotechnology have been tested (Marlier 1992), as well more general understandings 
of science (Durant, Evans & Thomas 1989). These questionnaires generally conclude 
that there is a certain amount of ignorance within the public pertaining to basic 
scientific fact (Irwin & Michael 2003, p.22). In order to improve the relationship 
between science and the public it was therefore considered appropriate to educate the 
public on scientific and technical matters. For example, the British Royal Society 
report in 1985 asks and answers in the affirmative, “Would the world be a better, or 
even a different, place if the public understood more of the scope and the limitations, 
the findings and the methods of science?” (Great Britain. Royal Society Council. & 
Bodmer 1985 cited in 'Public Understanding of Science: The Royal Society Reports' 
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1986). The process of education in the views of the science community would 
dissipate public fears of risks associated with new technologies, and in turn instil 
confidence in scientific research.  
  
Wynne has described such an understanding of public mistrust and disagreement as a 
‘deficit model’ (Wynne 1992(b)). The main assumption of the deficit model is that 
attitudes toward science generally correspond with the level of knowledge held by the 
individual. The more an individual understands the basic tenets of scientific research 
the higher the level of acceptance will be. Taking this angle further it is suggested that 
in order to participate in decisions involving complex data, the public must hold a 
basic understanding of this data.  
 
Critiques of the Deficit Model 
Several writers have critiqued this approach to understanding public knowledge of 
science and the role of public participation (Irwin & Michael 2003; Irwin 1994; 
Wynne 1996; Irwin & Wynne 1996). Irwin and Michael (2003) argue that 
questionnaires designed to test public knowledge are fundamentally flawed. Several 
writers have argued that questionnaires are designed not to elicit local knowledge in 
order to improve scientific technique and understanding, but are designed to illustrate 
the lack of knowledge the public holds (Yearley 2005, p.119). The questionnaires 
upon which much of the research is based generally hold the participants’ grasp of 
scientific ‘facts’ as the ultimate measure of scientific knowledge, where several other 
answers from participants may illustrate knowledge that remains unmeasured. The 
assumption that formal scientific technique is the only avenue to meaningful 
information is therefore inherent in this approach, particularly as the questionnaires do 
not take account of whether someone disagrees with a commonly held scientific 
belief, or genuinely is unaware of what the belief is (Yearley 2005). Evan and 
Durant’s (1995) research suggests that citizens with a good grasp of scientific 
knowledge are often more sceptical of some scientific claims in relation to morally 
controversial research (Evans & Durant 1995 cited in Sturgis & Allum 2004, p.59). 
This point as been supported by Eurobarometer surveys that suggest some regions that 
are more knowledgeable about GMOs are less supportive of its implementation than 
those with less knowledge. For example Northern Europe generally holds more 
knowledge than Southern Europe about GMOs but tends to be more outspoken in 
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opposition (International Research Associates (INRA). 2000 cited in Hallman 2000). 
Thus, the premise that more scientific knowledge will translate into better acceptance 
is contradicted by these findings.  
 
 Sturgis and Allum (2004) criticise the deficit model because it values only one form 
of knowledge that lay people may hold. Although the authors agree with the 
assumption that attitudes are linked to knowledge, testing the public’s scientific 
knowledge ignores the complex and interactional knowledge held by individuals, and 
how this knowledge also interacts with the attitudes of the public. Thus, as science is 
embedded within social and political frameworks, the publics’ understanding of 
policy and social structures surrounding science will affect attitudes. The authors then 
illustrate how surveys can test and encompass both contextual knowledge and 
traditionally scientific knowledge.  
 
Likewise Wynne argues that the extent of scientific ‘textbook’ knowledge is but one 
area that influences the public’s attitudes. Wynne suggests that three elements of 
public understanding are needed in order to understand the connection between 
knowledge and attitudes. These are, “formal contents of scientific knowledge; the 
methods and processes of science; and its forms of institutional embedding, 
patronage, organization and control.” (Wynne 1992(b) cited in Sturgis & Allum 2004, 
p.58). Therefore, the public uses scientific knowledge in the context of other factors, 
including other forms of knowledge which will also affect their attitude towards 
traditional scientific knowledge.  
 
Criticism of the deficit model marks a difference from the perception that the public 
must change; rather it suggests that the scientific approach should adapt to the 
contextual situation in which knowledge is applied. In this way, social scientists seek 
to understand why the public does not trust experts from a different angle than the 
deficit model.  
 
Irwin’s Citizen Science (1995) argues that science acts improperly as a device for 
legitimating political values, rather than a tool for empowering the citizen. 
Legitimatisation of certain policies is built by using ‘expert’ opinion as endorsement. 
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Irwin suggests that science therefore does not seek to help citizens but is used by 
policy makers to gain political leverage. This leads to a cynical outlook from citizens.   
 
However, more importantly for the current thesis, several social scientists have 
suggested the reason for the poor relations between the public and science is that 
science does not recognise that the public holds any relevant knowledge about 
technological matters (Wynne 1996). This argument is often offered as a critique to 
the deficit model, similar to Wynne (1992) illustrated above. Sturgis and Allum 
(2004) call such arguments the ‘contextualist approach’. Irwin and Wynne offer a 
series of case studies addressing this issue (1996). 
 
Several writers have connected the lack of trust in experts in relation to how experts 
recognise local knowledge (Jasanoff 1997), or can adapt their own knowledge into the 
frame of local knowledge and local context (Neufeld & Cinnamon 2004; Ozonoff & 
Boden 1987; Fischer 2000). Fischer (2000) suggests citizens turn to their own 
“cultural rationality” when they do not trust experts. “Cultural rationality” is 
concerned with the importance of personal experiences in assessing risk. Unlike 
questionnaires in which knowledge is assessed outside of any context (Yearley 2005), 
cultural rationality is used to assess scientific claims within one’s experiential context. 
Thus, “cultural rationality” is employed to assess expert claims. In this way, 
arguments about “cultural rationality” and local knowledge are often based on the 
common observation that citizens lack trust in experts and that trust can be increased 
through the recognition of local knowledge in technical decision making.  
 
The important division, however, lies in the question of whether the lack of trust itself 
is seen as the problem, or a lack of trustworthiness on the part of experts is the 
problem. If the lack of trust is regarded as problematic, then therapeutic solutions that 
focus on building better public representation may be called for. If it is the 
trustworthiness of the experts that is viewed as the problem, a greater scrutiny of the 
usefulness of expert knowledge and its influence over policy making will be called 
for.  
 
Normative participation in scientific matters 
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Although the focus on educating the public remains within science-based literature, 
there has also been a movement toward encouraging the public to participate in 
normative assessments of scientific decisions, perhaps as a response to the high level 
of criticism the deficit model has attracted. Many councils and government bodies 
have been set up to allow an avenue for public opinions and values to be heard in 
relation to technological decisions. For example, in New Zealand The Bioethics 
Council was formed in 2002 as a Ministerial Advisory Committee, following “a 
recommendation by the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, to meet public 
concern that decision-making was not adequately addressing the ethical, cultural and 
spiritual dimensions of genetic modification and biotechnology” (The Bioethics 
Council (b)). The Bioethics council holds public ‘conversations’ about issues 
surrounding biotechnology whilst also making recommendations to the government 
based upon public discussion over such matters. 
 
 A recent example of such conversation is the dialogue surrounding 
xenotransplantation, the transplantation of living cells or organs from one species to 
another. Forums were open to the public in the major cities, and a dialogue over the 
internet was set up for people to participate. Other governments around the world 
have similarly begun to encourage public involvement in decisions over the normative 
aspects of a technology. A report in March by the 2000 House of Lords Select 
Committee on Science and Technology (CST) in England suggested that development 
of mistrust has occurred because decisions are only discussed in terms of technical 
matters, and thus serious social, cultural and economic implications are ignored 
(House of Lords Select Committee 2000). Therefore, the report recommended more 
openness to public involvement in normative areas of technology policy. Wilma Aarts 
describes the Dutch public debate on the genetic modification of animals, and 
attempts to include the public through a “consensus conference”, in which “lay people 
have a central role in the discussion and the assessment of a technology. (Aarts 
1999)”. It has been documented that similar conferences have been held in twelve 
other countries6, including New Zealand, the majority dealing with decisions over 
gene technologies (Goven 2003)7.  
                                                 
6
 The Loka Institute documents that these countries have held consensus conferences: Argentina, 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South 
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Such developments in public involvement in technology mostly occurred in response 
to criticisms of the representation of scientific decisions as value-free. In fact, many 
studies have shown that ‘scientific’ decisions are neither value-free, nor devoid of 
social implications. Examples within the literature show evidence that suggests 
scientific findings have been misrepresented or suppressed in the favour of some 
interest groups (Stern, Fineberg & U.S National Research Council Committee on Risk 
Characterization. 1996). Rosner and Markowitz (Rosner & Markowitz 1985) explore 
the case of lead poisoning from gasoline that can be traced to the period of the 1920s 
in the United States, but only became widely controversial in the 1970s. According to 
the authors, evidence linking health problems to the gasoline product was often not 
publicised due to corporate pressure. After such findings show the falsity of value-
free claims, it is no surprise writers suggest that there is a mistrust issue (Stern, 
Fineberg & U.S National Research Council Committee on Risk Characterization. 
1996). As the decisions also have social effects, it is thought that the public should 
have input into whether such effects will be positive in relation to their own values 
and opinions.  
 
Meanwhile, several governments appear to have begun to interpret negative public 
reception of science-related decisions as due to public relations problems rather than 
any public ‘deficit’.  Science and government policy makers now generally recognise 
the importance of understanding public attitudes in order evaluate risk, as illustrated 
by the number of opinion polls that are now conducted (Weale 2002). It is perhaps for 
this reason a large number of studies on public attitudes to new technology and what 
affects these attitudes, particularly in relation to genetically modified organisms, can 
be identified in New Zealand (Coyle & Lincoln University (Lincoln N.Z.). 
Agribusiness and Economics Research Unit. 2003; Hunt et al. 2003). 
 
Practical participation, beyond normative participation  
 Unfortunately, the ability to contribute normatively often limits or overshadows the 
chance of alternate forms of expertise, outside the sphere of science, to be recognised 
                                                                                                                                            
Korea, Switzerland, Britain, and the US (http://www.loka.org/pages/worldpanels.htm cited in Goven 
2003). 
 
7
 On consensus conferences, see Andersen, I.E. and Jaeger, B. (1999).  
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in public participation (Levidow and Carr 1997).  As writers who address local 
knowledge have argued, the sphere of value claims is only one area in which the 
public can participate: they can also contribute practically to decision making. 
However, the public is often, intentionally or not, marginalised within the arena of 
normative participation, which implicitly suggests that the science community has 
reached a level of certainty at a technical level, and therefore, needs no contestation8.  
 
A represented dichotomy between scientists and the public, scientists being equated 
with ‘expertise’ and public with ‘values’ is apparent within efforts to increase public 
participation. For example, Goven (2003) notes that at a New Zealand consensus 
conference a theoretical biologist nominated by Greenpeace to speak, and who voiced 
concerns over plant biotechnology for reasons beyond the purely technical,  was 
identified as “nominated by Greenpeace”, whereas other scientists had their 
nominators unidentified. In later discussions panellists “recall him as a “greenie,” 
rather than a scientist.” (p.439). It can be assumed that the inversion of the assumption 
by panellists, that scientists hold their expertise only in the technical arena, is that the 
public should restrict their views to the arena of values.   
 
It is also important to note that some writers have identified that the new-found focus 
on public opinion and values is in line with the commercial concerns of the 
technological sector, which wishes to gauge the commercial viability of new 
technologies, essentially limiting public participation to that of a consumer (Davison, 
Barns & Schibeci 1997). Therefore, although attitudinal studies may allow 
participation for the public in terms of expressing values, there is still a lack of 
genuine recognition of local knowledge as something that could practically benefit 
analysis of problems and risk assessment.  
 
This distinction highlights the difference between normative, substantive and 
instrumental arguments for participation discussed by Fiorino, which illustrate the 
literature discussed so far (Fiorino 1990). In his discussion of citizen participation in 
                                                 
8
 The House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology 2000 does recognise this point, 
“The Institute of Science in Society suggests another, less obvious danger: that, if the divide between 
expert and lay members is too clean, ‘that implicitly assumes that the science has been established 
beyond any doubt, so that all that remains to be discussed are the ethical, environmental and other such 
issues’" (The House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology 2000, p. 330). However, 
focus does remain mainly on a normative argument for participation rather than an instrumental one.  
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environmental risk assessment, Fiorino suggests that participation is normatively 
important for the development of democracy, but he also recognises instrumental and 
substantive arguments. The instrumental argument is that allowing participation will 
decrease conflict and increase trust in experts. The substantive argument posits that 
useful knowledge exists outside of purely scientific circles. Therefore by using local 
knowledge better decisions can be made by risk assessors, both substantively and 
normatively.  
 
Popular Epidemiology  
Several strands of literature have demonstrated that the public can contribute to 
practical solving of problems in a variety of ways. The literature on popular 
epidemiology is one area which offers good examples. Coined by Brown after his 
study on Woburn, Massachusetts, popular epidemiology can be defined “as the 
process by which laypersons gather statistics and other information and also direct 
and marshal the knowledge and resources of experts in order understand the 
epidemiology of disease”(Brown 1987, p.78).  This has been mostly discussed in 
relation to public participation in issues surrounding toxic waste. The literature 
explores the difference between local and expert ways of knowing and the contrasts 
between the definitions of problems, the perceived significance of statistical findings 
and the implications for policy (Shavelson 1988 cited in  Brown & Mikkelsen 1997; 
Brown 1992; Ozonoff & Boden 1987).  
 
For example, Brown describes the process by which members of the small community 
of Woburn, Massachusetts (USA) identified and fought for scientific recognition of a 
cluster of leukaemia and health problems linked to the contamination of the water 
supply by two factories in the district. As the community was relatively small, 
traditional scientific procedures did not recognise local discovery of common ailments 
as statistically significant and therefore the risk of the factories’ toxic waste was not 
recognised in policy. Ozonoff and Boden (1987) illustrate the difference between 
statistical significance and public health significance, where a cluster that may be of 
little statistical significance due to the small number of people within the supposedly 
contaminated zone is however of a high public health significance to those within the 
zone. Therefore, popular epidemiology not only illustrates how local knowledge can 
recognise risks within a community, but also that current risk evaluation procedures 
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are not designed to acknowledge the contribution of local knowledge – or identify all 
significant health risks. This can be because of the view that science is the ultimate 
judge of risk and the public is emotionally biased (Brown 1992; Brown & Mikkelsen 
1997), types of statistical methods adopted (Ozonoff & Boden 1987), or the different  
priorities of community members compared to those in positions of economic and 
political power (Nash & Kirsch 1986; Ozonoff & Boden 1987). 
 
The identification of a cluster begins through techniques that fall in line with the 
earlier description of local knowledge. Casual observation deriving from a particular 
context and experiences (Brown & Mikkelsen 1997) identify issues that scientific 
approaches were not designed to be able to pick up. For example, Brown illustrates 
the beginning stages of identification in the Woburn, Massachusetts leukaemia 
cluster. 
 
Anne Anderson, whose son, Jimmy, had been diagnosed with acute lymphatic leukaemia in 
1972, had gathered information about other cases by word of mouth and by chance meetings 
with other victims at stores and at the hospital where Jimmy was being treated. (Brown 1987, p. 
79). 
 
Locals also had identified a strange smell and taste in their water supply; this would 
later be linked to what became identified as a disease cluster. Thus, individuals who 
held experience in everyday dealing with disease and the local factories held valuable 
knowledge, and expertise, on the causes of the cluster that could not possibly have 
been identified through traditional scientific statistical methods.  
 
Other case studies on popular epidemiology support Brown’s findings (Brown & 
Mikkelsen 1997). Nash and Kirsch (1986) describe the identification of occupational 
health problems in a General Electric Plant and environmental degradation caused by 
the plant located in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, USA. Members of the community, such 
as fisherman, recognised a problem whilst observing the large amount of dead fish 
and missing small animals. Nash and Kirsch call for recognition of community 
research in risk assessment of toxic waste.   
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Others have addressed the case study of Love Canal (Ozonoff & Boden 1987; Levine 
1982) in which locals noticed various phenomena including unusual numbers of 
miscarriages. The New York Department of Health investigated claims by locals that 
miscarriages were unusually common in areas surrounding Love Canal, however they 
only studied miscarriages verified by hospital or physicians in Love Canal, whereas 
their research of the comparison group addressed all miscarriages (Ozonoff & Boden 
1987, p.70). The results of the study were therefore statistically inaccurate. This 
illustrates both the inability of expert methods to incorporate local knowledge and 
experience, and also the uncertainty and potential for human error in traditional 
scientific methods.  
 
Popular epidemiology examples illustrate that lay members of the public can 
contribute practically to scientific knowledge and understanding, and to the 
assessment of risk. As illustrated, popular epidemiology efforts have exposed a range 
of dangers; according to Brown, these include “DES [diethylstilbestrol], Agent 
Orange, asbestos, pesticides, unnecessary hysterectomies, abuse of sterilization, black 
lung disease, and brown lung disease (Brown & Mikkelsen 1997,p.133)”. Popular 
epidemiology has also illustrated the limitation of some scientific epidemiology 
procedures. However, popular epidemiology highlights cases where popular 
knowledge must be translated into scientific knowledge before it can become part of a 
policy or assessment process. Although initial identification of clusters occurs through 
casual observation and experience linked to local knowledge, the language of 
participation still remains that of the expert, for example, pertaining to methods of 
recognising statistical significance (Brown & Mikkelsen 1997; Lagakos, Wessen & 
Zelen 1986). Indeed, the community typically is listened to only when so-called 
“counter experts” take up the community’s cause. Thus, the public only gains 
recognition when they are able to appropriate recognised scientific forms. This 
illustrates the reliance on experts for participation discussed by others in literature 
regarding the concept of a risk society (Giddens 1990; Beck 1992). Moreover, the 
assessment of the risk occurs after a technology has been released into the 
community, in which case the damage has often already occurred. The literature lacks 
a discussion of how local knowledge can contribute to prediction of future risk, before 
a technology has been implemented. Such participation requires an active role for the 
 27 
researcher in order to identify who holds relevant local knowledge before the 
technology has been imbedded within a community.  
 
Local knowledge and risk assessment  
Risk assessment has its roots in epidemiology (Slovic 1999, p.44). Popular 
epidemiology illustrates that local knowledge and observation is useful in detecting 
clusters of disease and illness.  Much of the literature on local knowledge suggests 
that it can be useful in the recognition of other risks as well, including social, 
environmental and economic risks. It can also point out the limitations of traditional 
risk assessment and areas that need improvement (Wynne 1996; Krimsky & Plough 
1988). Therefore, a number of scholars have attempted to illustrate how local 
knowledge can complement risk assessment, essentially because risk assessment 
involves assumptions about how social networks operate.  
 
In Citizen Science: A Study of People, Expertise and Sustainable Development Alan 
Irwin suggests that the idea of social knowledge contributing to technical 
understanding of risk assessment is often resisted by the science community, as it 
breaks the rule of having science separated from societal activities (Irwin 1995). It is 
on this premise of separation that modernity as a social structure and scientific 
advance has been built. Likewise Bradbury suggests, “[b]y virtue of their frames of 
reference, technical managers are predisposed to adopt technical approaches to risk 
management. (1989, p.388)”. Hays (1987) suggests that complexity of issues mean 
that scientists now generally study in one field (Hays 1987, p.343), becoming 
emotionally invested in their field, and hence motivated to see that it is recognised as 
the informative source on a matter. The need to have the ‘right’ answer has politicised 
science into a competitive market of ideas. This has encouraged limited, not open, 
world views, in which the incorporation of various types of knowledge is discouraged. 
Thus technical managers are able to develop technology away from any thought of its 
social implications.  
 
However, the understanding of science as socially unbiased is inherently flawed. 
Science-based risk assessment involves assumptions about the nature of the social 
world and value choices (Yearley 2005; Irwin & Wynne 1996). This is evident in the 
process of identification and estimation of risk on one hand and evaluation on the 
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other, when the separation of such tasks is impossible (Bradbury 1989, 381; Wynne 
1980). The process of identification involves an inherent evaluation of a subject. By 
estimating and identifying a subject, one is also categorising its nature and therefore 
already making a social or value-laden decision. That is, in order to determine what 
constitutes risk, one must assume that what is threatened by that risk is of value. 
Therefore both identification and quantification of risk have in-built normative 
principles.  
 
 Wynne (Wynne 1988) also suggests that it is social practices that define the rules of 
how a technology is used; therefore, it is not the technology itself which defines its 
use. Criticism is levied at risk assessment processes which ignore the social dynamics 
within which a new technology will operate. Haraway (1991) argues that one’s 
position is fundamental to the development of knowledge. Therefore, whereas early 
works have stressed the importance of a technical understanding of science, in which 
its values and assumptions are tacitly accepted, new writers have stressed the 
importance of a social understanding of science (Irwin & Wynne 1996). That means 
an understanding in which the implications of a technology are understood in context 
of the public or ‘lay persons’ everyday life. Therefore, local knowledge literature 
suggests that knowledge is situational in nature. If this is the case, the idea of science 
as an ultimate and purely technical judge on complex matters is challenged. 
 
 Several case studies have supported this point. For example, during the BSE crisis, 
recommendations of how to remove potentially contaminated cow body parts 
illustrate the expert lack of knowledge about processes in and assumptions about the 
social workings of slaughter houses, which consequently made recommended 
procedures impossible to follow (Yearley 2000,106; Jasanoff 1997). Wynne (1996) 
has argued that as scientific inquiry makes social assumptions, local knowledge is 
more helpful than scientific expertise in some areas. In this way, local knowledge is a 
valuable source of information, and a way to avoid flawed social assumptions within 
risk assessment and regulation. In order to recognise local knowledge within risk 
assessment, a general change in how risk is defined is needed. Risk is not only a 
technical matter, but is contingent upon social processes.  
 
Risk Conceptualisation 
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The characterisation of what risk entails is important in decisions of who will be 
involved in risk assessment (Stern, Fineberg & U.S National Research Council  
Committee on Risk Characterization. 1996). Therefore, characterization, or definition, 
of risk should occur before an analysis of risk occurs. Although this seems rather 
intuitive, it has been illustrated that risk analysis often occurs before any 
consideration of what the character of the risk is. Although the character of risk is 
always decided upon before risk analysis, it is rarely acknowledged that the decision 
has occurred. This is illustrated by the fact that risk assessment and risk management 
are sometimes separated within the literature. Risk assessment is suggested to be 
scientifically and objectively based, whereas ‘risk management’ weighs risk against 
other issues in order to make decisions about risk control (Levin & Strauss 1991), 
leaving more room for societal and value based considerations (Busch et al. 2004). 
Under this distinction, societal concerns are only included after the risks have been 
identified by experts. Therefore, risk analysis implicitly relies on assumptions from 
experts about who is likely to be affected by a new technology, and also how they will 
be affected. Such assumptions lead to faulty recommendations as stated above. The 
separation of risk assessment and risk management also leads to misleading 
representations of the certainty of risk assessment (Busch et al. 2004; Silbergeld 
1991).  
 
Judith A. Bradbury (1989) identifies two types of risk conceptualisation that reflect 
the criticisms of current risk assessment, 1) risk as a physical problem caused by 
hazardous technologies and 2) risk as a socially constructed attribute.  Likewise, 
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1985) identify two dimensions in social problems, factual and 
valuative dimensions, or as they term them, systems uncertainty and decision stakes. 
The systems uncertainty stake measures how much factual information is known 
about issues surrounding the decision. Decision stakes measure the level of 
consequence that is associated with a decision. These consequences relate to valuative 
issues, such as the level of controversy a decision will attract. Both factors, systems 
uncertainty and decision stakes, can be assigned a low, medium or high level. If both 
dimensions are low then it is likely that a technical approach is acceptable. The 
decision will not be controversial to society and there will be a high level of 
information obtained to counter disagreements within the science community. 
However, if both dimensions are high then a purely technical approach will be 
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inappropriate. That is when the information is not well documented and the social 
implications are likely to be high. The authors suggest the role of the public should be 
to act as an extended peer community in which technical decisions are critiqued in 
these situations.9   
 
 Yearley (2000) critiques this model because it assumes that the stakes of a decision 
can be easily agreed upon. Various studies have shown that perception of a decision’s 
importance is often contested (Slovic 1999; Bradbury 1989). This is supported by 
Irwin, who argues that the “literature on risk assessment suggests perceptions of risk 
and hazard may serve as a focus for a whole array of doubts and uncertainties about 
the direction of social change” (1995, p. 40).  This is illustrated for the inverse 
situation in research by Slovic (1999) that suggests people view x-ray technology as 
low risk because they trust the processes used to contain the risk. Therefore, risk 
assessment is also linked to public perception and trust in science and risk 
management.  
 
 Krimsky and Plough (1988) contrast the concept of technical rationality with the idea 
of “cultural rationality” in risk assessment. Technical rationality focuses on traditional 
scientific method, that is, expert judgement and empirical evidence to assess risk. 
“Cultural rationality” is concerned with the importance of personal experiences in 
assessing risk. Concerns are not only technical and empirical in nature, but assess the 
circumstances under which the technology will be implemented. “Cultural rationality” 
therefore places the social impact and implications of a new technology within the 
sphere of risk (Brown & Mikkelsen 1997, p.178). Therefore, risk is based upon one’s 
own rationality, in which case risk is essentially contested by different rationalities. 
Risk assessment that entails conceptions of both social and technical areas of risk is 
therefore important.  
 
 Bradbury (1989) suggests a cultural approach to risk assessment. The cultural 
approach allows for the use of social knowledge for critical as well as for instrumental 
purposes. Social knowledge can help facilitate creative solutions to policy problems, 
                                                 
9
 Some have critiqued the presumption of a single scale uncertainty measure, particularly as there are 
various forms of not knowing ignored in such an approach (Jasanoff, S. & Wynne, B. 1998,  cited in 
(Yearley, 2000  p.108).  
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as well as fulfilling the critical purpose of contributing to defining of the policy 
problem itself. This approach offers a critique of traditional forms of policy making 
and risk analysis, which is based upon the conception of risk as being solved through 
purely factual considerations. Therefore, like Irwin in Citizen Science (1995), 
Bradbury suggests that better policy is not only created through an improvement in 
technical process, but through an acknowledgement of risk as a social and value-laden 
entity, and by developing a framework for meaningful dialogue between holders of 
different values and knowledge on risk. Thus, discussion of risk is based upon the 
wider discussion of the role of science in society.  
 
Like the literature on popular epidemiology, studies of the role of local knowledge in 
risk assessment have mainly involved case studies that illustrate the failure to take 
local knowledge into account. A large part of this literature emphasises the problem in 
the light of public understanding of science and the effects this has on the public’s 
attitude toward the science community. Therefore, while the studies do illustrate the 
ability of local knowledge to help risk assessment practically, it is not the main focus 
of the literature. There is a lack of studies illustrating the use of local knowledge to 
assess the risk of a technology before it has been implemented or disseminated within 
society at a practical level. This study will involve identifying potential areas of social 
expertise perhaps even before the holders of such knowledge are aware of its 
usefulness.  
 
A Pragmatic approach to Local Knowledge  
It is important to note that not all local knowledge is helpful or useful to problem 
solving, or even to those who hold the knowledge (Less 2000; Hess 1997). Hess 
(1997) describes the local knowledge of some sheep farmers that actually harms sheep 
and produces poverty, whilst  the author also claims its inherent worth (Hess 1997 
cited in Less 2000). As stated earlier the tendency to romanticise local knowledge has 
been documented in the literature. Nygren (1999) argues that this mystification of 
local knowledge essentially excludes local knowledge from any rational contribution 
to decision making. Although local knowledge is viewed as an important avenue to 
freedom for indigenous people, it is also represented as incompatible with real science 
in its ‘ancient wisdom’ (Nygren 1999). This can exclude indigenous people from 
 32 
practical participation and also means that non-indigenous people with useful 
knowledge are often excluded from decision making (Nygren 1999). 
 
 Vayda, Walters and Setyawati (2004) suggest that local knowledge is exaggerated in 
the context of what it can do to improve economic development and environmental 
conservation. This mystification is caused partly by the methods taken to study local 
knowledge outside from any contextual situation. Local knowledge is often studied in 
isolation from any practical problem, particularly within the anthropological field 
(Vayda, Walters & Setyawati 2004, p. 39). Therefore, by studying the knowledge 
isolated from any contextual relationship the knowledge is simplified. The authors 
argue that local knowledge should be studied in relation to a specific event or actions, 
in terms of what actors know that can help develop better understanding of the action 
or event being studied. This method would demystify local knowledge as well as offer 
a practical contribution, without getting held back by the study of complex systems of 
knowledge within the whole of a given community or society. 
 
Conclusion 
The literature has described local knowledge as experiential, adaptable, situational 
and relational. Local knowledge is not exclusively held by a limited number of 
cultures; individuals and communities within society may hold unique information 
about their social and physical environments. The current thesis suggests that in order 
to better assess the risks of animal biopharming, it is vital to adopt and use local 
knowledge that has been acquired by individuals and communities through their 
experience and relationships within their own social environment, with which animal 
biopharming will interact.   
 
Therefore, the social risk of animal biopharming can take two forms. Firstly, there 
may be a risk of animal biopharming to valued social practices that may be influenced 
by its introduction. Secondly, and perhaps more relevant to this particular thesis, 
social practices may shape the nature of the risks posed by animal biopharming itself. 
It is difficult to make a measured decision about the risks of animal biopharming 
without understanding intimately how the technology and its regulation will fit within 
its social context. Local knowledge of how these social practices are performed 
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outside of the general theorization and abstractions of traditional risk assessment is 
vital.     
 
It is this latter approach to local knowledge that is adopted here. Unlike most of the 
literature, this thesis is less concerned with how local knowledge can influence the 
relationship between science and society, but more with how local knowledge can 
help make better decisions about technology. It is pragmatic in the sense that local 
knowledge is explored mostly in terms of whether and how it can be used to improve 
the risk assessment process, particularly in relation to animal biopharming in New 
Zealand10. Local knowledge in this sense can be of an instrumental value to 
identifying risks before they occur, rather than merely an indicator of the complexity 
of public attitudes towards science.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Several writers have illustrated the value of local knowledge in relation to the identity of individuals 
and communities (Wynne 1996; Irwin 1995) . In this sense a normative consideration of local 
knowledge should be, and has begun to be, included in decision making over complex decisions. Local 
knowledge in this context relates to traditionally held values, beliefs and practices. In terms of the 
discussion above, local knowledge in this sense can identify valued practices that may be put at risk by 
releasing a technology, but is not focused on identifying ways in which practices generate risk in 
relation to the technology. 
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Chapter 3: Methodological Approach 
In order to create a comprehensive risk assessment, it is important to understand how 
animal biopharming is likely to be implemented if commercial release is approved. A 
major argument of this thesis is that the risks of animal biopharming can not be 
considered until an understanding of how the technology is intended to be used, and 
then,  how it is likely to be used, is obtained. The approach of the thesis rests on the 
assumption that local knowledge can help identify where actual practice will differ 
from intended use.  
 
This chapter will give an account of the methodological approach taken here. It will 
firstly discuss some of the difficulties involved in including local knowledge within 
risk assessment prior to social implementation. A brief discussion of how this relates 
to current risk assessment within New Zealand will follow. Lastly, it will discuss the 
methods used here to identify and elicit useful local knowledge.   
 
Difficulties in eliciting local knowledge before the event  
Methods based upon the assumption of perfect compliance with ideal safety standards 
are inadequate for assessing the risk of biopharming for two reasons. First, best 
practice may not be practically viable for those involved in the processes of animal 
biopharming, and, second, some implications of animal biopharming may not be 
considered within the context of best practice. The risks of animal biopharming can be 
minimised only if the parameters of its ‘safe’ use are realistic in practice. Therefore, 
when the intention of developers is stated clearly, or can otherwise be extrapolated, 
the involvement of local expertise to identify risks and social implications can begin.  
 
A statement by a member of the community in a study conducted for the Ministry of 
Research and Science Technology reiterates this point, but also points to the 
difficulties of achieving a clear understanding of a technology’s use:  
 
“We now have an understanding of what they [CRI] want to do or how they are going to use it 
[GM] or the other reasons for its use. They don’t know– there is uncertainty about the final use. 
We have to really look at these issues, to take the time.” #827 community (Cronin & Jackson 
2004, p.26) 
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The increasing number of studies on involving the public in assessing technologies 
and the general increase in rhetoric calling for public involvement has been 
documented in the previous chapter. Even beyond the recognition of normative 
reasons for involvement of the public, many governmental reports and studies now 
recognise the concept of lay or local knowledge (e.g., Cronin & Jackson 2004; House 
of Lords Select Commitee 2000) and perhaps the possibility of useable information 
arising from public dialogue. That is, they recognise what might be called ‘cognitive’ 
reasons for public involvement.   
 
However, given the early stage of animal biopharming technology within New 
Zealand, there are difficulties involved in operationalising the concept of local 
knowledge in relation to risk assessment of animal biopharming. This is precisely for 
the reason identified by the participant quoted earlier: how do we know what risks and 
social problems may arise, when developers themselves are unsure, or unclear, how 
the technology will be used? The question points to a larger problem for the 
democratisation of technology decision-making. How can the public be involved 
practically in risk assessment before a technology is released into society, particularly 
when its development is in its infancy?  
 
Normative assessments 
This question poses problems for both normative evaluations by the public, as 
suggested by Frewer et.al (1997), and for the practical assessment of social 
implications. Frewer et al. argue that the public’s acceptance of a technology will not 
be based on its overall opinion of the general technology, but on the specific 
processes the technology requires. In the case of animal biopharming, although people 
have opinions about the technology in general, the benefits and risks of a specific 
application of animal biopharming, for example the transgenic production of human 
lactoferrin through cattle, will not be assessed by the public purely from this general 
opinion. The specific processes involved in producing human lactoferrin in cattle 
must be assessed as to whether they align with the public’s values. As Frewer 
illustrates, studies show that the public is not only interested in the ethics of the end 
product, but also the ethics of the processes involved in creating that product. 
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The reaction of the majority of lay members participating in a consensus conference 
in the Netherlands, on the topic of the genetic modification of animals, also illustrates 
this point.  
 
The majority was surprised about how the genetic modification of animals developed. They 
found that experts insufficiently made clear what to expect in the future; the goal of genetically 
modifying animals was not clear enough. (Aarts 1999) 
 
It is not surprising then that most of these lay member participants argued that genetic 
modification of animals should cease in the Netherlands. Anxiety and legitimate 
concerns over the intent of those developing the technology and the processes of its 
development cannot be addressed until it is understood what those intentions and 
processes are11.  
 
Within New Zealand the public discussion is typically more general than a discussion 
of animal biopharming; the debate concerns genetic modification overall and often 
simply “biotechnology”. As Simon Terry has argued, processes of genetic 
modification are often placed within the basket of “biotechnology is progress”. The 
government supports biotechnology in general, implying, “Take the entire package or 
else science in this country will be imperilled…” (Terry 2003). This approach is 
translated to the public debate, where it is rare that specific processes are discussed. 
 
General participation in risk assessment 
The generality of public discussion is extended to the regulatory and risk assessment 
arenas in New Zealand. Risk assessment in New Zealand is performed by the 
Environmental Risk Management Authority.12 ERMA provides few avenues for 
discussion of specific processes of implementation. The exceptions are public 
                                                 
11
 It is easy to fall into a ‘deficit model’ of public opinion when arguing this point. That is to say, by 
educating the public about the real intentions of the producers, public opposition to a technology will 
dissipate. Merely stating the intent of the producer, and processes of production, will not necessarily 
overcome the anxiety and concerns of individuals regarding a technology’s development. Whether or 
not concerns are alleviated depends upon the nature of those intentions and processes.  Thus concerns 
maybe supported (rather than assuaged) by further education.  
12
 ERMA was established under the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms (HSNO) Act 1996 and 
is a Crown entity. “The Authority's main role is to make decisions on applications to import, develop, or 
field test new organisms; or to import or manufacture hazardous substances. These applications are made 
under Part V of the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996.” New Zealand. Environmental 
Risk Management Authority (e)). ERMA also sets controls on the use of new organisms, and is responsible 
for promoting compliance with the authorities’ decisions.  A more detailed exploration of ERMA’s 
processes will be provided in chapter 4.  
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submissions at the time an application is assessed and discussions with stakeholders 
identified by the applicant. The problem with this approach, as will be illustrated here, 
is that there is a possibility that members outside of the industry may hold valuable 
local knowledge which can inform whether specific processes are viable, yet may be 
unaware that their knowledge is relevant to this application, or may simply be 
unaware of or uninterested in the ERMA process. Instead of a passive approach of 
allowing individuals holding local knowledge to initiate discussion, a more sensible 
approach would be to actively seek this knowledge.  
 
ERMA processes are application-specific  
Although it is important to involve appropriate members of the public in discussion of 
the specific processes of a technology, it is also important to examine how 
implementation of the technology will be carried out within society. Within New 
Zealand, risk assessment of GMOs is conducted by ERMA through their case-by-case 
assessments of GMO proposals that are put forward by groups seeking to develop 
research or commercialise an application. Assessment is based upon the nature of the 
application. For example, an applicant may choose to apply for permission to conduct 
a field trial. ERMA will then assess the risks of a field trial to the environment, 
society, culture and public health through a cost-benefit analysis. When a company 
seeks to commercialise a technology, the company applies to ERMA for either a 
conditional release, which entails controls and monitoring, or a full release where the 
technology has no mandated controls on its use. The risks of the commercialisation of 
that product are then assessed by ERMA. Risks of each phase (Containment, Field 
Test, Conditional Release and Full Release) are not analysed until an application is 
received to move into that phase; for example, assessment of applications for field 
trials does not consider risks of commercial release, even when the intention of the 
field trial is to progress toward commercial release. This means that considerable 
development costs can be incurred for a technological application that is (or should 
be) destined, for reasons of risk in the context of release and regardless of the 
outcome of the field trial, to be rejected for commercial release.    
 
There are two further problems with this process; first, the overall risk of a technology 
may never be assessed, as each stage of assessment is isolated. A useful illustration of 
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this approach can be seen within a summary of an ERMA decision regarding PPL 
therapeutics application to field test transgenic sheep.  
 
…submitters called for a major public debate (national and international) or a Commission of Inquiry on 
the commercial use of gene technology……before further work is authorised, or at least before 
transgenic organisms are released from containment  (New Zealand. Environmental Risk Management 
Authority 17 March 1999) 
 
Concerns could not be addressed by ERMA because “the extent to which the 
Authority can take into account concerns which are general and not specific to a 
particular application is restricted under the Act (HSNO ACT 1996) (New Zealand. 
Environmental Risk Management Authority 17 March 1999)”. Thus, the application-
specific nature of ERMA’s process limits both public participation and what can be 
considered.  
 
Secondly, and of particular relevance here, using ERMA’s approach it is very difficult 
to involve local knowledge in the assessment of that technology until an application 
has been made for conditional or full release. It is at this stage that a description of 
how the product or process would be used in its final form is given. Thus, it is 
difficult to include local knowledge of how a technology will affect or be affected by 
social practices until the last stage of assessment, that is, assessment of applications 
for release into the environment. The PPL Therapeuctics case suggests some of the 
possibilities and limitations of ERMA’s submission process in this regard. In that 
case, Federated Farmers made submissions querying the processes by which excess 
sheep will be disposed of in the case of the PPL application for field trials, and used 
local knowledge of cases in Waimorou to suggest that sheep can escape containment 
and become feral. This information is mentioned in ERMA’s decision documents, 
however does not seem to have affected ERMA’s decision, as they state that farm 
animals are highly unlikely to become feral in the case of field trials.  
 
Ways to incorporate Local Knowledge: Scoping proposed uses  
However, despite the limits of risk assessment frameworks in New Zealand, there are 
ways to incorporate local knowledge, even when specific details of how a technology 
will be used may be hazy. The solution lies within the concept of what is practically 
useful in risk assessment, and whether predictive assessment can provide useful 
information on the risks and social implications of a technology.  
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By scoping out proposed uses for a technology through literature and interviews with 
those involved in developing or promoting a technology, an understanding of how to 
involve local knowledge can be gained. Although scoping may not provide exact 
details of how a technology will be used, this thesis suggests it is worthwhile to 
analyse the potential risk of a technology based upon what the developers hope for 
it13. Involving local knowledge in assessments of the risks of a technology, given the 
potential uses of the technology in its developed form, is practical in the sense that 
risks can be identified earlier than if assessment is left until a technology is ready to 
be fully commercialised. In this way, it is possible to reduce the chances that large 
investments in a project will have to be abandoned when risks are later identified—or 
that the assessment process will be influenced by prior investment to proceed despite 
what would otherwise be unacceptably high risks. This is particularly relevant to New 
Zealand, where development of animal biopharming is currently, and likely in the 
future to be, conducted through public funding in Crown Research Institutes (CRIs). 
If applications are rejected at the last stage, public investment in the development of 
the technology may go to waste. An alternative is to include previous investment in 
the cost/benefit analysis. However, as noted above, including “sunk costs” is likely to 
bias the assessment toward greater risk-taking.  
 
Once future implementation scenarios have been identified, the social processes that 
may affect or be affected by animal biopharming can also be identified. It is then 
possible to identify areas of local expertise that may inform what the nature of the 
risks may be, whether these are avoidable, and whether existing regulatory 
approaches are able to address these risks. The next section will explain and explore 
the methods used in this thesis in more detail.  
 
Overview of Methodology 
                                                 
13
 Interestingly, although ERMA does not officially consider potential future benefits in their 
risk/cost/benefit equations, applicants commonly cite future benefits in their applications. An 
implication of this is that developers will often project a technology as a solution to a large medical 
problem. This encourages public support, and has also been criticised as an avenue to avoiding the 
moratorium on GM applications within New Zealand (now expired) that excluded medical applications 
(SAFE 2001). Thus, the process is biased in the sense of permitting one form of speculation 
(speculation about possible benefits of future release) but exclude another (speculation about possible 
harms of future release). This is discussed further in Chapter four.  
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The methods used in this thesis build on those developed by Goven, Cram and Gilbert 
in the context of research on genetic testing (Goven, Cram & Gilbert 2004; Goven 
2005). Their approach seeks to identify forms of expertise that can inform the risk 
assessment of new technologies, including evaluation of the social implications. It 
begins with the “scoping” of academic literature (techno-scientific and social-
scientific) and other material (such as industry reviews, corporate reports and 
promotional material, as well as government documents) in order to identify potential 
development trajectories. In this way, social practices relevant to these 
implementation scenarios can be identified, and, from this, relevant areas of ‘local’ 
expertise can be derived. This is followed by semi-structured interviews with 
individuals who have been identified as likely to hold this relevant knowledge (here 
called ‘local knowledge’).   
 
Scoping the literature 
Scoping refers to the practice of researching relevant literature and expertise on the 
drivers of animal biopharming, and on the recognised problems and risks that animal 
biopharming might entail. This practice involved a variety of database searches of 
academic literature including Jstor, Pro Quest and Worldwide Political Science 
Abstracts and ISI Web of knowledge. As the technology of animal biopharming is in 
an early phase of development, new developments are likely to occur quickly and 
unpredictably. In this sense, it was important to conduct general searches through 
internet search engines such as Google, in order to keep up to date with material and 
releases regarding animal biopharming. Newspaper articles were also explored using 
the Factiva search engine, in order to gather relevant information on animal 
biopharming development and opinion, particularly within New Zealand. Government 
and organisation websites were also explored, including New Zealand Trade and 
Enterprise (NZTE), AgResearch, MoRST , The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
(MAF), The Ministry of Health  (MoH), and ERMA websites. These were useful to 
understand how the government plans to promote, develop and regulate animal 
biopharming. Reputable information websites such as www.checkbiotech.org were 
also accessed in order to keep abreast of international developments which could in 
turn inform likely trajectories for the technology in New Zealand.  
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Particular attention was given to information pertaining to the potential uses of animal 
biopharming, risks they may involve, and what players are pushing for its 
development. Thus, press releases from CRIs and government departments were 
scanned for useful information on the intentions of those seeking to develop animal 
biopharming. Journal articles pointing to identifiable problems with the technology 
were also scoped as potential areas in which local knowledge could offer practical 
information. Attention was also given to similar technologies and problems that have 
occurred with them, for example problems experienced by the GM crop industry used 
in the United States held useful information about the impacts and potential problems 
with the use of animal biopharming of and on social practices.  
 
This general scoping succeeded in identifying a range of relevant information. Some 
reports gave particularly useful background information on animal biotechnology in 
general and animal biopharming in particular (e.g., U.S National Research Council 
Committee on Biological Confinement of Genetically Engineered Organisms 2004; 
U.S National Research Council Committee on Defining Science-based Concerns 
Associated with Products of Animal Biotechnology 2002 ; Kues & Niemann 2004; 
Dyck et al. 2003). Other sources gave indications of the likely future developments of 
animal biopharming, and who are driving these developments (e.g., MoRST 2005; 
New Zealand Association of Crown Research Institutes 2000; Edmond 2002; 
Beckman & Goldberg 2003). Some of the most useful literature on the possible risks 
and implications (social, economic and legal) of animal biopharming were Wisner 
(2005); Weaver (2003); Terry et al. (2001) ; Jaffe (2003) and Pollack (2003).  
 
Scoping extended: Interviewing Drivers and Regulators 
This traditional research method did glean useful information on the international 
context of animal biopharming, and some of the intended uses for animal 
biopharming in New Zealand. However, a large proportion was not specific to the 
processes of animal biopharming and its likely trajectory within New Zealand. As 
there is reason to believe that the risks of animal biopharming may be particular to the 
local environments and social practices the technology interacts with, more 
information about New Zealand’s possible future with animal biopharming was 
sought through interviews with traditional ‘experts’ and those involved in the 
development of animal biopharming in New Zealand.  
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Five people were identified and then interviewed who are involved in developing 
general biotechnology policy in New Zealand, developing or advocating specific 
animal biopharming technology, or regulating and assessing new organisms in New 
Zealand, interviewed14. These people were from MoRST, NZTE, AgResearch, and 
ERMA. The questions in the scoping interviews were aimed at understanding how the 
experts involved in the advocacy, development or assessment of animal biopharming 
see the future of the technology in New Zealand, including how it would develop 
initially and how the technology would work if scaled up to commercial production15. 
The purpose of these interviews, as with the scoping methodology in general, was to 
identify areas in which local expertise may inform us about relevant social practices 
likely to affect or be affected by animal biopharming. By combining these semi-
structured interviews with a review of relevant literature, a picture of possible avenues 
for the development of animal biopharming could be derived.  
 
The semi-structured interviews were loosely structured around an interview guide of 
themes and key questions that needed to be covered. Suggested questions which 
highlighted the themes were included within this guide. However, it was left to the 
interviewer’s own judgement and discretion to decide how and in what order the 
questions would be asked. This judgement depended upon the answers given.   
 
The interviews began with a briefing in which the subject was informed of the 
purpose of the interview, relevant background information, and why the subject was 
chosen to be interviewed. A project description was offered to the subjects prior to the 
interview. Following the interview a debriefing occurred in which the subject was 
offered the chance to ask any questions they may have, and in which the interviewer 
briefly stated the main points that had been gained from the interview.  
 
                                                 
14
 All participants for this thesis were asked to sign a consent form, in which they were informed of 
their ethical rights regarding the interview process (see appendix 1). A general project description was 
also provided (see appendix 2 for local knowledge interviews and appendix 3 for scoping interviews). 
In the case of telephone interviews, verbal consent was requested, and an information sheet emailed.  
 
15
 As stated, animal biopharming is in a relatively early stage of development and therefore a clear 
picture of how it will be commercialised was not possible, even through in-depth interviews with 
developers. However, this thesis contends that the intentions that those developing a product hold for 
its use at least offer clues to how it may be comme
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Eliciting local knowledge through interviews  
It was assumed that after conducting scoping interviews and research, forms of local 
knowledge that may be informative to the risk assessment and identification of social 
implications could be identified. Initial scoping produced the finding that 
biopharming in New Zealand was likely to involve herds of dairy cows genetically 
modified to express pharmaceutical substances in their milk. A fairly obvious 
extrapolation was that dairy farmers could offer useful knowledge of practices that 
may be vital to assessing the implications and risks of this type of animal biopharming 
in New Zealand.   
 
Semi-structured interviews were carried out with seven dairy farmers. The initial 
process for locating interviewees was conducted through a search of local dairying 
websites, such as Federated Farmers and Dairy Insight. The contact details of 
potential interview participants were provided on these websites. The personal 
network of the researcher was also used to find dairy farmers who may have been able 
to recommend interview participants. Several farmers were contacted via email, and 
then by phone, with a request to be involved in the study. Once initial interviews 
began, a verbal request was made to the participants to provide the names of other 
possible candidates for interviewing. As locality was considered important to the 
types of knowledge that would be offered, requests were made to provide people with 
farming experience from districts other than Canterbury, where initial interviews were 
conducted. It was possible then to interview a farmer from Waikato (via telephone), 
and several farmers with experience in farming from Taranaki and Waikato (but now 
farming in Canterbury).  
 
Most, but not all, dairy farmers had little knowledge of animal biopharming. Because 
of this, depending on what the farmer already identified they knew, basic background 
information was offered on biopharming. This included information on the kinds of 
animal biopharming being explored, the hazards generally recognised to be associated 
with animal biopharming (such as the potential mixing of biopharm milk with the 
general milk supply) and the kinds of controls likely to be recommended to mitigate 
the risk of those hazards occurring (such as double fencing to keep cows contained in 
their own paddock). This background information was not designed to summarise the 
risks of biopharming, but rather to help the farmer relate the particular needs of 
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biopharming to their knowledge of farming practices. That is, it was intended to 
‘translate’ the available information on biopharming into a form that would enable 
farmers to recognise where their knowledge is relevant.  
 
The usefulness of semi-structured interviews 
The interviews conducted for this thesis were based on a semi-structured format. 
Semi-structured interviews are generally accepted as a useful method to extract in-
depth knowledge on particular topics from individuals. The qualitative nature of the 
semi-structured interview contrasts with the positivist approach. The interview 
technique does not seek to understand general rules of behaviour as they apply to 
humanity; the qualitative nature of these interviews allows a focus on “understanding 
the thinking and behaviours of individuals and groups in specific situations” (Arksey 
& Knight 1999, p.11). As the scoping of literature already allowed for a level of 
information that was general in nature, more specific information was needed in order 
to identify and elicit forms of local knowledge for the purpose of risk assessment.  
 
Semi-structured interviews are also important in that they partially allow for the 
participant to direct the flow of the interview into areas which they see as relevant but 
which the interviewer had not identified in advance. As one assumption of this thesis 
is that individuals may hold specific and experiential knowledge of social processes 
that are relevant to risk assessment, it is important to allow the participant to identify 
relevant issues that relate to the general themes of the interview guide. In this way, the 
interviews may highlight issues or behaviours that may have social implications for 
the assessment of animal biopharming, which had not been anticipated by the 
interviewer. Semi-structured interviews allow for identification and exploration of 
relevant knowledge by the participant, whereas a formal interview guide with 
specified ‘questions’ instead of ‘themes’ may not allow for the participant to expand 
on issues unrecognised in the questions 
 
Combining the technical, normative and social: Triangulation   
This thesis does not suggest either technical/scientific or normative assessments of 
animal biopharming are unnecessary. There are obvious reasons for technical 
information to assess the risks of animal biopharming; for example, an understanding 
about the molecular processes through which genetic traits spread from modified 
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organisms is not possible without some form of scientific investigation. Also, 
normative assessments can help us understand the ethical and political risks of a 
technology.  Similarly, research into attitudes may identify those who are likely to use 
or avoid a technology, which may in turn suggest areas of future disparity and other 
implications. However, in isolation these investigations do not allow a full risk 
assessment. For example, in order to understand the likelihood of gene transfer from 
genetically modified organisms, it is necessary to understand not only molecular 
processes of its spread, but also how social practices may shape the opportunities for 
those molecular processes to occur.  
 
Scoping and analysis of literature generally identified scientific and normative 
accounts of the issues surrounding animal biopharming. Interviews were required for 
further information on the social processes of animal biopharming. The methodology 
is in this sense what Webb et al. (1966) described as triangulation. Triangulation is a 
technical term “whereby two known landmarks or reference points are used to define 
the position of the third” (Arksey & Knight 1999, p.21). Webb used this term 
metaphorically and adapted it to social science method (Webb et al. 1966). In the case 
of this thesis, the scientific and normative research16 scoped through the literature in 
the earlier stages can identify social practices about which it may be useful and 
necessary to obtain local knowledge. Thus two forms of research, normative and 
scientific, point to another area which should be explored, that is, social research.  
 
Weaknesses of this methodology 
Limited Sample Size 
Using semi-structured interviews to elicit local knowledge can offer in-depth accounts 
of how social processes work, and how this might be adapted to the likely regulations 
and guidelines that animal biopharming requires. At the same time, given the amount 
of time it takes to conduct and analyse semi-structured interviews, there can be a 
trade-off between quality of information received and quantity of interviews 
conducted. Combined with the time constraints of the thesis process, this resulted in a 
relatively small number of interviews being conducted. However, the argument of the 
                                                 
16
 This is not to suggest that the scientific and normative issues surrounding animal biopharming are 
clear-cut or “known landmarks”. Given the nature of scientific development and public opinion this is, 
of course, impossible. Risk assessment should consider possible outcomes, and therefore in its very 
nature is speculative.  
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thesis does not hinge on the number of interviews conducted. Rather, what it aims to 
do is demonstrate that interviews with properly selected informants (whose selection 
is informed by the scoping process) can provide information that is clearly relevant to 
evaluating the risks of biopharming in New Zealand. It does not itself constitute a risk 
assessment, but points to areas that need further investigation and consideration when 
risks are formally assessed. 
 
Moreover, the methodological approach drawn on here is one that, in general, seeks 
out qualitative insight rather than quantitative data (for example, on “public opinion”). 
Identifying social practices that are relevant to risk assessment requires good 
‘translational’ (background) material and thoughtful informants, rather than 
‘representative’ samples.   
 
Given the limited time available, it was not possible to explore in depth the usefulness 
of local knowledge for investigating regional variation. It is quite possible that within 
different provinces the implications of animal biopharming will be different. For 
example, in the Waikato where farms tend to be located closer together and on hillier 
terrain, the practices relevant to containment of animals may differ somewhat from 
those within Canterbury where farms are more spread out. The farming styles and 
attitudes within each province may also differ.  
 
Limited range of relevant informants 
The complexity and interrelatedness of modern society makes it highly unlikely that 
an abstract scoping exercise can recognise all individuals and groups relevant to this 
study. Thus, the scoping exercise should not be considered an endpoint in the 
identification process of relevant areas of knowledge. Given the interrelated nature of 
social practices, initial interviews with possessors of local knowledge actually served 
to identify other forms of knowledge and social interactions that may be relevant, for 
instance, organic farmers, meat workers and milk transporters. Ideally interviews with 
people in these areas would have been carried out as well, but, again, time limitations 
prohibited this.  
 
International drivers and knowledges 
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Given the limitations of money and time, it was obviously not possible to extend the 
research to include interviews with overseas actors. However, this may be a weakness 
given that the New Zealand dairy industry is so dependent on international markets, 
laws and trends, and biopharming in New Zealand will likely occur as a result of 
investments by, and partnerships with, overseas actors. Hence, ideally, people with 
knowledge of, for example, investors’ expectations regarding biopharm herd 
ownership arrangements or major markets’ food audit systems and expectations 
would be interviewed. 
 
Eliciting v leading 
As the semi-structured interview is designed to elicit knowledge that may remain 
unrecognised by current risk assessment considerations, it is important that the 
participant is able to identify and adapt their knowledge to the topic of animal 
biopharming. One weakness in this approach is that participants may feel unqualified 
to do this, as they have not been participants in the dialogue over animal biopharming 
until this point. It is important then to offer background information on why they 
might have useful knowledge, and to guide them during the interview into a 
framework in which they can adapt their knowledge into a discussion of a technology 
they may initially feel they can offer little information on. A challenge is to resist 
unintentionally imposing answers onto the participant, but instead to let them 
formulate these answers themselves, whilst also encouraging an adaptation of their 
knowledge to the theme of the interview. An attempt was made to structure questions 
in ways that would encourage the participant to draw on and relate their own 
knowledge, while also facilitating their identification of avenues of implication and 
risk.   
 
Conclusion 
The methodological approach used here seeks to identify useful local knowledge 
either omitted by existing risk assessment processes or sought only at a point where it 
is not easily utilised. It seeks to use this local knowledge to identify both specific and 
general areas of implication and risk. In this sense, a step away from the more general 
discussion of GM toward a more focussed discussion of specific practices is 
encouraged, although at an earlier period than is conducted by ERMA currently. The 
methodology is also more proactive in seeking public knowledge, rather than the 
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passive approach of public submissions. Whilst this methodology is limited by sample 
size and scope, it offers a useful tool to begin understanding how local knowledge can 
contribute more specifically to risk assessment. The next chapter will discuss current 
risk assessment and regulation within New Zealand, in relation to its ability to include 
local knowledge and adequately identify social implications and risk.  
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Chapter 4: Risk assessment and regulation of Animal Biopharming 
in New Zealand 
 
Introduction 
According to an independent review of New Zealand biotechnology, New Zealand 
has a primary sector ideal for animal biopharming, and the adoption of animal 
biopharming in New Zealand could yield significant benefits (Beckman & Goldberg 
2003). Consequently, one may question why we should even consider not pursuing, or 
significantly restricting, biopharming in New Zealand. However, there are some 
prima facie reasons for conducting a thorough exploration of the risks of animal 
biopharming in New Zealand. 
 
It is clear, for example, that pharmaceutical products produced through animal 
biopharming should be kept out of the general food supply. It seems uncontroversial 
to point out that people should not inadvertently consume pharmaceuticals that are 
intended for other people’s particular medical conditions. Beyond this, the 
environmental consequences of horizontal and vertical transfer of GM material to 
non-GM animals, soil, and plants is not fully known. Therefore, additional 
dimensions of transfer of genetic material implicated in pharmaceutical-substance 
production require further investigation. Unintended intermingling of GM and non-
GM products in general has the potential to impact negatively upon New Zealand’s 
export markets, while the ProdiGene episode17 (and common sense) would suggest 
that unintended contamination with GM biopharm products would be particularly 
damaging. Finally, as with other types of GM, one could mention the ethical right of 
consumers and producers to choose to buy and sell non-GM products, including 
products free from inadvertent GM contamination.  
 
Therefore, in light of these potentially serious issues there is a need for risk 
assessment to identify and evaluate risks associated with biopharming in New 
Zealand, including the evaluation of the possibility of maintaining strict separation of 
biopharm animals from others. 
                                                 
17
 In 2002, it was reported that soybeans in Nebraska were contaminated with grains of corn modified 
to produce pharmaceuticals. This occurred because the farmer contracted by ProdiGene to grow the 
experimental corn, replanted soybeans on the plot that was used for the experimental corn the previous 
year (Scott  2002). Although the contaminated plant did not enter the food chain, ProdiGene was fined 
three million dollars, (Biotech Company is Fined $3 Million 2002).  
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 It is somewhat encouraging to note that risk assessment of animal biopharming has 
begun in New Zealand. This risk assessment has been based upon several applications 
to field test animal biopharming production in New Zealand. The first of these 
applications was received on September 10, 1998, from PPL Therapeutics (New 
Zealand) Ltd, who applied for permission to field-test transgenic sheep, in order to 
produce the biopharmaceutical human alpha-1-antitripsin (hAAT), in the Waikato 
region. AgResearch has also submitted two applications. The first, received by ERMA 
on December 11, 1998, was to field test genetically modified cattle by inserting a 
human myelin basic protein gene to be expressed in the milk of the cattle. The second, 
received by ERMA on May 1, 2002, “[t]o develop transgenic cattle that can express 
functional therapeutic foreign proteins in their milk, and to develop transgenic cattle 
to study gene function and genetic performance” (New Zealand. Environmental Risk 
Management Authority 2002 (Ammended 18 November 2005), p.1), and was thus 
much broader and general in scope than the first application. Each of these 
applications went through ERMA’s decision-making process. All three decisions were 
approved with conditions set on how the field-test and containment could be 
managed, including fencing restrictions and guidelines for disposal of animals.  
 
Unfortunately, beyond the risk assessment of these specific applications, there has 
been no other specific risk assessment of animal biopharming in New Zealand. Thus, 
one major limitation of risk assessment in New Zealand is that it does not allow for 
consideration of risks beyond specific applications. Within the risk assessment of 
specific applications there have been other limitations come to light, including vague 
guidelines for how ERMA should analyse social impact, and limited room for local 
knowledge to be included in decision making. The exclusion of local knowledge in 
the risk assessment process points to two further weaknesses of the risk assessment 
process: firstly, it does not allow for a full assessment of social risk and risk deriving 
from social practices on animal biopharming; and secondly, the public are provided 
with only limited opportunities to participate in or contribute to consideration of the 
risks of animal biopharming.  
 
This chapter examines risk assessment and risk management processes and structures 
currently in place within New Zealand, in order to determine if they provide sufficient 
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information regarding the social and practical implications of animal biopharming. Of 
particular relevance here is the ability of risk assessment to consider the risk impact of 
and on social practices. As this thesis suggests, the ability to do this relies partly on 
the ability to identify and use relevant ‘local knowledge’; thus, this chapter will also 
explore whether the current system can and does adequately take account of local 
knowledge. Firstly, a brief discussion of the general structure and processes of risk 
assessment within New Zealand will be offered. Secondly, the current weaknesses of 
this structure and process will be discussed, particularly in the light of how it enables 
evaluation of social impacts and the use of local knowledge. 
 
The General Structure of risk assessment in New Zealand 
The HSNO ACT 
Any discussion of the regulatory framework for GM in New Zealand must address the 
Hazardous Substance and New Organisms ACT 1996 (HSNO), as the framework is 
based upon this legislation. Section 4 of the HSNO Act states the general purpose of 
the Act: 
 
Protect the environment, and the health and safety of people and communities, by preventing or 
managing the adverse effects of hazardous substances and new organisms (Le Bas 2005, p.2) 
 
 Previously, new organisms, a category that includes genetically modified organisms, 
were controlled through two pieces of legislation, the Animals Act 1967 and the 
Plants Act 1970. As these Acts did not require any formal review of genetically 
modified organisms prior to development or release18, it was clear that a new Act was 
required to meet the regulatory issues that were being created from rapid 
developments in the genetic modification field (Environment and Business Group. et 
al. 2001, p.6). In 1996 the drafting of the HSNO Act and the inclusion of new 
organisms within this legislation were passed partly to meet these demands19.  
 
GMOs defined under the ACT 
                                                 
18
 In 1988 the Interim Assessment Group (IAG) was set up by the Minister for the Environment. 
Private research was required to apply for review by the IAG only on a voluntary basis.  Review of 
government-funded research was mandatory (Pollak 2003).   
19
 Rules on new organisms went into effect in 1998, under the HSNO Act (Pollak 2003).  
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The regulation and management of GMOs are legislated through the Act as a subset 
of “new organisms” which are defined by the Act (Le Bas 2005, p.80)20. Animal 
bioreactors, central to animal biopharming and produced through the genetic 
modification of the animal, are legally considered to be GMOs, and the responsibility 
for their management and assessment therefore falls under the Act. The Act delegates 
this responsibility to the Environmental Risk Management Authority (ERMA).  
 
ERMA  
The following section will offer a brief overview of ERMA’s responsibilities and 
procedures. 
 
ERMA was established by the HSNO Act in 1996 as an autonomous Crown Entity. 
The ‘Authority’ is a quasi-judicial decision-making body and consists of up to eight 
members, who are appointed by the Minister for the Environment. They are 
responsible for all decisions regarding the importation, development and release of 
GMOs in New Zealand (as well as those regarding the importation or manufacture of 
hazardous substances).  Its overall mission is: "Achieve effective prevention or 
management of risks to the environment, public health and safety associated with 
importing or manufacturing hazardous substances and introducing new organisms, 
and their use” (New Zealand. Environmental Risk Management Authority 2001, 
p.16). It is empowered to accomplish this through a number of activities, including 
“achiev[ing] cost-efficient and effective decisions on applications under the HSNO 
Act which take appropriate account of benefits and costs as well as risks, to New 
Zealand.”21  
 
                                                 
20
 The definition of a new organism in the HSNO Act is expansive. It is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to discuss the definitional details of new organisms under the Act. For those interested, new organism 
is defined in Section 2A of the Act.  
21
 The other activities are to “promote compliance with the Act and with the Authority's decisions; 
promote public understanding and knowledge of risks associated with new organisms and hazardous 
substances and how to prevent or manage them, and enhance the HSNO Act as an effective legislative 
framework for the prevention or management of HSNO risks.” (New Zealand. Environmental Risk 
Management Authority 2001,p.16). Interestingly, the activity of promoting “public understanding and 
knowledge of risks” suggests a one-sided communication of risk and management, from ERMA to the 
public, but not vice-versa.  
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The ‘Agency’ provides operational support for the Authority, and is organised into 
eight groups: New Organisms; Hazardous Substances; Strategy and Analysis; Public 
Awareness; Transfer of Substances; Corporate Services; Māori Affairs; and Legal 
Services.  Of relevance here are the New Organisms and Public Awareness groups. 
The New Organisms group’s responsibilities include: 
 
 New organisms operations and operational policy including decision-making, compliance and 
enforcement, reassessments, Standards, links with other N[ew] O[rganisms] jurisdictions and 
supporting investigations. Scientific and technical expertise aspects on biological and physical 
of new organisms” (New Zealand. Environmental Risk Management Authority(c)). 
 
The Public Awareness group, which could potentially play a role in elucidating the 
social dimensions of risk, currently has the following responsibilities: 
 
 Public awareness programmes, corporate communications, Website management and the 
overview of stakeholder relationships (New Zealand. Environmental Risk Management 
Authority (a)). 
 
ERMA also includes two other bodies: Ngā Kaihautū Tikanga Taiao (NKTT) and the 
Ethics Advisory Panel.  NKTT is an advisory committee of up to eight members, 
appointed by the Authority. Its responsibilities include advising the Authority on 
Treaty implications, risk issues of concern to Māori and as they relate to Māori, and 
consultation with Māori. The Ethics Advisory Panel was established in April 2004. Its 
role is: 
 
to provide the Authority with expert advice and assistance on applications under the Hazardous 
Substances and New Organisms (HSNO) Act which raise ethical and cultural issues and to 
assist in the development of frameworks and guidelines for dealing with such issues (New 
Zealand. Environmental Risk Management Authority (a)). 
 
While the Authority has overall responsibility for monitoring and enforcing 
compliance with the Act and Authority decisions, enforcement activities are delegated 
to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF), as agreed upon through the 
Memorandum of Understanding between MAF and ERMA (Pollak 2003,p.9) 
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Finally, the HSNO Act provides that under certain circumstances the Minister for the 
Environment can ‘call in’ an application from ERMA in order to make the final 
decision himself/herself. These circumstances include ‘where it is judged ERMA 
lacks sufficient experience to decide the case’ and where there are seen to be 
‘significant economic, environmental, international and health effects’.  In 2003, as a 
response to the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, 
the latter was extended to include ‘significant cultural, spiritual and ethical effects’. 
 
ERMA decision-making framework 
Part 5 of the Act states that ERMA is required to make decisions regarding 
applications, “by evaluating risks, costs and benefits, placing conditions on approvals; 
and making decisions on transitional licences and other approvals (New Zealand. 
Environmental Risk Management Authority (a)).” The decisions are based on a 
decision-making framework, that consists of The HSNO Act 1996 (specifically part 
5), The Methodology (Order) (1998), and supporting material written by ERMA staff.  
The HSNO Act 1996 (specifically Part 5):  
Part 5 of the Act sets out the requirements for the Assessment of Hazardous 
Substances and New Organisms, including to name those most relevant here,  
guidelines for the assessment of new organisms and hazardous substances, types 
of approvals allowed, and determination of new organisms.   
The broad statements of principle, policy and processes set out in the 
Methodology (Order) (1998) 22:  
This provides a framework for assessment derived from the HSNO Act. ERMA 
is obligated to consistently apply the Methodology when making decisions. The 
Methodology is discussed later in this chapter.  
Supporting material by ERMA staff:  
Various technical guides have been issued by ERMA staff regarding 
requirements of the HSNO Act and Methodology. These are designed to help 
                                                 
22
 Hereafter referred to as the Methodology. 
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both applicants and ERMA staff in reviewing applications, and discuss specific 
working processes applied when assessing applications. Some examples of this 
supporting material are Policy on consultation & interaction : under part V of 
the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (New Zealand. 
Environmental Risk Management Authority. 1999) and Preparing information 
on risks, costs and benefits: for applications under the Hazardous Substances 
and New Organisms Act 1996 (Gough & New Zealand. Environmental Risk 
Management Authority. 2000). 
Decision Making Process 
This section will outline ERMA’s decision-making process, as derived from the 
HSNO Act, the Methodology and the supporting material.  
It is primarily the applicant’s responsibility to conduct risk analysis (Gough & 
New Zealand. Environmental Risk Management Authority. 2000,p.2). ERMA is 
required to notify the public through a published notice in four major daily 
newspapers of its consideration of an application regarding new organisms, 
including brief details of the application, and a reference to ERMA’s website for 
further information on making submissions (New Zealand. Environmental Risk 
Management Authority. 1999, p.10).ERMA must review these submissions before 
making a decision on the application. ERMA is then held responsible for decisions 
based on the risk/costs/benefits analysis 23(Gough & New Zealand. Environmental 
Risk Management Authority. 2000, p.1). ERMA defines Risk, Costs and Benefits 
as follows: “Risk means the combination of the magnitude of an adverse effect and 
the probability of its occurrence” (Gough & New Zealand. Environmental Risk 
Management Authority. 2000, p.2). “Cost means the value of a particular adverse 
effect expressed in monetary or non-monetary terms” (Gough & New Zealand. 
Environmental Risk Management Authority. 2000, p.3). “Benefit means the value 
of a particular positive effect expressed in monetary or non-monetary terms” 
(Gough & New Zealand. Environmental Risk Management Authority. 2000, p.3).   
More specifically, the Methodology outlines the types of risks and costs to be 
analyzed when evaluating an application. Section 9 states: 
                                                 
23
 These consider both monetary and non-monetary costs and benefits.  
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9. When evaluating the information provided by an applicant (including prescribed 
information and any additional information) so as to achieve the purpose of the Act, the 
Authority must 
 
(a) Recognise risks, costs, benefits, and other impacts associated with the substance or 
organism in an application which relate to the safeguarding of the life-supporting capacity of air, 
water, soil, and ecosystems, and provide for this principle; and 
(b) Recognise and provide for the principle of maintenance and enhancement of the 
capacity of people and communities to provide for— 
(i) Their own economic, social, and cultural wellbeing; and 
(ii) The reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and 
 
(c) Take into account risks, costs, benefits, and other impacts associated with the substance 
or organism in an application which relate to— 
(i) The sustainability of all native and valued introduced flora and fauna; and 
(ii) The intrinsic value of ecosystems; and 
(iii) Public health; and 
(iv) The relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, 
water, sites, wahi tapu, valued flora and fauna, and other taonga; and 
(v) The economic and related benefits to be derived from the use of a particular hazardous 
substance or new organism; and 
(vi) New Zealand's international obligations 
 
 The authority is also allowed to delegate decisions on low-risk GMOs to institutions 
which have set up Institutional Biological Safety Committees (IBSCs). IBSCs are 
predominantly located in Crown Research Institutes and universities24. Delegation is 
applicable when considering “the development and import of genetically modified 
organisms that meet the low-risk criteria in laboratory and research situations within 
contained facilities” (New Zealand. Environmental Risk Management Authority (b)).  
 
Guiding Principles 
The authority also follows guiding principles, some of which are derived from the 
HSNO act, and others which have been developed by ERMA staff, about how it 
                                                 
24
 The list of ISBCs in New Zealand: The universities of Auckland, Waikato, Dunedin, Lincoln and 
Massey University. CRIs HortResearch, Landcare Research, AgResearch, Crop &Food Research, and 
Industrial Research. Private company, Genesis Research and Development. 
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should consider an application for the release or introduction of a new organism25. All 
decisions must be consistent with the purpose of the Act, stated in Section 4, which is: 
 
To protect the environment, and the health and safety of people in communities, by preventing 
or managing the adverse affects of hazardous substances or new organisms. (Le Bas 2005, 
p.199) 
 
The guiding principles aimed at upholding the purpose of the Act stated above and are 
intended to provide general standards and goals which ERMA decisions should meet. 
Regarding social assessment, which is of particular relevance to this thesis, a rather 
vague principle is generally cited as the basis for analysis of social implications of an 
application. The decisions must allow for: 
 
The maintenance and enhancement of people and communities to provide for their own 
economic, social and cultural well-being and for the reasonably foreseeable needs of future 
generations. Section 5 (b) (Le Bas 2005, p.199) 
 
The guiding principle of caution, derived from Section 7 of the Act is also relevant 
here:  
 
All persons exercising functions, powers, and duties under this Act…Shall take account the 
need for caution in managing adverse effects where there is scientific and technical uncertainty 
about those effects.  
 
Methodology of ERMA 
As stated, ERMA is required to follow the Methodology when making a decision on 
an application. The process which ERMA must follow when making decisions is set 
out in the Methodology and discussed in detail in the Annotated Methodology (1998). 
As stated in the Methodology , Section 1: 
 
The Authority, or any Committee appointed under clause 43 of the First Schedule of the Act, 
and responsible for making decisions under Part V of the Act, must consistently apply this 
methodology when making decisions.  
 
                                                 
25
 A list of the guiding principles throughout the Act is offered at ( New Zealand. Environmental Risk 
Management Authority.(d)) 
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The Methodology does not prescribe a strict decision making formula or a detailed 
process, but provides a general framework for making decisions. For example the 
Methodology in Section 2(2) outlines ERMA’s role in assessing applications.  
 
(2) In relation to applications and decision-making, the Authority 
(a) Must inform applicants (as far as practicable) of the provisions of the Act and this 
methodology and, where relevant, of the need to obtain approvals under other enactments: 
(b) Must arrange any statutory processes, including the notification of applications and the 
holding of hearings: 
(c) Must review and verify information contained in applications and submissions from the 
public or, where appropriate, engage expert bodies to conduct the review and verification or to 
provide additional information so that the Authority may be expertly informed for the purposes 
of decision-making: 
(d) May facilitate consultation and pre-hearing meetings between applicants and persons 
who make submissions opposing the application, where these are requested by the applicant and 
may assist in the early clarification of areas of technical or scientific dispute: 
(e) Must co-operate with other bodies (for example, government departments, Crown 
entities, and local bodies), in particular, when a hazardous substance or new organism also 
requires approvals under other enactments: 
(f) May assist applicants to decide on the extent of relevant and appropriate information to 
be included in any application. 
 
As is evident from the above section while ERMA has specific responsibilities under 
the Methodology there is a wide scope for interpretation within an application. For 
example, the definition of what an ‘expert body’ consists of is not provided in 2(c). 
One interview conducted for this thesis suggests ERMA’s general interpretation of 
what constitutes expertise: 
 
Q. How do[es ERMA] identify who are experts, and can it be members of the community who 
can offer, who are considered experts… 
 
A: No, I’m talking about the process of going to a scientific expert. [ERMA] looks for 
information in a range of areas. We look at the effects on the natural environment, the 
ecological effects, when I’m talking about effects I’m talking about risks, costs and benefits, so 
risks and benefits. (Interview Participant 1.)  
 
However, it may be possible to expand the concept of expertise to include relevant 
holders of local knowledge, under the guidelines of Section 2 (c) of the Methodology.  
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Weaknesses of the current regulatory regime 
This next section will explore the weaknesses of the system of regulation described, 
particularly in relation to the types of knowledge it includes and excludes. 
 
Application-specific assessment 
In exploring the need to recognize local knowledge earlier, Chapter Three briefly 
highlighted a weakness of the current regulatory system in New Zealand: the 
limitations of application-specific assessment by ERMA. Essentially ERMA 
considers the risk, costs and benefits of a particular organism only within the specific 
context of its application. There are four types of applications that can be made to 
ERMA in relation to new organisms and specifically GMOs: containment, field 
testing, conditional release and full release. Analysis of the risks of GMOs and how 
these risks should be managed is linked to and limited by the level of development 
proposed in the applications sent to ERMA. For example, the risks of animal 
biopharming currently have been analysed only in terms of the risks posed by the 
specific field tests in the application, even if the field test is a prelude to a hoped-for 
commercial release. This prevents consideration of how further development or 
commercialization of this organism may impact New Zealand.  This may result in the 
investment of considerable resources in the development of a specific technological 
application that in fact poses significant (as yet unconsidered) risks at the release 
stage. This is illustrated in ERMA’s response to public submissions26 regarding 
specific field tests.  
 
In some cases, ERMA has noted that many submissions in relation to specific field 
test applications relate to wider concerns about the use of GM technology. The 
following example from ERMA’s decision summary of PPL’s therapeutics 
application illustrates this: 
 
All of these submitters called for a major public debate (national and international) or a 
Commission of Inquiry on the commercial use of gene technology, especially that involving gene 
transfer between species, before further research work is authorized, or at least before transgenic 
organisms are released from containment…. 
 
…However, the extent to which the Authority can take into account concerns which are general 
and not specific to a particular application is restricted under the Act, and these must in any 
                                                 
26
 The process of public submissions will be discussed later in this chapter.  
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event be weighed on a case by case basis against the benefits of the application. (New Zealand. 
Environmental Risk Management Authority. 17 March 1999)  (Emphasis added)  
 
Although a large proportion of submissions in this particular case were concerned 
about the future use and wider implications of commercial GM, the example 
illustrates the limitations that the HSNO Act places on ERMA that prohibit them from 
considering risks involved in the commercialization of animal biopharming, beyond 
those directly posed by the specific application at hand. Hence, potential future risks 
are not included, while public knowledge is also excluded.   
 
Bias toward scientific and medical “future framing” 
Interestingly, it is not only the public who are interested in discussing the future 
implications of developing a technology beyond its specific application. Often 
applicants seeking approval for field trials will offer future commercial applications 
as a benefit that should enter into the cost/benefit equation. An ERMA decision on an 
application to field test GE onions illustrates this point: 
 
The Committee notes that this list [of benefits] is somewhat narrower than the list of benefits 
originally cited in the application which included potential long-term benefits that may result 
from the application of the technology currently under development (e.g. projected savings on 
herbicide costs for growers and reductions in overall herbicide usage in the environment). This 
field trial is only one step in the process from research to commercialisation. While the potential 
downstream benefits are relevant to an assessment of the value of the development of these 
genetically modified onions… the Committee considers that the significant benefits that warrant 
further assessment are those that will accrue directly from this field trial. (New Zealand. 
Environmental Risk Management Authority 2003 (Amended 2005)) 
 
 
A vital part of risk assessment is ignored by the approach of ERMA because the 
commercial benefits of developing a product must be considered in relation to an 
application. By limiting the analysis to the field trial of the crop, this approach fails to 
address the fact that the technology’s main purpose for being developed is 
commercial release. This is something that developers will clearly admit and it seems 
irrational to omit consideration of risks correlating with the intended end use of a 
product. 
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One reason for limiting assessment to the specifics of the application is that it avoids 
future developments rendering past risk considerations redundant. For example, 
scientific developments could mean that the risks of commercialization can change 
rapidly. In this way, it may be important to avoid speculation on future risks. 
However, it is interesting that ERMA does seem to base some decisions on 
speculation on possible benefits of stages of development beyond the current 
application. An example from ERMA’s decision on PPL sheep illustrates this point:  
 
…the Authority notes that should clinical efficacy be proven, there is a potential for the 
enhancement of the capacity of people and communities to provide for their own economic, 
social, and cultural wellbeing as a result of health benefits to sufferers of cystic fibrosis (and also 
potentially sufferers of congenital deficiency of AAT). (New Zealand. Environmental Risk 
Management Authority. 17 March 1999)  
 
In order to reach members of the community, the medical benefits of PPL’s 
technology would have to be based on some applications beyond its field trial. Even if 
the field trial produced medical advances these would have to go through further 
assessment by drug-approval authorities and be commercially produced and 
distributed in order to allow people to “provide for their own economic, social, and 
cultural wellbeing” as the decision states. However, the potential medical benefits of 
the potential future development of this GMO were considered in the field test 
application. By allowing consideration of benefits, but not risks, of further 
development beyond the field trial, the process seems to be biased towards applicants 
and their development of GMOs.  
 
This apparent bias has been noted in public debate. A press release by SAFE (Save 
Animals From Exploitation) regarding AgResearch’s application to test GE cattle 
voiced concerns about the tendency for applicants to promise large medical benefits in 
order to better their public relations, and make the application process easier27, a 
tendency which they referred to as ‘medical fraud’ (SAFE 2001).The term ‘medical 
fraud’ maybe exaggerated, as it is possible that the speculative medical benefits may 
eventually be realized28. However, SAFE points to the limitations of the process 
                                                 
27
 One reason for this approach may be that the moratorium on GM in New Zealand between 2001 and 
2003 gave exception for field tests of products that could produce medical benefits. AgResearch had 
been criticised for applying for tests of commercial agricultural products through the guise of medical 
research (SAFE 2001). 
28
 This was not the case for PPL Therapeutics as testing was halted before any benefits occurred. The 
funding partner Bayer Biological products pulled out of the deal because it no longer saw any 
economic potential for the trial.  
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which encourages medical and scientific speculation, but discourages any 
consideration of social problems and processes beyond that which the field trial itself 
brings.  
 
Valiverronen (2004) argues that reference to the future is used as a device to frame 
scientific developments and shape perceptions of developing technology.  
Valiverronen argues this in relation to the role of the media in constructing the 
concept of ‘medicine cows’ as a representation of work done on transgenic cattle in 
Finland. Within this discussion lies the central argument that the representation of the 
future is a major tool towards power in ‘risk society29’ (Valiverronen 2004), where the 
future no longer “flows seamlessly from the present” (Valiverronen 2004, p. 366) . 
Theoretically, if risk assessment allows for one form of future projection, the 
consideration of future scientific advance through field trials, but ignores another, the 
possible risks (both social and biological) of commercializing and releasing a 
technology in the future, then power is skewed to those seeking to advance their 
application. 
 
It is possible to suggest that risks associated with commercial production will be 
considered when a commercial application is made, and therefore no product will be 
commercialized without adequate consideration. However, it is clear that people may 
be ready and eager to offer useful information on the risks of commercializing or 
widely releasing a technology before this point. Therefore, in order to adequately 
account for the risks of animal biopharming, and particularly the social impact both of 
and on the risk of animal biopharming, it may be important to allow consideration of 
risks of later stages of development of the organism, earlier.  
 
Application-specific assessment leads to exclusion of local knowledge.  
As of yet there is little room for local knowledge to be included in practical 
considerations of an organism’s risk for New Zealand. The quote from the PPL 
decision summary used earlier illustrates how the conception of the public as value-
                                                 
29
 The reference to ‘risk society’ refers to Beck’s (1992) theory regarding the increasing complexity of 
decision-making, and the resulting politicised and competitive arena of expertise. The public must 
choose the ‘experts’ they trust, from the differing accounts of expert opinion. Hence, the public has lost 
faith in ‘expertise’ because of the level of contradictory opinions amongst ‘experts’.  
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holders, together with the limitations of application-specific assessment, may exclude 
local knowledge which can identify important social risks. 
 
All of these submitters called for a major public debate (national and international) or a 
Commission of Inquiry on the commercial use of gene technology, especially that involving gene 
transfer between species, before further research work is authorized, or at least before transgenic 
organisms are released from containment. 
 
 Overall the Authority accepted that on one ground or another there were varying degrees of 
unease within society expressed towards the application, and that to approve the application could 
conflict with the firmly held beliefs of some people. (New Zealand. Environmental Risk 
Management Authority. 17 March 1999) (Emphasis added). 
 
 Although some public submissions called for public debates on supposedly technical 
issues of gene transfer, ERMA interprets these concerns generally within the category 
of “firmly held beliefs”. This language at least rhetorically places these public 
submissions in the category of non-technical and value-laden, hence immeasurable in 
the context of cost/benefit analysis considerations. 
 
 This approach ignores the practical concerns the public may have about the general 
processes and subsequent risks of the commercialization of GM, an area where local 
knowledge can offer useful information and where scientific uncertainty remains. 
Busch et al. (2004, p.26) point to the interesting correlation, found in the 2003 UK 
GM Science Review, between the areas of scientific uncertainty regarding GM and 
the public concerns over the uncertainties regarding environmental and health 
consequences of GM. The correlation between what the public is concerned about and 
what the science sector is unsure about illustrate that public consultation should not be 
automatically considered the antithesis to scientific assessment. 
 
The ambiguity and adaptability of rule-following  
Several field tests of animal biopharming have been assessed by ERMA and have 
been approved. This approval, in itself, should not be considered an adequate 
indication of the safety of animal biopharming in New Zealand. As field tests are 
largely isolated and contained, and it is under these conditions that the safety of the 
technology has been considered, the assessment approach falls into what Wynne has 
described as a ‘black box’ concept (Wynne 1988, p. 149). As Wynne (1988) suggests, 
“The policy field has been dominated by ‘black box’ concepts which treat technology 
as autonomous and ‘internally’ unproblematic, or at best, the non-social domain of 
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technical experts” (p. 149). As the animal biopharming is yet to be released into 
society and it has not been analyzed in its social context, the risks analyzed regarding 
field trials relate to animal biopharming as ‘autonomous’ and self contained. This 
ignores the intrinsic relationships and social worlds animal biopharming will enter, 
which further production of animal biopharming will entail. Little or no consideration 
is given to how animal biopharming will be produced commercially, who will be 
involved, how accidents resulting from human behavior can be avoided, or even 
whether they can be avoided at all.  
 
It is already evident from other cases that human error is a real risk to the containment 
of technologies, and specifically to animal biopharming. This is applicable to field 
trials, but may be even more vital for commercial release in which more parties are 
involved. For example, there is already a documented case of experimental transgenic 
pigs being released for food consumption in America. The University of Illinois 
released to livestock dealers 356 pigs which were part of their transgenic experiments. 
The university argued that the pigs did not contain the genes of their parent stock; 
however investigations by the FDA found that records were inadequately kept and 
they were unable to verify this (FDA INVESTIGATES IMPROPER DISPOSAL OF 
BIOENGINEERED PIGS 2003). 
 
This illustrates Wynne’s assertion that the technology itself cannot be the only factor 
of assessment when considering the desirability of a technology; it is the human 
interaction involved with the technology, and how rules and regulations are made and 
followed, that should be considered (Wynne 1988, p. 149). The assumption that the 
risks of a technology can be fully contained through rules and regulations ignores the 
essentially ad hoc and ambiguous nature of rules and rule-following that social 
conditions help create and accidents often illustrate (Wynne 1988, p.149). The 
university of Illinois example illustrates this well; confusion over how controls should 
be applied (whether they apply to pigs that did not retain the gene) and how records 
should be kept (should they indicate which pigs retained the gene, or whether this is 
possible) led to an undesirable outcome of release of pigs into the food market. These 
are not essentially technical problems, but relate to the social environment. They 
relate to how rules are adapted to the local situations they are in. 
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 The literature on local knowledge, as discussed previously in Chapter Two, has noted 
the flexibility and adaptable nature of local knowledge, and this is important in the 
case of risk assessment. Adaptation of rule-following may also lead to interpretations 
of rules not intended by risk managers. This can lead to a greater risk of the 
technology not being contained in ways that minimise risk. In the context of animal 
biopharming there will be specific areas in which farming practices, transportation 
practices, and record keeping will adapt to the controls placed on animal biopharming. 
These factors need to be considered earlier in the risk assessment process.  
 
The intersection of local knowledge and knowledge held by risk assessors and ERMA 
staff may end in conflict reminiscent of cases such as Wynne’s study of Cumbrian 
sheep farmers (Wynne 1996), if assessors do not take local knowledge as a legitimate 
form of expertise. In Wynne’s study, the formalised and systematic approaches of 
scientists addressing the problem of soil contamination conflicted with the knowledge 
farmers held, which was generally adaptable and less formalised. Farmers, who 
accepted changing environments, conflicted with scientists who attempted to 
standardize the farming environment to their own scientific knowledge. Farmers lost 
confidence and trust in scientists when their local knowledge was ignored because it 
did not fit the standardised parameters of scientific knowledge; ignoring this 
knowledge resulted in scientists predicting early resolution of the problem, which they 
then could not deliver. This suggests further reasons for assessors to recognise farmer 
knowledge, relevant to animal biopharming, even though this knowledge might not fit 
the traditional framework of ‘scientific’ knowledge. In doing so, an understanding of 
the practicalities of controls and other risk factors maybe garnered, and conflict 
avoided.  
 
MAF and the difficulties with enforcing ERMA’s decisions 
In light of these issues around rule-following, it is particularly important that the 
enforcement of ERMA’s decisions and controls be consistent and relatively 
unambiguous, in order to avoid problems arising through human error. However, 
several reports have highlighted the difficulties MAF and ERMA have had in 
coordinating enforcement of decisions (Pollak 2003, p.65). One independent report on 
the effectiveness of ERMA in relation to the management of new organisms suggests 
that ERMA and MAF have different priorities that affect the way they approach the 
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enforcement of rules (Nakhies, Loutit & Rogne 2003, p.9). The institutional makeup 
of each organization means that each prioritizes different characteristics of controls. 
The report suggests that whilst ERMA is primarily concerned with risk aversion, 
MAF is highly interested in the importance of cost-effectiveness (Nakhies, Loutit & 
Rogne 2003, p.50). In this way, difficulties around rule-setting and rule-following are 
heightened by the organizational makeup of risk management in New Zealand. This 
could have the potential to confuse those seeking to follow rules, and undermine both 
regulatory agencies, which could lead to further opportunity for human error.  
 
Identification of risks and stakeholders by applicants 
It could be argued that the social dimensions of risk are covered in the requirement of 
the ERMA application process for stakeholders to be involved in decision making. As 
stakeholders can include members of the public, it could be argued that the public is 
offered a useful avenue to discuss social issues within this process.  Under Part V of 
the HSNO Act, ERMA is required to consult stakeholders on applications to release 
new organisms.  In the words of ERMA,  
 
By gathering information, expertise and comment from a range of stakeholders, a decision-maker 
will have a better picture of the issues. Consultation can improve the quality of information on 
which a decision is based (New Zealand. Environmental Risk Management Authority 17 March 
1999, p.5) 
 
However, further inspection of ERMA’s processes point to the fact that it is primarily 
the applicant’s job to identify and consult stakeholders, as well as to identify and 
assess risks. ERMA reviews the application and finds areas that need further scrutiny, 
or areas that need outside sources of expertise. This expertise is viewed in the sense of 
traditional scientific and technical expertise. Before this review however, it is the 
applicant who does the majority of assessment and consultation. This process involves 
the public in a limited way, and essentially assumes that those applying already know 
the scope of what and who will be affected by their technology. 
 
As there is no formal methodology for how applicants should identify whom to 
consult, applicants may not know how to adequately identify those with genuinely 
useful practical knowledge on the social practices that may exacerbate the risk of a 
technology. Thus, although it is useful to identify stakeholders, individuals and 
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communities who might have useful knowledge, there is no guarantee under this 
process that they will be identified. Local knowledge, which can provide useful 
information on the social impact of animal biopharming can easily be ignored under 
this arrangement.  It is generally considered that neighbouring farmers and local 
communities should be consulted, but the nature of this consultation, including the 
kinds of information sought, is left unclear.  
 
ERMA’s consultation with the public and evaluation of risk  
ERMA may also consult the public as a stakeholder, through the invitation of public 
submissions. The boxing of the public into the category of stakeholder ignores that 
within the public different kinds of knowledge combined with different degrees and 
types of interest exist. This essentially allows those already interested in the process 
of the application to be involved, but excludes those who may not realize they have 
useful knowledge to offer, or may not be skilled in the art of formal submissions.  
 
Furthermore, given the nature of social interaction and rule following, local 
knowledge relevant to the social impact of a technology may arise from relatively 
obscure areas; it is precisely for this reason that it must be actively identified. The 
avenue of public submissions is necessary and useful, but should not be considered 
adequate for identifying all knowledge necessary for the consideration of an 
application. 
 
ERMA’s qualification for considering social implications 
Aside from ERMA’s limitations in identifying local knowledge, it is necessary to 
query whether ERMA is qualified to consider social implications. Beyond 
considerations of Māori rights under the Treaty of Waitangi, there is little guidance 
for how the social implications for New Zealanders are to be considered by ERMA in 
their decision-making. The main part of the HSNO Act that can be interpreted as 
requiring that social implications be considered states that decisions must ensure “the 
maintenance and enhancement of people and communities to provide for their own 
economic, social and cultural well-being and for the reasonably foreseeable needs of 
future generations”. However, guidelines for achieving this goal are vague, and it is 
unclear whether ERMA is expected to have the expertise, or is even empowered to 
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make such an assessment.  There appear to be doubts within ERMA as to whether 
they are legally entitled to consider social and economic issues: 
 
[W]e have interpreted the requirements of the act to mean that we are able to address social and 
community effects, and sometimes the lawyers tell us that by actually considering those effects 
we are on the edge of being ultra vires. Because the act, it’s quite specific about Maori and also 
the Treaty of Waitangi. But it’s quite oblique about people, it talks about people in communities’ 
ability to provide for themselves, and also talks a little bit about future generations. But it’s not 
very specific... we and the applicants are not very good at identifying effects on society and 
community. (Interview Participant 1.) 
 
Currently the identification and consideration of social, cultural and economic effects 
are carried out mainly within ERMA itself. This division between what can be done 
in-house and what requires ‘expertise’ again points to the lack of recognition of local 
knowledge that can benefit practical considerations of risk.  ‘Expertise’ is consulted 
on areas considered scientific, such as environmental and health effects; the 
consultation of ‘expertise’ is not extended to the consideration of social and economic 
effects. Thus, the practical steps of how a technology will be used within its eventual 
social environment, and how this social environment will affect the risks of the 
technology, is considered to be adequately addressed from the abstract view of those 
within ERMA. This can lead to risks and implications going unaccounted for. 
 
 Again, the case of PPL Therapeutics’ sheep field trial illustrates this. The evaluation 
of the economic implications of this field trial was done by ERMA staff; however, 
they failed to account for the possibility of commercial partner Bayer Biological 
Products pulling funding from the project. The subsequent problems of how to deal 
with the GM sheep (whether they could be sold or should be destroyed) and what 
should be done with the land on which the field trial was being conducted (how long 
should it be monitored, whether it can be resold) were not considered. As in many 
cases where problems occur which were not anticipated, these issues were decided in 
court 30(Andrew 2004; Court Told Decision on GE Trial Site A Concern For New 
Landowner 2004).  
 
This was a social cost that could have potentially been avoided if ERMA had 
consulted others on the economic implications of the PPL project and looked beyond 
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the applicant’s own risk assessment process. It was unlikely that the applicant 
company would suggest the possibility of economic failure. Therefore, it is implicitly 
accepted that economic issues will not really be a problem in field trials; however, 
expertise outside that of the applicant and ERMA could have at least questioned this 
assumption. Relevant independent knowledge on the workings of the biotechnology 
industry could have perhaps pointed to the fact that this was a possible risk that 
needed to be accounted for. This is not a scientific or purely technical issue, but a 
social and economic one, which could have surfaced with the use of appropriate 
expertise.  
 
Public Participation outside of ERMA 
Bioethics Council 
The Royal Commission on Genetic Modification was conducted in 2000, partly in 
response to the unexpected amount of public interest in applications made to ERMA 
regarding GM. Applications under the new organisms section of the HSNO act to 
ERMA would regularly receive large numbers of public submissions. Interestingly, 
Bas Walker, in the forward to A Practical Guide to the Hazardous Substances and 
New Organisms Act, suggests the new organisms section of the Act was “almost an 
afterthought” (Le Bas 2005, p.ix). Thus, later surprise at the level of public attention 
given to applications of new organisms, specifically GM, and the workings of ERMA 
were seemingly inevitable given this approach. Nonetheless, given the level of 
interest, it was decided that an overall review of the regulation of genetic modification 
should be conducted. 
 
After its review, the Royal Commission published a report making several 
recommendations on how the debate and assessment surrounding GM should be 
conducted in New Zealand. Several of these suggestions were taken up by the 
government31. One of these was to set up the Bioethics Council, with the purpose of 
                                                 
31
 There were several notable differences between government decisions and Royal Commission 
recommendation. The government decided to have a moratorium for two years, which aimed to allow 
time for more research to be conducted on areas such as gene transfer and socio economical 
consequences, whereas the Royal Commission only suggested that work on GM should proceed 
cautiously. When the Royal Commission recommended additional research on gene transfer, etc., it 
would seem a reasonable reading of their recommendation that the intention was that future decisions 
be guided by the results of the research; but the government decided to interpret this as simply 
commissioning the research, not waiting for the actual findings. Another key difference was the Royal 
Commission recommendation that GM research should, wherever possible, not include animals that are 
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allowing an avenue for the New Zealand public’s ethical, spiritual and cultural 
concerns and issues to be discussed and considered. It is generally considered that the 
Bioethics Council offers an avenue for public involvement in GM decisions. The 
Bioethics Council is designed as a Ministerial Advisory Committee and reports to the 
government through the Minister for the Environment (The Bioethics Council (a)).  
Its recommendations are not binding. Interestingly, the RCGM report initially called 
for the Bioethics Council to include social issues within their range of considerations; 
however this was not carried through.  
 
A key role of the Bioethics Council is to provide a forum for the public to express its 
views and values on GM .Whilst it is undoubtedly important to provide a forum for 
values to be considered, it is interesting that the Bioethics Council only has authority 
as an advisory panel whilst having no authority on decision making. ERMA 
reportedly finds it has little use for the Bioethics Council’s work. A large part of this 
may be that the very nature of ethics and values are unquantifiable, and therefore 
cannot be entered into the risk/cost/benefit analysis.   
 
….what we need in terms of ethical info is threefold, we need some kind of framework for 
looking at ethical consideration, we need expert advice from ethicists, in areas that are really 
tricky, embryonic stem cell stuff coming up, and then there’s general advice on issues, ethical 
issues. So the Bioethics Council, they write papers on the general ethical issues, 
xenotransplantation, but it’s far too generic for us to be able to use it anyway. (Interview 
Participant 1.) 
 
ERMA has begun to develop a framework for addressing ethical concerns, with the 
aim of producing a more consistent and transparent process (New Zealand. 
Environmental Risk Management Authority 2005 (a)). A document for public 
discussion was issued in 2005 outlining ERMA’s proposed framework.  Under the 
framework, the responsibility remains on the applicants to address and assess ethical 
issues, for instance by identifying and consulting stakeholders who may have ethical 
concerns at a pre-application level. However, ERMA must provide strong guidance 
                                                                                                                                            
used as food; the government recognised the intent of this recommendation, that GM animals should 
not enter the food supply, but did not believe further action was required. The government also denied 
that there was a legal criterion or need for the Parliamentary Commissioner for Biotechnology 
recommended by the Royal Commission.  
 71 
on how this is to be done.  They may also consult the Ethics Advisory Panel as to 
whether further information is required.  
 
Interestingly the documents suggest that wise choices regarding applications need to 
consider information that “goes beyond what might be considered ‘technical’ or 
‘scientific’ (New Zealand. Environmental Risk Management Authority 2005 (a)), 
meaning ethical dimensions32. It also interesting that within the discussion paper, 
ERMA acknowledges that ethical values should not be ‘boxed’ into a purely isolated 
domain, but can influence other factors such as “physical, biological, cultural, 
community, and other considerations” (New Zealand. Environmental Risk 
Management Authority 2005 (a), p.5).  Thus, as the paper suggests, there are ethical 
considerations in determining the validity of competing claims regarding physical 
impacts and deciding the level of caution to exercise in relation to scientific 
uncertainty. This is a step in the right direction, and suggests that members of the 
public may be able to contribute to knowledge about practical problems, albeit 
through participation in discussions of ethics.  
 
However, there remains little room for the public to be involved in practical 
considerations of risk assessment beyond that of public submissions regarding 
specific applications or avenues for ethical discussion and participation. Whilst 
ERMA frames the public as holding legitimate knowledge and perhaps expertise on 
ethical issues, there is limited recognition of the public as holding expertise outside of 
this area. This thesis posits that the expertise of the public is not limited to ‘values’ 
but can be extended to areas of practical implication, such as the practicalities of 
proposed risk management, and the risks to and of social practices in relation to new 
organisms or hazardous material.      
 
Conclusion 
The risk assessment process in New Zealand currently limits the ability to identify 
and use local knowledge in assessment, particularly before a technology is 
commercialized. Identification of risks entailed in the technology is restricted by 
application-specific assessment, and the limited role for public involvement beyond 
                                                 
32
 Ironically, the discussion paper states that the procedural standard of “Scientific and rational 
methods” be upheld when considering ethical dimensions.  
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public submissions and the Bioethics Council’s non-binding discussions of values. As 
public submissions require participant initiative, valuable areas of knowledge that can 
contribute practically to risk assessment may be excluded. It is therefore important to 
develop systems to extract local knowledge beyond the current passive approach. The 
methodology of this thesis has attempted to address the lack of utilization of local 
knowledge in the current approach to risk management assessment in New Zealand. 
The next chapter will discuss the scoping process by which relevant local knowledge 
regarding the social implications of animal biopharming is identified.   
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Chapter 5  
Results from Scoping: Where is animal biopharming headed in New 
Zealand, and who holds useful knowledge?  
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, two sets of interviews were conducted for this thesis. 
This chapter focuses on findings from the first set, scoping interviews.  (The next 
chapter will present findings from interviews with relevant holders of local 
knowledge.) The scoping interviews, in combination with relevant literature, make it 
possible to identify certain drivers that are likely to affect the direction of animal 
biopharming in New Zealand.  
 
Scoping interviews were conducted with five people, from New Zealand Trade and 
Enterprise (NZTE), AgResearch, MoRST and ERMA. These organizations are 
involved in policy, research and regulation surrounding biotechnology, including 
animal biopharming. The primary goal of these interviews was to attain a better 
understanding of the most likely trajectories of animal biopharming in New Zealand 
in order to identify which areas of local knowledge could be of significance.  
 
The chapter will discuss, firstly, what the potential benefits of animal biopharming are 
reported to be, secondly, why New Zealand may be particularly likely to adopt animal 
biopharming and, thirdly, what possible factors will affect how the adoption of animal 
biopharming is likely to look when scaled up to a commercial production. It will then 
become clear what group of people may hold relevant knowledge deemed useful to 
the assessment of animal biopharming 
 
Drivers: What are the benefits? 
It is important to analyse what the projected benefits of animal biopharming are in 
order to understand whether and how commercial implementation of the technology 
might develop in New Zealand.   
 
The need for high-value products 
One benefit of animal biopharming is that the higher value of products it is designed 
to produce fits with the expected need for New Zealand to shift from commodity-
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based agriculture to an agricultural sector that produces higher-value products for 
export. The belief that New Zealand must maintain a competitive edge in international 
markets is implicit within the argument for this shift.  For example, an interviewee 
from AgResearch suggests:  
 
 Already certain countries, for example, Eastern Europe and probably South America, have got 
lower cost of production than what we’ve got, so therefore we can’t maintain an edge. Also we 
are a relatively small player in New Zealand, even though Fonterra has a large proportion of 
traded dairy products, if you look at the proportion of actual world markets including internal, 
it’s miniscule. So we can’t continue to be, we are not a low cost commodity player anymore. 
Therefore we have to get into some aspects of higher value….you can choose to make a 
completely different product, out of cow’s milk, or potentially out of meat by actually putting 
the gene [in] from another animal, and clearly that all forms part of the tool kit for the future of 
the pastoral industries in this country.  
 
New Zealand has traditionally relied on efficient production methods to produce 
large amounts of commodities that are price-competitive on overseas markets. As 
other countries become more efficient with production methods, it is argued that 
New Zealand’s economic competitiveness decreases. Thus, a new focus on quality 
rather than quantity is considered important to maintain competitiveness. This 
argument is also expressed in the literature surrounding biotechnology and animal 
biopharming in New Zealand. For example, the New Zealand Association of Crown 
Institutes emphasise this point in a paper released in 2000 (New Zealand 
Association of Crown Research Institutes. 2000, p.26), while NZTE argues that the 
Biotechnology Sector Engagement Strategy should partly focus on the development 
of higher-value products for the primary sector and that the highest revenues for 
biotechnology will be derived from non-food health applications (New Zealand 
Trade and Enterprise 2005).  
 
Beneficial to agricultural industry and farming practices 
It is clear that a major argument for animal biopharming is that it will benefit the 
farming industry in New Zealand. However, it is fair to question whether animal 
biopharming is intended to benefit actual dairy farmers through the production of 
pharma animals, or “the economy” or “the industry” or “the country” more 
generally through flow-on effects of foreign investment. This question is important 
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to understand where animal biopharming is most likely to be used in its commercial 
capacity. 
 
One interviewee supported the belief that animal biopharming is aimed at farmers, 
the industry, and the country in general. The main benefits of animal biopharming 
will reach farmers through a revitalisation of the industry and because of the 
extraordinary gains in value for farmers who choose to opt into this area of 
production.  
 
Q: Do you have an idea of who you think is most likely to benefit from this development?  
 
I personally think farmers will. The percentage increase would be massive to farmers and New 
Zealand… [I]f we are trying to grow this country, grow the economy of the country, you 
address the largest bits of the economy first, and the largest bits of the New Zealand economy 
are large animal agriculture. And if you can get a 20 percent increase in value return from 
agriculture in New Zealand, it’s like having a wine industry, a creative industry, Lord of the 
Rings, every couple of months, just by working on those large bits first. (Interview Participant-
NZTE).  
 
The participant from AgResearch supported the idea that the New Zealand farm 
will be the likely recipient of this technology and its benefits, more specifically 
through the actual adoption of the technology by farmers. In relation to who will be 
using the technologies of animal biopharming that AgResearch is developing, he 
states,  
 
Go back to AgResearch’s core vision which is something about getting technologies out on 
farms. [It] [d]oesn’t make a grain of sense to me at all for AgResearch to be hogging any of that 
business once its got to a point when it’s ready to go on to a farm. That’s not what we are about. 
And in this particular place, we are doing this because we see it as a vehicle to introduce 
technologies into N.Z, or to give N.Z the opportunity to use these technologies. (Interview 
Participant-AgResearch).  
 
Economic uncertainties 
However, other interviewees from the policy side were less confident of the 
economic benefits of animal biopharming. Although it was recognised that New 
Zealand holds the natural advantages for the development of animal biopharming 
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commonly cited in the literature (relative disease-free status, strong pastoral 
sector33), less confidence was placed in the actual chance of animal biopharming 
developing, given the safety and regulation issues it faces. An informant associated 
with Biotechnology Policy at MoRST argues, in his personal view, this point: 
 
My personal feeling, and this is where it is personal and definitely not government policy. My 
personal feeling is that biopharming, because of the health and safety and containment issues, is 
unlikely to take off. Unless there is no way you can produce your molecule by a cell culture then 
there’s no real great economic reason for growing in animals. 
 
Patent enhancing and busting vs. discovery of new drugs 
The observation highlights another point often made by those questioning the 
purpose of developing animal biopharming. The pharmaceutical substances 
currently associated with developments in animal biopharming are already 
produced through other means.  Is animal biopharming a means to develop and 
produce medicines that would otherwise not be possible?  The answer to this is not 
yet clear.  Elebehri (2005) argues, in relation to biopharm crops, that this may turn 
out to be the case. This point may need to be considered when weighing risks and 
benefits. 
 
The issue is also highlighted by a comment made by another interviewee 
identifying the advantages of animal biopharming. 
 
(U)sing animals to produce pharmaceutical proteins allows patent-busting or patent-enhancing 
on behalf of big pharma…. there’s something like, I haven’t seen the most recent figure, but 
tens of billions of dollars worth of IP [Intellectual Property] coming off patent in the 
pharmaceutical area in the next couple of years. And what, if you are a big pharma company and 
you have many many millions of dollars held in your IP, in patents on particular drugs, and also 
you are making a lot of money by selling those types of drugs because of your patent, the last 
thing you really want to do is relinquish that IP position without a fight when the patent life 
ends. So if you are able to have another way of making your drug that you can patent, then that 
basically enhances your patent for a longer life. So you now reapply for another patent based on 
a different [production method]…but on the other hand, and what makes this whole equation 
very intriguing, is that you have pharmaceutical companies looking to bust patents. And if they 
can get around a known patent by using a different method of production, then there [are] 
                                                 
33
 These will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.  
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significant gains in being able to do the same product as someone else, but without breaking a 
patent. (Interview Participant-NZTE) 
 
This informant sees the ability to find new ways of production, and hence new 
ways of busting or extending patents, as a reason for companies to invest in animal 
biopharming. Likewise MoRST suggests that pharmaceutical companies will focus 
on more novel ways of producing purer drugs that are harder to copy (MoRST 
2005, p.90). Whilst this may be of benefit economically to pharmaceutical 
companies, this reasoning partially conflicts with those arguing the possibilities of 
unique medical benefits developing from animal biopharming found in other 
literature scoped. If one of the economic drivers of animal biopharming is patent- 
enhancing or patent-busting, those developing animal biopharming may see no 
economic value in developing new drugs. In light of this, it is important to point out 
that animal biopharming may not lead automatically to new medical benefits or 
technologies34.  
 
Cheaper and larger-scale production 
Another advantage of animal biopharming suggested in the literature is that it 
allows a cheaper and larger-scale production of medicine than conventional 
methods, which are currently both expensive and time-consuming processes. An 
independent report on the potential for biotech in New Zealand suggests that animal 
biopharming is advantageous because it does not require complex monitoring and 
investment in plant equipment that other processes require (Beckman & Goldberg 
2003). Therefore, it is possible to produce larger amounts at a cheaper rate. A paper 
put out by MoRST cites that this production could cost 1/1000 of what it currently 
does to produce specialist drugs (MoRST 2005, p.68) Similarly, Kues and Niemann 
(2004) suggest that conventional production of rare human therapeutic proteins is 
expensive, time-consuming and inefficient (Kues & Niemann 2004, p.287) and that 
the use of animals to produce proteins can alleviate these problems.  
 
                                                 
34
 In 2005 AgResearch signed a deal with the drug company Pharma to produce recombinant human 
lactoferrin in cows. Interestingly, this drug is already manufactured by Texas-based firm Agennix 
through microbial fermentation processes (Wisner 2005) . The company claims its conventional 
method of production has relatively the same costs as producing human lactoferrin through a method 
developed by Ventria Bioscience, which biopharms rice to produce a human gene that triggers the 
production of human lactoferrin (Wisner 2005).  
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However, one could question whether animal biopharming is feasible or desirable 
without similarly extensive and expensive monitoring of the processes and 
conditions of production.  Not only must the purity of the pharmaceutical substance 
be ensured, but also the surrounding environment and the food supply must be 
protected from inadvertent introduction of pharmaceutical substances.  Will this 
erode or negate the alleged cost advantage of animal biopharming? 
 
Even if animal biopharming does prove to be cheaper, it should be noted that this 
may not necessarily translate into large benefits for patients. An article in Nature 
Biotechnology suggests that the complex production processes of biotechnology 
may mean that cheaper knock-off drugs will be harder to produce, in which case it 
is possible to question whether the cheaper production methods of animal 
biopharming will necessarily lead to a greater availability of drugs for patients 
(Herrera 2004). A distinction arises between the concept of new drug development, 
the desire for new drug production methods, and the benefits for patients. 
  
Healthcare value 
The ability to merge healthcare with New Zealand’s agricultural sector may also be 
one of animal biopharming’s most attractive features. The Biotechnology Sector 
Engagement Strategy states that healthcare biotechnology has the potential to 
generate the greatest economic gains, particularly as the population ages, the cost of 
healthcare increases and new technology improves (New Zealand Trade and 
Enterprise 2005). Supporting this is the Biotechnology Taskforce Recommendation 
Action No. 9, which aims to reinforce New Zealand’s relationship with the 
pharmaceutical industry. Whilst this does not relate specifically to animal 
biopharming, the focus is on building partnerships with the health industry as well 
as developing biotechnology research that has human health applications (New 
Zealand Government Press Release September 18 2003), within which animal 
biopharming obviously can be categorised.  
 
Why is New Zealand likely to be affected? 
The potential benefits of animal biopharming mean that there is definite interest for 
New Zealand to invest in encouraging its introduction. However there are also reasons 
why New Zealand seems a particularly attractive and likely destination for companies 
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searching for locations to develop the technology. Quoted in Trademark magazine, Dr 
Pickering, chief operating officer of Virolonyx Corporation, a developer of HIV 
vaccines, reiterates this point,  
 
With its disease-free status, a long history of efficient and innovative farm management 
practices, as well as top quality biomedical research, New Zealand has huge potential to claim 
its place as the world's natural home for the development and commercialisation of novel animal 
and plant derived human therapeutics. (Powell 2001, p.15) 
 
Disease- free status 
As stated by Dr Pickering a major reason that New Zealand is considered an 
attractive place to develop animal biopharming is its disease-free status, in 
particular its freedom from diseases such as BSE and Foot and Mouth Disease. This 
point is prominent throughout the literature, and was identified by all interviewees 
as a reason that animal biopharming is likely to develop in New Zealand: 
 
Q: So is there anything about New Zealand that makes it particularly good place to develop 
biopharming? 
 
 [It is] Disease free. The fact that we don’t have BSE, we don’t have FMD [foot and mouth 
disease], would be the two absolute keys. But we can go through anthrax and a whole lot of 
other ones that that’s the huge encouragement for companies to come to New Zealand or for 
New Zealand to [produce] animal based food and health products.  (Interview Participant-
AgResearch).  
 
Similarly: 
 [Our] disease-free status is really the key. Our bio security and isolation have meant that … we 
are the only country in the world that has no category-one listed diseases and my feeling is that 
if you were wanting to get …an animal biosphere product into the health system people would 
really …New Zealand has a key advantage in that area. (Interview Participant- MoRST).  
 
The importance of New Zealand’s disease-free status also relates to the likely need to 
monitor animal health through regulation. Kues and Heiner state that general 
guidelines of the FDA require close control and monitoring of the animal’s health and 
of the performance of the transgenic animal over several generations (Kues & 
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Niemann 2004, p.288). They suggest that GM farming should be conducted using 
animals from disease-free countries to make this process easier.  
 
Strong dairy and research sector 
New Zealand’s farming sector is also a strong reason that animal biopharming is 
likely to develop in New Zealand. New Zealand has had strong backing both 
privately and by government for basic research on cattle which may be helpful for 
the development of animal biopharming (Beckman & Goldberg 2003, p.10). The 
expertise in farm management within New Zealand may also encourage foreign 
companies to invest in production of animal biopharming here, particularly as its 
success may rely heavily on farm management practices, such as the ability to 
monitor, control and contain animals.  
 
The obvious focus on biotechnology research from government funding will also 
encourage overseas investment in the development of animal biopharming 
capability. For example, Crown Research Institutes such as AgResearch are 
expected to form partnerships with industry and to commercialise research. The 
Biotechnology Taskforce, set up under the governments Growth and Innovation 
Framework, sets this as one of its tasks (New Zealand Government Press Release 
September 18 2003). The focus on practical commercial applications and the 
government support for partnerships encourages overseas investment in animal 
biopharming, illustrated in the recent deal between AgResearch and Pharming 
(NV).  
 
What will it look like?  
Given the potential benefits and projected suitability of New Zealand for animal 
biopharming there is a good case to suggest the technology is likely to reach our 
shores at some point. The interviews were also supportive of the fact that if 
biopharming becomes viable, it will probably occur in New Zealand: 
 
[W]ell my feeling is that it will be a New Zealand animal that does it first. I would be very, I 
would be quite surprised if it’s a non-New Zealand animal that gets the first product on the 
market, I think, the way things are going. (Interview Participant-MoRST).  
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Recent developments in the field support this claim. There have already been several 
cases of field tests, as stated in earlier chapters. Commercial ventures have also been 
attempted. In 1999 biotech company PPL Therapeutics gained approval from ERMA 
to field-test a flock of four thousand biopharm sheep.  The sheep were made 
bioreactors by “[i]nserting a human gene into the DNA of sheep to produce the 
protein alpha-1 antitrypsin in the sheep's milk. This protein is a potential treatment for 
cystic fibrosis (AgResearch 2000).”35 The operation was cancelled and the flock 
slaughtered when partner company Bayer Biological Products no longer felt the 
operation was economically viable. Bayer was originally meant to carry out the 
clinical trials and marketing of the drug (NZPA 2003).  
 
More recently, AgResearch has signed a deal to produce recombinant human 
lactoferrin in cow’s milk, with a Netherlands-based biotechnology company called 
Pharming (NV). The purpose of the deal is for AgResearch to develop the capability 
for market-scale production of the protein, as well as developing purification 
capabilities within New Zealand. AgResearch believes that at best calves will be in 
the paddock by mid-spring 2006, under containment. AgResearch has received 
approval by ERMA to field-test these transgenic cows under a previous decision 
given in 2002 to conduct a broad development of GM cattle for non-commercial 
purposes. ERMA however has not given AgResearch approval to develop commercial 
herds of the transgenic cows as several press releases36 suggest AgResearch planned 
to do (Atkinson 2005).  
 
The decision by ERMA has come under heavy criticism particularly as the public was 
not included in any discussion or review of the decision. In making the decision 
ERMA also amended their previous decision by allowing AgResearch to use imported 
GM semen developed by other biotech companies. It has been argued that this will 
open the door for overseas companies to use New Zealand as a developer and 
producer of GM animals (GE Free NZ 2005).  
 
                                                 
35
 This information was taken from AgResearch’s website.  
36
 For example, a press release by Pharming (NV) on their website states, “AgResearch shall bear costs 
associated with the initial production of rhLF [recombinant human lactoferrin] and support the 
commercialization of rhLF through its extensive network in the South Pacific and Asia. ( Pharming 
Group N.V 2005)”.   
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The recent decision by ERMA strongly suggests that development of animal 
biopharming for commercial purposes is likely to be attempted at some point in 
New Zealand. The next section identifies several scenarios for how animal 
biopharming may develop and be used in a commercial sense. In doing so, it will 
become apparent what forms of local knowledge may be useful for the assessment 
of the risks of animal biopharming in New Zealand.  
 
The intentions of those developing animal biopharming 
As discussed in Chapter Three, in order to know where the technology is headed, 
and what areas of local knowledge maybe useful, it is vital to understand how 
animal biopharming is intended to be used by those driving its development. This 
next section will briefly highlight how the intentions of those developing and 
encouraging animal biopharming could affect where it operates, the size of its 
operations and who will be involved and affected by those operations.  
 
Dairy 
There are several types of animal that can be used for animal biopharming within 
New Zealand. For the purpose of this thesis, a focus has been placed on animal 
biopharming involving dairy cattle. Through scoping of the literature and 
interviews it has become apparent that the dairy industry will be particularly 
impacted by the introduction of animal biopharming. As the infrastructure is 
already developed here to farm dairy cows efficiently, those developing animal 
biopharmed products can save money on start-up costs. As one interviewee put it:  
 
[E]very time you make a change in an industry it costs money. Because you’ve got to train 
people, you’ve got to put in new processes and new technologies and structures, so it stands to 
reason that you make as few changes as possible to keep the costs down. Hence in New Zealand 
you do meat and milk. (Interview Participant-AgResearch).  
 
This is perhaps why animal biopharming will be more likely to be used on dairy 
cows than other animals such as pigs, which are also capable of producing human 
pharmaceuticals, and are considered the most appropriate animal for production of 
organs for xenotransplantation (into humans).  
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Well that’s what we farm in New Zealand, yeah we’ve got pig farms, but that’s only for 
domestic consumption. We don’t have hi-tech pig farms. We don’t have a researched pig 
industry in this country. The pork industry goes to Australia for its research. Likewise there is 
no research poultry industry in this country. (Interview Participant- AgResearch).  
 
A report prepared by the MoRST in 2005 predicts that animal biopharming will be 
active within New Zealand by 2008, to the point that factories of livestock will 
develop across the country (MoRST 2005).  Within the livestock category, this 
thesis has focused on dairy cows for a variety of reasons. First, as illustrated above, 
New Zealand has a natural advantage in expertise and experience in dairying, 
therefore it is natural that companies will wish to use the systems already 
developed for dairying in the development of animal biopharming. Second, there is 
a perception that large animals are safer to use in biopharming than crops and 
easier to contain (Pollak 2003, p.59). As crops can potentially contaminate non-
biopharm crops through pollination via insects and wind, animals are considered 
easier to isolate. Large animals are easier to see also, and therefore detection of 
escape would be less challenging. However, there is a high level of debate as to 
what constitutes containment of animals, as will be discussed later in this chapter.  
 
How many cows? 
It is generally considered likely that fewer cows will be needed to produce 
pharmaceuticals than are used in traditional dairy operations. The size of the herd 
will affect how the animals are raised, and what management system is required.  
Interviewees indicated how the size of the herd could vary depending on market 
demand and scientific capability. The participant from AgResearch suggests:  
 
[Y]ou can do sums that will tell you that a herd of 12 cattle can produce a substantial amount of 
national, or the international requirement. So potentially if everything is optimized you can get 
some very efficient small herds that are producing large amounts of high value milk. That’s a 
possibility. Another possibility is that you say actually I’m not going to go for intensive system, 
I’ll have more animals that are perhaps a bit less efficient…it will depend on the economics of 
it. It also depends on the cost of purifying the product out of the milk, assuming that that is what 
you are going to do. 
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In another interview with an informant from NZTE, the suggestion that utilizing 
farmer’s experience in farming may mean that larger herds are used: 
 
 … I guess you are looking for the economies of scale, and you would be looking to utilize the 
knowledge that we have in handling 250 cows with one man and a dog, which we do on our 
dairy farms. So I guess if you are smart you would want to get all the productivity gains that 
would come from good New Zealand farm practice, but also obviously the significant revenue 
gains from producing something other than milk.  
 
Higher milk cleanliness 
One interviewee illustrated the need for even higher standards of cleanliness for 
transgenic milk. In order to extract pharmaceuticals from milk it is necessary to 
have ultra-clean milking facilities.   
 
[I])f you start pulling milk out of a cow that has got a protein expressed in it, you are going to 
have to really start looking at the hygiene side of it. I mean New Zealand dairy farmers are very 
clean anyway, but they are going to have to go up to almost lab standards. (Interview 
Participant- NZTE).  
 
There may need to be new facilities to ensure this status of cleanliness.  
 
Nutraceutical or pharmaceutical 
The stringency of regulations may depend on whether the product being produced 
is a nutraceutical or a pharmaceutical. A nutraceutical is a food or food extract that 
is thought to convey medicinal or health benefits, but is not considered a drug (if 
consumed as food, it is known as functional food). Interviews with those supporting 
the development of animal biopharming indicated that the decision to produce 
nutraceuticals may come down to market demand: 
 
Q: In terms of the nutraceutical, is that something you are aiming for now perhaps because the 
regulations are less stringent?  
 
No it’s purely a marketing thing.  I mean, again I’m not talking about lactoferrin here; I’m 
talking in general terms it’s purely a marketing issue. And whether the market wishes products 
from this source. (Interview Participant- AgResearch). 
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Depending on economic factors there is a possibility that nutraceuticals could be 
produced from biopharm cows. This would bypass more stringent regulation in 
terms of clinical trials. If this is the case, it can be expected that the commercial 
production of biopharm cows would occur more quickly than if cows are producing 
pharmaceuticals.  
 
Who owns the cows? 
Finally, the operation of animal biopharming will also be dependent on the 
management and ownership structure in place. Interviews from the scoping section 
indicate that it is most likely that animals will be owned by the developer, and 
managed by farmers. However, other options are possible such as a group of 
farmers banding together to own an operation, or the operation being subsidised by 
the pharmaceutical company: 
 
I think it would really depend on the business bottle…what you would get effectively is farm 
managers farming the animals that are owned by a biotech company or a pharmaceutical 
company… [b]ut I guess a smaller scale example is farmers that band together and decide to go 
organic in their area, and then sell together. You know they basically, they started on their own 
herds, they got the technological information on what they needed to do, they needed to do this 
and that to become organic milk producers, so they did. Obviously there is a massive difference 
in investment in time and regulations, but it would be like that. It would be a group of farmers 
that saw the business case, worked with a provider, worked with a pharmaceutical company and 
you know something came out the other end of it. (Interview Participant- NZTE).  
 
Possible Controls Related to Risks:  
A large part of how animal biopharming will look if scaled up to commercial 
production will depend on what the risk assessment process deems to be the 
required controls for its safety. These controls will be determined based on what the 
perceived risks of animal biopharming happen to be. This is particularly important 
given the recent amendment to the HSNO act in 2003 to include conditional release 
as one of its categories of application (New Zealand. Environmental Risk 
Management Authority November 2003). Previously applicants could only apply 
for containment, field test or full commercial release. Full commercial release 
meant that the product required no controlling or monitoring. The inclusion of 
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conditional release allows a new organism to enter the environment whilst still 
having controls placed on its use. 
 
 It is important to understand what these controls are likely to be for two reasons. 
Firstly, the controls will affect who will use and own the technology, for example, 
as compliance with controls may raise the cost of production significantly, controls 
will determine whether it is economical for farmers to run and own the operation. 
And secondly, it will affect how the technology is used, for example, what type of 
production model is required. Scoping likely controls makes it possible to identify 
holders of local knowledge that may be relevant to assessing the practicality, risks 
and likely effects of the controls. 
 
Animal biopharming likely to be a conditional release 
Several interviewees indicated that they did not expect animal biopharming to be 
approved as a full commercial release, and therefore controls will be influential in 
the use of animal biopharming:  
 
Someone could apply for a full release, but I think they’d be better off going for a conditional 
release. Because the kinds of conditions you put on would be that it could only be done in a set 
number of properties.  It just means that, particularly thinking of cows, if anything did go wrong 
then you’d be able to retrieve it, put it back. (Interview Participant 1).  
 
The quote suggests that there are already several perceived risks of animal 
biopharming that may lead to certain types of controls being put in place for 
commercial operations.  
 
This next section will briefly identify some of the likely controls that will shape 
how animal biopharming operates.  
 
Keeping milk separated from general food supply 
One of the main risks of animal biopharming involving cows is the possibility of 
GM milk entering the food supply. This could have effects on human health, the 
market perception of non-GM milk and on the rights of consumers and producers to 
decide what to purchase or sell.  
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Depending on the protein or pharmaceutical being produced within the cows’ milk, 
the safety of consumption will differ. Although most pharmaceuticals will have to 
be extracted from the milk, rather than consumed through milk, it is generally 
recognised that harmful health effects could result from inadvertently consuming 
pharmaceutical substances by drinking the milk.  The nature of the effect would 
depend on the substance and on the individual involved.  Nutraceuticals are more 
likely to be intended for consumption in the milk itself; again the risks of 
inadvertent consumption by the public depend on the type of substance involved 
and the particular individual consuming it.  
 
Beyond health issues, for the economic well being of both GM and non-GM dairy 
farmers in New Zealand, it will be vital to separate both types of biopharm milk 
from non-biopharm milk. GM milk will likely be closely monitored, and high 
standards of cleanliness will be required in order to extract pharmaceuticals. As it 
will be worth more than normal milk, the results of mixing the two could be costly. 
On the other side, the perception of New Zealand non-GM dairy by overseas 
markets would be affected negatively by an accidental release of GM milk into the 
food supply.  
 
The incident of the accidental release of Starlink corn into the human food chain, 
generally considered only a minor health hazard, illustrates the economic cost of 
accidental leaks of GM substances into the food chain. Starlink was GM corn which 
was not approved for food consumption, but was detected in human foods in 
200037. The Starlink case cost millions to recall contaminated food, clean plants, 
and settle lawsuits38. It was also costly to non-GM farmers, as Japan temporarily 
ceased importing U.S corn in October 27 until they were confident that testing 
                                                 
37
 The Starlink gene Cry9C was found in a sample of Taco Bell shells on September 18, 2000 (Schmitz 
2005). The gene was detected later in other foods. 
38
 Schmitz, Schmitz and Moss (2005) illustrate the cost of two such law suits. Fingers et al. v. Kraft 
Foods North America, Inc., et al. was a case in which plaintiffs claimed they had allergic reactions to 
contaminated food. Although testing found none of the plaintiffs had antibodies that would indicate an 
allergic reaction to the Starlink gene, a settlement of $9 million dollars was approved in 2002 (2005, p. 
392). Mullholland et al. v. Aventis Crop Science USA Holding, Inc. was a case filed by non-Starlink 
corn growers who claimed damages from contamination. This involved loss of market value as well as 
storage and transportation costs resulting from contamination (2005, p.392). The case was settled for 
$110 million in 2003.  
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mechanisms for Starlink were adequate. An article in Agribusiness journal 
estimates that the Starlink episode resulted in losses between $26 and $288 million 
dollars for producers in the U.S (Schmitz, Schmitz & Moss 2005).  
 
The Starlink episode illustrates the importance of keeping GM material not 
regulated for the food chain, out of the food chain. In the case of animal 
biopharming in New Zealand, this will inevitably mean that modified cows’ milk 
should be separated from non-GM cows’ milk. Controls will have to be put in place 
to attempt to ensure this. 
 
Keeping cows separated from the food chain and the use of excess cows 
The National Research Council in the United States also identifies the importance 
of restricting biopharm animals from the food chain. However, issues can arise 
given the nature of animal biopharming in relation to dairying. As the valuable 
protein is produced in the cows’ milk, and cows lactate in order to feed calves, it is 
not possible to produce the milk without the birth of new calves. These calves will 
essentially be worthless if not needed for the herd (e.g., only a small herd is needed 
[see above] or they are males) and not welcome in the food chain. It may be likely 
that developers seek approval to use excess cows for some other use such as food 
(U.S National Research Council Committee on Defining Science-based Concerns 
Associated with Products of Animal Biotechnology. 2002, p.54). 
 
 However, it is possible that regulation will not allow this. Even if a transgenic 
animal does not contain the product of an introduced gene, and therefore is perhaps 
unlikely to have human health consequences, the possibility of such a threat and the 
regulatory problems this would cause, leads the National Research Council to 
recommend keeping these animals from the food chain (U.S National Research 
Council  Committee on Defining Science-based Concerns Associated with Products 
of Animal Biotechnology. 2002, p. 54). New Zealand regulators may well do the 
same.  This raises the question of how the calves will be treated and/or disposed of, 
and what costs that might entail. 
 
Stop animals from escaping and entering 
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It will also be likely that controls are mandated to stop the intermixing of transgenic 
and non-transgenic cows. Field tests of transgenic cows in New Zealand have 
focused on containing the cows, for example by using double fencing which is two 
metres high in order to stop the animals mixing with neighbouring animals. 
Identification tags to monitor where cows are at any time are also considered 
important, both to avoid escape and to ensure that inspectors are able to identify 
cows easily. The possibility of transgenic/non-transgenic interbreeding could lead 
to incidents such as Starlink, in which biopharm substances are inadvertently 
consumed and major economic repercussions occur, or could undermine the 
viability of the biopharming enterprise by compromising the purity of the biopharm 
herd and its product.  Presumably, controls will (attempt to) address this. 
 
However, it is generally considered easier to contain transgenic cows than 
transgenic plants, mostly because they are more visible, and less likely to survive 
undetected in the wild. This could lead regulators to mandate less stringent controls.  
 
Horizontal gene transfer through soil and other material 
The possibility of horizontal gene transfer39 is a debated issue within risk 
assessment of animal biopharming. The National Research Council suggests 
“Although there is no example yet of acquisition of any gene, including drug 
resistance markers, by bacterial flora living in a transgenic animal, the spread of 
introduced genes remains a possibility, albeit remote” (U.S National Research 
Council Committee on Defining Science-based Concerns Associated with Products 
of Animal Biotechnology. 2002, p.52). The GM protein contained in the cows’ 
milk, or the genetic material that “programs” the expression of the protein, may 
also be contained in blood, secretions, faecal matter and other waste material.  This 
could be of concern, as it could be ingested or spread by other organisms or 
animals. For example, blood-sucking insects or soil bacteria could become affected 
by, or vectors for the spread of, the altered genetic material. Whether or not this is 
recognised as a danger will determine whether any effort is made within the 
regulations to contain more than the cows themselves and their milk.   
 
                                                 
39
 This is the transfer of genes other than ‘vertically’ (i.e., from parent to offspring). 
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Another concern is that the effects of proteins in novel environments are largely 
unpredictable. For example, the BSE virus developed from young calves 
consuming meat and bone meal (MBM), from which prion proteins were acquired 
which changed shape and became pathological (Cambridge scientist reviews 
origins of BSE 2001). Some suggest that similar prion diseases could develop 
through genetic modification of animals (Weaver 2003, p.25). This may happen if 
the protein is able to be passed and expressed outside of the transgenic cow’s milk 
or from the consumption of a cow’s transgenic milk (U.S National Research 
Council Committee on Defining Science-based Concerns Associated with Products 
of Animal Biotechnology. 2002, p.52) .The National Research Council argues that 
“[t]ransgenes might be expressed at a low level in various tissues in which the 
promoter is not expected to be active” (U.S National Research Council Committee 
on Defining Science-based Concerns Associated with Products of Animal 
Biotechnology. 2002, p.66). If this is the case there could be an unpredictable 
spread of genes and proteins. Therefore, controls may be set in place to limit the 
spread of soil or cow waste matter within or from GM farm to non-GM farms.  
 
Health of the cows and disposal of unused milk and carcasses  
As the animals are likely to be worth a large amount of money, their health will be 
paramount. If an animal becomes sick, it will be unable to be used for 
pharmaceutical milk. Therefore the disposal of sick animals or the disposal of their 
milk may also have to be regulated to ensure the material is not spread off the farm, 
and in turn the potential risks of inadvertent consumption and horizontal gene 
transfer are limited.   
 
Conclusion: Identifying relevant knowledge  
Scoping research made it possible to sketch the parameters of how animal 
biopharming might develop and who may be affected by animal biopharming in 
New Zealand. Through the literature and scoping interviews, it became obvious that 
there is perceived economic incentive to pursue animal biopharming in New 
Zealand and, given New Zealand’s well developed dairy infrastructure and freedom 
from BSE, it is most likely to develop within dairying. It is also became clear that 
some form of controls will be needed (and likely mandated) in order to manage the 
risks of animal biopharming identified in the literature. Such controls will affect 
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and be affected by the behaviour of those producing animal biopharmed products.  
It seems logical to assume therefore that dairy farmers are likely to hold useful 
knowledge on how their current practices may be affected by animal biopharming, 
whether they can see additional risks in the operation and whether likely controls 
will be practical or realistic. The interviews with dairy farmers focused on possible 
scenarios for how animal biopharming might develop, given the information 
collected from the scoping section, and what the farmers thought could be relevant 
to the assessment of the risks of these developments.  
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Chapter 6: Eliciting Local Knowledge: Results from interviews with 
dairy farmers 
In the previous chapter, particular focus was placed on different drivers of animal 
biopharming, and their potential to shape future applications on a practical and 
commercial level. This chapter will discuss what has been learned from interviews 
with dairy farmers about the risks of biopharming in the dairy sector, particularly with 
regard to practical issues of implementation. 
 
Seven farmers with varying experiences, from Canterbury, Taranaki and Waikato, 
were identified and interviewed either by phone or in person. These interviews 
focused on how animal biopharming is likely to be implemented in the dairy sector 
and how the implementation is likely to be shaped by practices in the sector.  The 
discussion here will first be organised into three categories of risk that emerged from 
the interviews: rule-following, containment, and economic factors.  After exploring 
these areas in detail, the chapter will apply the findings to several ownership and 
regulatory scenarios for animal biopharming in New Zealand.  This is important, as 
various implications identified by farmers will be dependent upon which scenarios of 
management, ownership and controls are in place. 
 
Biopharming risk areas 
Findings on the sources of risk arising from farming practice can be categorised into 
three general areas. These are: 
 
1) Ambiguity of rule-following: 
The interviewees noted the risk of relying heavily on controls to ensure the safety 
of animal biopharming. This is particularly relevant given the complexity of rule- 
following within the social context of dairy farming. Both practical and general 
thematic areas of risk are highlighted in this section.   
 
2) Containment factors: 
The interviewees identified several areas of practice that may affect the ability to 
contain animals and soil within an animal biopharming operation. Significant 
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changes to farming practice may have to occur to ensure animal biopharming 
containment.  
 
3) Economic Factors: 
A large part of the implications of animal biopharming will be determined by 
economic factors. These factors will affect farmers behaviours as well as the 
practicalities of controls.   
 
Before beginning, it is important to note that at least some of the risks and 
implications identified in these interviews are avoidable through careful planning and 
considerable spending. However, it is assumed that in order to avoid hazards and 
manage risks, it is generally useful to identify them first, if possible.  
 
Ambiguity of rule following 
The literature on local knowledge and risk assessment is littered with examples of 
individuals not following rules and behaving in unexpected ways (at least to those 
looking from the outside), generally making risk minimisation more complex than it 
may initially seem. Rules and controls are often demonstrated to be unrealistic, 
impractical or irrelevant in the context of actual rule-following and behaviour on a 
ground level. The Starlink episode and Britain’s BSE debacle, among others40, point 
to the need to understand rule-following from within the social dynamics of the rule-
following context. Behaviour can be complex and adaptable, thus often resistant to 
fixed standards and rules. Wynne articulates the point clearly: “Practices do not 
follow rules; rather, rules follow evolving practices” (Wynne 1988, p.153). 
 
                                                 
40
 Irwin’s (1995) example of the public dispute between farm workers and British regulatory authorities 
over the use of the herbicide 2,4,5-T is particularly relevant here. Farm worker’s campaigned to have 
the pesticide banned to the Advisory Committee on Pesticides (ACP). They provided the ACP with a 
dossier of information on the ‘real world’ uses of the pesticide and examples of the pesticide being 
linked to ill health. However, this information was discredited by the ACP because it did not fit the 
scientific model of proof. The ACP felt the pesticide was safe for use if recommended procedures were 
followed; however such information was based on flawed assumptions of the social environment the 
pesticide was to interact with.  As Irwin suggests “[t]he argument for a ban on the pesticide 
was…constructed in terms of an inherently uncontrollable technology and of a messy and 
heterogeneous ‘real world’. The advisory committee’s insistence on ‘recommended’ conditions made 
little sense within this social and technical model of pesticide administration” (p. 113). In the case of 
Starlink, faulty assumptions about the planting practices of farmers assumed that the segregation rules 
for GM corn would be easily followed, which thus provided a false confidence in containability 
(Taylor and Tick 2000). The BSE example relates to scientific recommendations made to ensure safety 
of cows that ignored the social realities of meat practices in Britain.   
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Given that animal biopharming is likely to be, at least initially, subject to strong 
controls41, farmers recognised and highlighted the risk in relying heavily on regulation 
to maintain safety. The following interviews illustrate the importance of looking at 
how farmers follow rules when seeking to gauge the risk and implications of a 
control-intensive operation such as animal biopharming. This next section will briefly 
discuss the interviews in relation to farmers’ behavioural and attitudinal approach to 
controls and rule following. 
 
The effect of ownership on the attitude of farmers  
Many of the farmers interviewed suggested that the effectiveness of controls will be 
affected both by how farmers interpret them and how they feel about them. Most of 
the interview participants noted that a farmers attitude and commitment to following 
controls may be influenced by whether they own the animal or not. If animal 
biopharming is likely to be run under a farm-management operation, seen as a likely 
scenario in the previous chapter, several participants viewed this as a potential area of 
risk: 
 
In normal mainstream farming people who are managers are trying to get ahead. People who 
own the cows will do everything, come hell or high water for those cows, because they are 
theirs. And… they would take care of the farm better, they would take care of the animals 
better, they are more specific (sic) with their cows. Share milkers and farm owners… they will 
bat for a cow until it dies. Whereas a farm manager goes, “I don‘t own it, what do I care?” It’s 
an attitude. I mean if you got the right farm manager, it could be good. The other thing is if it 
was a farm management position, you would have to get quite a legal binding document with 
him saying he can’t do what normal practices he thinks he could do.  
 
Q: Such as? 
 
Well if he was only there for a year, he could take something with him to the next farm.... An 
owner you are in it boots and all, and you are going to make sure that it works. Whereas a 
manager its like “I’m only here for a year, what do I care?” It can be an attitude thing. (Dairy 
farmer participant 1) 
 
                                                 
41
 As stated earlier, this may depend on the classification of what health product the animal is designed 
to produce. For example, as Pharma (NV) is seeking to classify human lactoferrin as GRAS (Generally 
Recognised as Safe) through the FDA (Food and Drug Administration, U.S), this may have 
implications for the level of controls required for that particular product in New Zealand (Cow 
produced Lactoferrin Completes GRAS notification January 2006).  
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According to this interview participant, the commitment to following controls may 
need to be factored into a risk assessment analysis. Such a consideration falls outside 
the bounds of purely technical evaluation, given the unquantifiable nature of the 
subject. However, in order to avoid the risk of poor control-following, it may be 
necessary to evaluate the different affects of ownership on farmer attitudes and rule-
following and include this in a risk assessment equation.   
 
Beyond the more general theme of rule-following, the above quote identifies an area 
of practical risk. Behaviour such as taking property from one farm to another when a 
job is finished illustrates a practice which will need to be considered when seeking to 
set appropriate controls for animal biopharming. If not recognised and controlled for, 
such practices could affect the spread of animal biopharming material, particularly 
given the level of job turnover among farm employees (discussed later in this 
chapter).  
 
However, whilst the majority of farmers interviewed agreed that ownership will affect 
attitude and in turn, may affect willingness to follow rules, one farmer believed farm 
managers would be particularly capable of performing the proper procedures: 
  
Q: So a farm manager is someone who is hired to work… 
 
To run a farm, is very capable of running a farm. Has got the right skills, and the people skills 
and the animal husbandry skills , and it probably takes them, they probably have to be farming 
for up to six or seven years at least before they can be called a competent manager…a farm 
manager now is a pretty skilled and qualified person. So they should be quite confident of 
handling what you are suggesting here. (Dairy farmer participant 2).  
 
The differences in opinion between farmers illustrate the diversity within the farming 
community on attitudes towards risk. This supports the literature that suggests local 
knowledge is not always unified within a community.  
 
Farmers’ perception of risk and rule interpretation 
The farmers’ own perception of what the risk of an operation is may affect the 
likelihood that they will accurately follow controls. Perhaps unsurprisingly, if a 
control is felt to be arbitrary, it may not be followed. In relation to risk assessment, it 
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calls into question whether it is possible to have confidence that risks are truly 
minimised by controls, given that their effectiveness is reliant on farmer discretion.  
 
For example, one farmer indicated that there could be potential for rule skipping in 
relation to escapes of GM animals from containment. The farmer admitted that he 
would be unlikely to report any escape of GM cows onto his farm because he would 
not want to deal with red tape and potential monitoring requirements for an issue he 
did not believe was a risk. Thus, in the case of an animal escaping onto his farm, he 
would be likely to return it without reporting the case, even if this was required to be 
done by regulation.   
 
As with the last section, the farmer’s comments illustrate a practical point, as well as 
supporting the general theme that rule-following is flexible within farming culture. 
Practically, the relationship between neighbouring non-GM farmers and GM farmers 
may have implications for the ability to contain GM animals or material, particularly 
if there is limited ability to regulate behaviour after an escape occurs. A potential 
reluctance of neighbouring farmers to cooperate with controls and monitoring could 
be a real problem with regard to reporting and monitoring containment problems. This 
raises the risk of milk or meat from animals that have been in contact with GM cows, 
or escaped GM cows themselves (or their descendents), entering the food supply. 
 
Similar issues are illustrated by the following farmer’s discussion of “slackness” 
around management of herds containing tuberculosis-infected cows: 
 
Well there are some areas where you can’t move animals in and out of, and the rest of it is free. 
And you just have to record the movement of animals from one farm to another. But that is 
pretty, well; I would say it is pretty slack. The officials would say that it is not.  
 
Q: how is it slack? 
 
 Well it is pretty easy to get around it, let’s put it that way. 
 
Q: how do you do it? 
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 Well you just simply do it and don’t tell anybody… But I mean that is going to change 
dramatically in the traceability work that is being done now; with the traceability of animals…it 
is just a paper-based system at this stage, and an ear-tag system. And ear-tags fall out, whether 
voluntary or involuntary. I mean we are talking about a very small proportion of farmers that are 
doing this sort of thing, like minute. But it is happening. (Dairy farmer participant 4). 
 
On a practical level, it is clear from the above quote that an up-to-date technological 
system for monitoring GM animals will be required. However, the quote also further 
illustrates the more general theme of rule-following. In the case of animal 
biopharming, the examples illustrate that an over-reliance on controls to ensure safety 
was considered a risk by interviewees, given the nature of rule-following within 
dairy-farming culture.  
 
Employment and human error 
Quality of employees, the number of workers employed and the high staff turnover 
rates were all identified as potential areas of concern for animal biopharming, whether 
this involves employment by a pharmaceutical company, or by farm owners hiring 
extra help. Most participants could give a litany of human error that occurs in 
everyday farming practice42. With regard to animal biopharming, the issue of human 
error may become more important in relation to the current liability laws, which assert 
that liability falls on those who break rules. Thus, securing quality labour was 
considered vital to the safety and economic success of animal biopharming by the 
farmers:   
 
 [Y]ou would be faced with employing top labour, let’s put it that way. And therefore probably a 
substantially increased cost. I mean with our situation, I don’t know if [other interviewee] said 
anything to you or not, but we’ve changed our labour situation down there quite dramatically 
because of just those sort of problems.   
 
Q: … So what kind of problems, just people not following the rules? 
 
                                                 
42
 For example, gates being left open and penicillin-treated cows being unintentionally milked were 
commonly mentioned. The fact that penicillin cows are milked may be of particular relevance to 
animal biopharming, given that the separation of penicillin cows from the milk supply reflects a similar 
view of how GM cows may be treated.  
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[They are] just too slapdash you know, not, you know Saturday mornings being boozed and 
asleep and that sort of stuff. And it is pretty important, well it is very important that these things 
are kept separate. (Dairy farmer participant 4.) 
 
One interview suggested that mistakes are particularly prone to happen on farms with 
many employees. Changes in shift times and more people on the farm mean that 
communication becomes difficult and mistakes are made. Interestingly, the point 
relates to the organisational nature of dairy farming rather than anything specifically 
related to animal biopharming itself. Thus, the farmer’s focus in relation to risk was 
derived from a social perspective, rather than focused simply on the technology itself.  
 
Some farmers mentioned the example of cows being milked that were not meant to 
be, simply through lack of communication or concentration. 
 
It’s a little bit like keeping antibiotic milk out of the main lot, you know. You are watching it all 
the time to make sure it doesn’t happen; every now and again it does happen. 
 
Q: How do you avoid that, [are] there steps that you can take to avoid it?  
 
Yeah there are steps, you mark the cows and you milk them in test buckets and that sort of 
thing, but yeah it is always something to keep separate.  
 
Q: What… leads to the mixing with the cows? 
 
Well it would just be through the marking coming off, or you know just someone who has just 
sort of been busy putting cups on cows and just accidentally missed one or something. (Dairy 
farmer participant 5). 
 
In fact, the potential for human error in milking cows was considered important 
enough for all farmers to suggest that GM cows be kept entirely separated from non- 
GM cows, at the very least in different milking chambers.  
 
You would either have to do the whole lot or none at all wouldn’t you?  It would be very hard 
on a larger-scale farm to keep , I don’t know how many cows you’d be looking at, but say it was 
ten cows for example it would be very hard to keep them separate on a farm from seven hundred 
other cows for example. You would still have to put them through the shed and milk them. 
(Dairy farmer participant 5). 
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Another comment from an interview further illustrates this point: 
 
You know just the physical thing of keeping the milk separate alone would be quite substantial. 
I mean we do it now, with, as you say, penicillin milk and colostrum milk and all that stuff, but 
you know you are not too worried about a tiny little [bit of] cross infection. Well you are with 
the penicillin milk but, with the rest you are not. Admittedly the milking machines are getting a 
lot smarter so you know you have got bullets of air and stuff that you can blow through them so 
that you can clean them out. But, yeah, you are dependent on labour and things; I would see that 
as being a major problem (Dairy farmer participant 4). 
 
Human behaviour/error and the implications for risk assessment 
Most of the farmers assumed that human error and influenced behaviour is 
inevitable. Parallels can be found with Wynne’s studies. Because lay knowledges’ 
are generally more adaptive and flexible to ‘physical and social worlds’ they are 
less threatened by ‘ambiguity and contradiction’ than traditional scientific 
knowledge (Wynne 1996, p.299). Likewise the farmers in the interviews for this 
thesis generally accepted that environment and human behaviour cannot be 
completely controlled. Hence, their social world has been ordered to work around 
and adapt to this problem. From the interviewees’ perspective it is not 
controversial to state that unexpected events and behaviour occur. Risk assessment 
should work from this assumption also.  
 
A similar point is made by Marvier and Acker who list several examples of human 
error in the containment of corn to suggest that risk assessment should include the 
inevitability of human error (Marvier & Acker 2005, p.101). As they suggest, 
“…smart, highly trained, and conscientious people make mistakes, and those 
mistakes may be repeated and go unnoticed for years” (Marvier & Acker 2005, 
p.102). Therefore, in order to adequately and accurately assess the risk of animal 
biopharming, assessors must accept that behaviour and environments cannot be 
entirely controlled.  
 
Economic incentive to flout rules 
One farmer suggested that rules are most often ignored when there is an economic 
incentive not to follow them.  
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…the only concern that I have is that sometimes in New Zealand they want to prescribe the 
rules but they don’t have the economic driver behind [it]. And so people skip [the rules]… I’ve 
never been in this field but you know like…effluent disposal, they think “oh this will do”, you 
know. The rules are that strict, but if we do this and this, it might be alright. (Dairy farmer 
participant 3).  
 
In the case of animal biopharming, this could be particularly important, dependent on 
the ownership structure of the operation. If a farmer owns the operation and is 
responsible for paying to ensure that all controls are met, the following of controls 
may be particularly influenced by economic factors. This is of particular concern 
given that the production of pharmaceuticals will most probably be isolated to one 
type of pharmaceutical per farm43. Thus, the farmer is heavily affected by the 
international demand for that type of drug. If a downturn in the market occurred, or 
some other drug was supplied as competition, there may be a higher chance that 
corners are cut in order to remain competitive. Later in this chapter, the flexibility of 
production, or the inability to change back to normal dairy farming, will be discussed.  
These factors may also increase the risk of rule skipping.  
 
Current risk assessment  
The findings regarding economic influence on farmer behaviour may have 
implications for how risk is assessed. Instead of treating economic impact as an 
isolated issue, quantifiable in terms of cost and benefit, it may be pertinent to view 
economic impact as a factor that reaches into other areas of safety in animal 
biopharming. The farmers’ comments illustrate that economic impact can be viewed 
as a risk in itself, such as economic loss to farmers, but also a factor that influences 
other areas of behaviour and risk, such as the ability, or willingness,  to follow safety 
prescriptions.    
 
Strict monitoring would be one potential way of avoiding such problems, however as 
stated in Chapter 4, the monitoring capabilities of MAF have been shown to be more 
focussed on cost-effective procedures (Nakhies, Loutit & Rogne 2003,p.50) and may 
not extend to extensive monitoring. This could particularly be problematic when 
animal biopharming becomes more mainstream, which would make monitoring more 
                                                 
43
 This will be discussed in the containment section of this chapter.  
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demanding and expansive, given the wider range of people involved. One farmer 
pointed the need to ensure the general safety of the product before it is in mainstream 
use: 
 
Q:  So how do you stop animals escaping at the moment? 
 
I think being rigid before the animals are spread over, once they get into the next stage of 
[production]. I mean first you have your multiplication, and then you have your big group of 
people that breed these animals; it’s got to be safe at that stage and very well controlled. But 
once you get to the next stage, it has got to be safe, or else you wouldn’t want to buy it. (Dairy 
farmer participant 3).   
 
Containment Factors 
The previous chapter illustrated the need to contain bioreactor animals and possibly 
the GM constructs they incorporate. If animal biopharming is to be applied 
commercially and taken up by farmers, it is useful to see how the need for 
containment will affect farmers, and how farmer behaviour will affect the likelihood 
of this containment. The interviews highlighted several areas of concern regarding the 
ability to contain animal bioreactors and other materials.  
 
Grazing patterns (off- farm winter grazing) 
The common practice of off-farm grazing, particularly prevalent in the winter (in 
some areas of the country), may make containment more difficult. One farmer raised 
this point as an area of concern and a practical implication.   
 
Your replacement stock are now very seldom grazed on your dairy unit, very seldom, and there 
is an awful lot of off-farm wintering. Well you wouldn’t be able to do that.  
 
Q: What is off-farm wintering? 
 
Well over the winter the cows go out to grazing. 
 
Q: Oh right, why don’t you graze them on the dairy [farm]? 
 
There [are] lots of reasons. You [do it] because the winter is the slowest growing of the year, 
and the spring is your highest intake of the year you need to carry some food …some grass 
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through. …You have got to calve your cows before your growth really starts. So therefore, you 
have got to carry grass forward. (Dairy farmer participant 4).  
 
This may have practical implications for the controllability and containment of animal 
biopharming operations in the future. Depending on the size of the operation, it may 
be impractical to keep the cows on the same unit all year round. It is questionable 
whether the average farmer would have enough money to buy an adequately sized 
farm to compensate for the lack of grass in the winter. If the farmers were to graze 
GM animals off the farm in the winter, then additional safeguards may need to be 
implemented during transport of cows and measures may need to be in place to 
monitor the spread of GM material to soil microorganisms and possibly to other 
animals on those paddocks. At the very least, the farmer illustrates that strictly 
containing animals to one specific area may be a complex task requiring significant 
amounts of money and changes to normal farming practices. 
 
DDT 
The same farmer raises another grazing-related practice which may lead to the spread 
of GM animals off the one farm.  
 
We graze all our animals off the property in Canterbury, but it is more for DDT, than anything 
else. Because the residuals of DDT in the land. (Dairy farmer participant 4). 
  
DDT is insecticide which was widely used from the 1950s until it was eventually 
banned in 1970, when it was found to accumulate in the environment and settle in 
organisms within the food chain. Although the levels of DDT found in New Zealand 
soil are expected to be below the level that would cause health problems, the risk and 
undesirability of the chemical entering the food chain and further accumulation in 
New Zealand soils was enough to call for a ban (Boul 1994, p.257). Unfortunately, 
levels of DDT are still found in many farms across New Zealand, and, although 
decreasing, will remain for a long time (Boul 1994, p.271). The potential for DDT to 
enter the food supply influences the grazing patterns of cows, as the interviewee 
explained: 
 
Q: Would you almost have to, for the health of the cows, graze them off the farm? 
 
 103 
Well we do it in the winter, but it is not for the health of the cows… (Dairy farmer participant 4). 
 
The interviewee went on to say that the residue is retained in the soil and over the 
winter the cows ingest a percentage of the dirt containing the DDT. This DDT is 
retained in the animal’s fat, and during the spring when the cow is not consuming 
enough grass to meet demand, they ‘milk their fat off’. From this process it is possible 
that DDT can enter the milk supply. In the words of the interviewee “…the world 
does not accept DDT in the milk” and it is therefore necessary in some areas to graze 
animals off the farm during the winter.   
 
This again raises issues of transport and of potential dissemination of GM material, as 
well as the extra risks of DDT contamination of pharma milk. It will be important for 
controls to be in place to ensure that farms have low enough levels of DDT to ensure 
that off-farm grazing is not required. Currently testing is done on farms before they 
are converted to dairying, however the levels may need to be lower in the case of an 
animal biopharming operation, or they need to be able to afford a lower stocking rate, 
in order to avoid off-farm grazing.  
 
Beyond this practical advice, parallels can, and have, been made between the 
introduction of DDT and the introduction of GM (Scientists warn of DDT trap 1999). 
DDT essentially restricts the freedom of dairy farmers to conduct certain farming 
practices. This could have been avoided if adequate testing of DDT’s effect in soil 
and on living organisms was conducted before its adoption by farmers. In this light, 
vigorous testing of GM animals’ effect on the soil must also be conducted to avoid 
negative repercussions in the future. As Dr Turner, a soil chemist at Massey 
University, suggested in a 1999 article for Dairy Exporter,  
 
Nobody has looked at the soil implications…Most of the current interest is in health and food 
safety issues, but no one has taken into account that GE modified crops are likely to leave a 
genetic imprint on land on which they are grown (Scientists warn of DDT trap 1999).  
 
This may be equally applicable to GM animals and may be particularly relevant given 
the evidence from these interviews, which suggests it may be difficult to contain cows 
or soil on one farm without great expense, time and energy.   
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Reliance on animals and the cleanliness of milk 
Because it is likely that biopharm milk will need to be kept at a higher standard of 
cleanliness, the chance of animals becoming sick and disrupting production may be 
particularly concerning to farmers. The cost of veterinary care may be higher than 
normal dairy farm operations as the health of animals will be particularly important, 
and regular checkups will perhaps be required. It may also be necessary to hold extra 
animals in case an animal does get sick and adversely affect the economic viability of 
the operation. If this is the case, the disposal of excess milk may become a factor. 
Several interviewees suggested that the practice of spraying unused milk onto the 
paddock may have to be changed, particularly if this land is being grazed by non-
transgenic animals as well. The chance of this milk affecting the soil composition may 
also be an issue.  
 
Turnover rates of farms and employees 
As stated previously, the PPL therapeutics field tests ended with controversy. The 
failure of partner company Bayer to continue funding of the operation led to the 
termination of the field test, but also highlighted important areas left unregulated 
regarding the operation. Questions such as what would happen to the GM sheep and 
land were left for the courts to decide (Court Told Decision on GE Trial Site A 
Concern For New Landowner 2004).  
 
Interestingly, farmers could envision similar problems occurring as a result of the 
current climate of farming in New Zealand. One farmer suggested that the high 
turnover rate of farms and farm employees could leave problems for regulators. If 
land is bought and sold at a fast rate, or employees move from job to job at a high rate 
this could pose problems for rule following and adequate containment.  Questions of 
whether animal biopharming farms or animals can be traded will also be relevant to 
risk assessment. One interviewee suggested that the current climate of high turnover 
relating to farm ownership and employment was particularly relevant to these issues 
of containment.  
 
The interviews suggest that the same questions that arose after the PPL situation, such 
as whether GM animals can be traded or whether land can be used for both GM 
animals and non-GM animals, will inevitably arise given the social climate of farming 
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in New Zealand. The high turnover of farms could potentially lead to a wide spread of 
GM material or the selling of GM animals. Therefore, flexibility of production, 
whether a farmer can change back to non-GM farming or sell their animals or land, 
raises important questions that will have significant implications for the safety of 
animal biopharming. The interviews suggested that some farmers may not be 
interested in an operation which leaves little room for opting out. Most farmers found 
these questions of concern, as illustrated by the following questions of one 
participant:  
 
What implications would [there] be? What can you do with those cows? Would they have a 
month of milk withholding and they can then join the main herd? (Dairy farmer participant 1). 
 
Similar problems could arise from the nature of employment in the dairy industry.  A 
2002 a report showed that 76% of employees in the dairy farm industry had worked 
within the industry for over a year. However, only 28% had been at their job for more 
than one season (Shearle 2002, p.17). This indicates a high level of job turnover that 
will have to be addressed by farmers, or pharmaceutical companies, who hire help 
with biopharm animals. Training will be a high priority in order to ensure the safety of 
animal biopharming but the high level of turnover may make this more difficult and 
costly. One implication for farmers is that they may have to commit to longer-term 
employment under an animal biopharming operation. One interviewee suggested it 
would be particularly impractical for share milkers to be involved in animal 
biopharming because they tend to move farms every three or four years, which in his 
eyes would cause the containment and regulatory difficulties discussed above.  
 
Who enters the farm? 
As stated in the last chapter, there has been significant debate about the effect animal 
biopharming may have on soil. Questions of whether transgenes and their proteins can 
be transferred to the soil through animal waste are still regarded as debatable. If GM 
material can be transferred into the soil, it becomes clear that animal biopharming 
facilities will have to be completely segregated. The interviews show the cost of such 
an operation could be huge, and the practicalities of the operation nearing impossible.  
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Many farmers suggested that the need for segregation would be complicated by 
various farming processes that effectively require traffic through the farms. The 
potential for hay bailers and land fertilizers to spread soil from one farm to another 
was identified by the interviewees.  
 
I can see a problem like with the likes of hay bailers and stuff, because there is always a bail left 
in the chamber. Carrying feed off one farm onto the next; I don’t know if that would be an issue 
or not, but that is in fact what happens. You know the big forage harvesters always have grass 
hanging off them and things like that. They may well have to clean their equipment before they 
left the farm. (Dairy farmer participant 4). 
 
It is questionable whether workers applying fertilizer and hay-bailer operators will 
find time and the economic incentive to clean their equipment each time they exit the 
farm. An article in Nature Biotechnology also questions the wisdom of presuming 
farmers will follow such meticulous cleaning standards, this time in relation to GM 
plants, however the point is applicable. “Can we reasonably expect farmers to clean 
their agricultural equipment meticulously enough to remove all GM seed?” (Nature 
Biotechnology 2002, p. 527). 
 
Getting rid of carcasses / replacements 
As stated in the last chapter, the number of animals needed by an animal biopharming 
operation will vary according to what type of pharmaceutical or nutraceutical is being 
produced, and the levels at which they are present in the milk. However, there is a 
good chance that fewer animals will be needed than normal dairy operations. If this is 
the case, major implications for how dairy farmers run their operations are evident. 
Several farmers were concerned about the ability to dispose of excess animals in 
terms of economic cost and containment issues relating to soil. One farmer suggested 
the cost could be significant, as some farmers’ income, including share milkers’, is 
derived from the culling of animals and sale of bobby calves: 
 
One of the other problems if the beef at the end of their life cycle is not acceptable in the meat 
trade, you have got a problem there getting rid of them. … The lack of income, you know the 
loss of income from them, because it is about, what is it? I don’t know. What is about 20% of 
the farmer’s income that is cull cows and bobby calves and things like that. Yeah it is a little bit 
less than that, but it is getting up to that figure.  
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Q: Ok so what, I mean, is there any way to get around that?  
 
There again it becomes a cost figure. I mean you would have to have those animals slaughtered 
and destroyed in some manner. And there again it becomes a cost factor. Therefore it might be 
better for someone else to own those animals, like whoever is doing the project. (Dairy farmer 
participant 4). 
 
This suggests that the cost for a farmer to individually own one of the operations may 
be too high. Another issue with culling animals concerns the environment. If animals 
are to be buried on the farm, then the water table must be considered, as one farmer 
illustrates.  The potential for animal waste and pollutants to run into the water system 
may be more likely the larger the number of animals that are being disposed: 
 
…ten metres below us is water. We don’t want to have rotting decaying animals going into the 
water system here. The underground water… that goes across Canterbury; and so if we can burn 
them, and generally it takes two or three burns to actually get the animal totally done, but it 
means it is not rotting and being buried and all t[he] bad products [are] getting into the water 
system. (Dairy farmer participant 1). 
 
Similarly, whether the animals are buried or burnt, there could be flow-on affects to 
other farms: 
Q: what about with, like, material you’ve burnt, the cows … is that like what you are talking 
about it could run off into another farm? 
 
…every farm in this district is linked through water, because of underground rivers. So anything 
we do here could be affecting four or five people down the road. Because of all the water 
filtering underground. So yeah. (Dairy farmer participant 1). 
 
Selling waste for use in animal feed 
Because of the cost and inconvenience of culling animals, there is a possibility that  
offspring of animal bioreactors not used for pharmaceuticals, or which do not express 
the appropriate proteins, will be allowed to be used for non-human consumption such 
as animal feed. It is likely that this will at least be requested by those producing 
transgenic animals (U.S National Research Council Committee on Defining Science-
based Concerns Associated with Products of Animal Biotechnology. 2002, p.54). If 
this is this allowed, problems could arise. As with the corn industry in Starlink case, 
in which corn had approval for animal feed but not human consumption, it is 
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questionable whether the New Zealand dairy and beef industry has the ability to 
determine whether the animals they process are transgenic or not. It may mean that 
meat works should be provided with adequate testing facilities. Thus, a wider range of 
responsibility for safety may need to be cast if animal consumption is allowed. 
 
Flooding 
Another area identified by farmers that may affect the containment of animals is 
flooding. As it is common during and after floods for animals to mix, all the farmers 
suggested that animal biopharming should not be permitted in common flooding 
areas. An interviewee described the level of disorganisation that occurs during a 
flood, in which normally controlled environments could easily be disrupted. The 
ramifications for containment are obvious:  
 
It would be too risky to have a farm like this in a flood place. Where all of a sudden your farm is 
coming under water and you have an hour to shift your stock and it might mean open the gate let 
them on the road, and mix them with neighbour’s cows to get out of the flood waters. That 
would be a huge risk. But you wouldn’t have a farm like this on the flood plain. You know, 
when you get your consent to have a farm like this that would be an issue that would be talked 
about then. (Dairy farmer participant 2). 
 
The interviewee illustrates the need to consider the local placement of the farm 
conducting animal biopharming, when considering its ability to contain animals. The 
implication of this point is that only certain farmers in certain areas will have the 
option of animal biopharming.  
 
Characteristics of the land 
The farmers were certain that the positioning of the farm and its soil types would be 
important. Whilst risk assessors may be aware of this, it does point out an area in 
which local knowledge of specific environments may be useful in determining the 
safety of a location for animal biopharming. This is particularly the case if soil is a 
factor. The following quote from a farmer illustrates the detailed local knowledge 
farmers hold: 
 
It would probably have to be somewhere that is free draining, that doesn’t get gluggy soils so 
the water can get through the soil as quick as it wants but it doesn’t get down to the actual water 
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table for twenty or thirty metres. So it has a huge buffer zone. You wouldn’t want it clay, 
because clay soils… the rain doesn’t go through them, it goes off them. So the soil structure, 
you wouldn’t want stones like what we have got here because the water goes through too fast. 
Taranaki has got good organic soil…good drainage, good soil…Probably not anywhere around 
a river bank. Getting into some of these deeper country soils around here. You wouldn’t want 
somewhere around Leeston way where it’s low. Ellesmere is getting quite salty, salty stuff in 
their soils. You wouldn’t probably want it, you’d want it in a high rainfall good rainfall area, 
you wouldn’t want it to be irrigated. (Dairy farmer participant 1). 
 
The same farmer questioned current controls that demand a plant-free strip between 
fences in the farm. The participant argued that the common practice of maintaining a 
riparian strip between rivers and farm land could be jeopardised, hence raising the 
chance of leaching of GM materials or animal waste which contains GM materials.  
 
My own thoughts on that is, “why do we have riparian strips between rivers?” 
 
Q: what is that?  
 
Next to any creek river or anything, you leave five metres of land and you leave it to have nice 
long grass on it, and then you put trees in there. Because anything that leaches across, before it 
gets to that water way, everything that is over there is sucking all the nutrients in the soil so 
nothing can get in the river. (Dairy farmer participant 1). 
 
However, there may be a trade-off between riparian strips to protect waterways from 
contamination, on the one hand, and the visibility of animals as an aid to containment, 
on the other. If a riparian strip is required, trees that lie between the fences containing 
GM animals may make escaped animals less visible. In order to maintain the safety of 
animal biopharming operations, these issues will need to be addressed.  
 
Economic Factors 
Flexibility of production 
As discussed above, the need for flexibility of production may impact on the safety 
and containment of animal biopharming in New Zealand. It also suggests that there 
are significant economic risks for farmers who choose to invest in an animal 
biopharming operation. The ability to revert to normal dairying was questioned by 
several farmers. This could severely affect the desirability of such an operation. The 
following participants’ comments illustrate the ways in which the current dairy 
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industry context could affect the desirability and economic impact of biopharming for 
a farmer. He suggested that the power Fonterra44 holds to accept and reject milk may 
particularly affect investing in animal biopharming for the farmer, given the chance 
the operation may not work out.  
 
Well that is a risk because you are not sending your milk to a mainstream company as much. I 
would sort of relate to someone opting to take their milk away from Fonterra and to one of the 
small companies that are starting up. What happens if that one factory burnt down? Where is 
that milk going to go for the next two or three months? Because that factory is out of 
commission.  
 
Q: Can they go back to Fonterra? 
 
Well Fonterra doesn’t, if they’ve said “bye bye Fonterra”, Fonterra aren’t going to be too kind 
to them and get their milk back. Unless they might be short of milk and want the milk, but they 
have the capacity they could say, no, sorry we don’t, we can’t handle your milk. It would be a 
risk similar to that. Because you can’t start up again. (Dairy farmer participant 2). 
 
Overseas pressure 
Another economic risk of animal biopharming relates more generally to the demands 
within the international market for farming as it currently stands. The potential for 
overseas markets to require certain procedures from farmers, or place “non-tariff trade 
barriers” on New Zealand farmers could affect the New Zealand dairy industry 
significantly. Even if certain types of animal biopharming are found by New Zealand 
regulators to be safe, and hence requiring minimal controls, overseas markets may 
force strict procedural standards regardless. These standards could potentially affect 
non-GM farmers as much as GM farmers if international markets are concerned about 
cross contamination and thus require non-GM farmers to perform procedures or tests 
to insure they are not contaminated.  The following comments by participants 
identified these issues: 
 
… I would be more concerned about the market. Like the ‘marketplace’ in inverted commas. 
Whether it be the whole of the New Zealand dairy industry, or the world dairy industry. 
                                                 
44
 Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd is a multinational dairy company, owned by 11,600 New Zealand 
dairy farmers. Shareholders make up over 95% of New Zealand dairy farmers (Fonterra 2006).  
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Whether they see it as, you know, another form of tariff that can be slapped upon us, because 
they do it with all sorts of other things. 
 
Q: Ok, another form of tariff as in? 
 
 Like, “you have got GM milk we won’t take it”. You know you are also farming GM milk, 
there could be some type of contamination therefore “we won’t take your milk.” …I mean that 
has happened, I mean a lot of a milk problems are really only driven by tariffs. Unofficial 
tariffs, they are saying you have got to have this and you have got to have that, just to make it a 
little harder for us to get in there. 
 
Q: So it might not just be the New Zealand government… 
 
No no no no. It could well be the marketplace. And I see that is a bigger problem than New 
Zealand [controls] quite frankly. (Dairy farmer participant 4). 
 
Another interview raised a similar concern: 
Yeah, that is right, the international influence from overseas. The way we present our cows. The 
inductions make the cow abort her calf two to three months before she is supposed to. You 
know [those] procedures [are] a real no no. So they will say we prefer not to have your milk or 
we won’t buy your product because you dock the tails on your cows and abort cows prematurely 
so that is how big an influence the overseas market has. So that is probably the biggest risk that 
we have talked about today is what we are talking about now. (Dairy farmer participant 2). 
 
Size of herd-milking and cost 
The cost of creating facilities to transport and milk smaller herds was suggested as an 
interesting implication of animal biopharming. Current milking facilities are designed 
to milk hundreds of cows; they cannot, according to the interviewees, be used on 
small herds, as the quantity of milk obtained from them would not be enough even to 
push through the machinery. This implies that milking small biopharm herds would 
require the design and installation of new milking facilities, significantly raising the 
cost of the operation and the amount of investment in sunk costs.  
 
The interviewees also suggested that the transportation of significantly smaller 
amounts of milk will result in additional costs and infrastructure requirements:  
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Yeah you are going to have to have some form of storage in collecting it separately. Like a milk 
tanker comes in here and picks up twenty thousand litres of milk, if you are going to, every day, 
if you have got another little group of ten cows, you know, you’d have to pick the milk up at 
least every second day to keep it right. And ten cows times 30 litres a day in the peak for 
example, which is 300 litres of milk a day from that little group of cows. So you might have to 
have, you’d have to have a little tanker that picked up six hundred litres of milk every second 
day. (Dairy farmer participant 5). 
 
What are neighbouring farmer’s rights and who is liable? 
The question of liability for damage to neighbouring properties raises another set of 
economic issues. Should neighbouring farmers be expected to deal with the extra 
work and cost of monitoring if a GM cow from another farm escapes on to their land? 
The rights of neighbouring farmers may need to be discussed before any 
commercialisation of biopharming occurs.  Also, if GM material is found to be 
transferred into soil, this could potentially lead to a lower value of land for 
neighbouring farmers (Scientists warn of DDT trap 1999). This raises the question of 
liability. On the other hand, if a GM farmer is held liable for escapes onto 
neighbouring farms, it may be too costly for many farmers to own this sort of 
operation or pay for adequate insurance. Several farmers argued this would be the 
case: 
 
No they wouldn’t be able to [own cows]. Not in this sort of world... for instance if you would 
end up in the environment court. A couple of hundred thousand later. (Dairy farmer Participant 
3).  
 
Scenarios 
There are several scenarios for the future of animal biopharming in New Zealand. 
Each will have varying implications as illustrated by the interviews. This section will 
briefly evaluate the four scenarios (Farm manager, Farmer-owned, Farmer-subsidised 
and Coalition of Farmers) and the implications they may have. A more detailed 
discussion of the implications of the last scenario, Coalition of Farmers, for the 
relation between local government and the HSNO Act will be discussed in order to 
illustrate where detailed local knowledge may provide useful information. It is 
important to note that the risks of soil contamination, grazing patterns, the lie of the 
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land, human error, culling of animals, flexibility of production and the effect of 
international markets are generally the same in each scenario.  
 
Farm manager scenario 
Containing the modified animals adequately will likely have a strong economic 
impact on the operation. Adequate fencing, milking facilities, cleaning equipment, 
security and milk transportation systems all suggest the cost of running such an 
operation will be high. This raises questions as to whether dairy farmers will be able 
to run this operation under their own funding. It seems most likely that a farm 
management system will be operated in which farmers do not own the farm or 
animals. Risks and implications specific to this scenario include: 
 
1) The attitude of farm managers may mean less commitment to following strict 
controls. 
2) The length of farm management contracts and job turnover rates may be an 
issue particularly as training will be vital to operational safety.  
3) The farmer may not see large benefits from the operation, beyond what farm 
managers on conventional farms receive.  
  
Farmer owns the operation  
It unlikely that farmers will have the economic resources to start their own animal 
biopharming operation. However, there is a small possibility that controls will be 
minimal enough, particularly if the product is considered GRAS, that farmers may 
own the operation. Risks and implications specific to this scenario include: 
 
1) The ability to buy and sell a farm once it has been used for animal 
biopharming may be limited. 
2)  The turnover rates of farms and farm employees will affect containability and 
will have to be controlled for: however there may be limited legal mandate to 
do this. 
3) The reliance on one product could lead to economic vulnerability for the 
farmer. 
4) Farmers may be influenced by external economic forces to cut corners in 
following rules. 
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5) The employment of staff will have to be monitored to ensure quality and 
reliability. This could have implications for the rights of farmers to choose 
who they hire.  
 
Farmer owns the operation but is subsidised for containment and safety costs 
For animal biopharming to be accessible to farmers, it is likely that containment and 
management costs would need to be subsidised by a larger company. If this is the 
case, the operation may be more affordable and available to farmers. Risks in this 
scenario will be similar to those of simple farm ownership. However, it is likely in 
this instance that more farmers will opt into animal biopharming operations. 
Therefore:  
 
1) Monitoring and maintenance of biopharming operations, by MAF, may be 
more time-intensive, and may be prone to less scrutiny, given the wider 
scope of its use. 
2) The implications of risk or costs associated with animal biopharming will 
be dispersed more widely given the wider scope of its use. For example, 
non-official tariffs from overseas may be blanketed across the dairy 
industry if animal biopharming becomes a relatively mainstream dairying 
option within New Zealand.  
 
Coalition of farmers within a geographical area 
In an interview for the scoping section of this thesis, a senior member from NZTE 
suggested another possible scenario of management. A number of farmers within a 
designated area could form an animal biopharming coalition. He suggested this could 
be similar to agreements currently made between organic producers within some 
regions of New Zealand. A key implication of this scenario may be the conflict 
between local government and ERMA. 
 
As a coalition of farmers would encompass a larger area, the effects of biopharming 
on the land may be more intensive and further-reaching. This may lead to the 
Resource Management Act (RMA) being enacted by local governments to ensure 
stricter standards of containment than ERMA would require, hence leading to 
potential legal conflicts between local governments and the ERMA decision. The 
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main tool for influencing decisions from a local government’s perspective would be 
the RMA, in which a precautionary principle has been ruled by courts to be inherent. 
On the other hand, ERMA’s use of the precautionary principle is optional (Terry 
2004, p. 17). Simon Terry suggests the government has not yet explored the 
implications of these conflicting standards of precaution. As ERMA’s process is 
suggested to be the ‘gold standard’ , where in actual fact it is not legally bound to 
make precautionary decisions, a conflict between local expectations and legal 
mandate could arise (Terry 2004, p. v).  Interestingly several councils have already 
symbolically declared their jurisdictions ‘GE free’45.  
 
The potential for conflict between local governments and ERMA rulings is further 
discussed on the website of the Ministry for the Environment, which suggests that 
whilst it is possible for local governments to use the RMA to control GM in their 
region, this would be very difficult to do. The website states that the issues 
surrounding GM safety are “highly technical, meaning that councils are unlikely to 
have the skills to deal with these issues” (Ministry for the Environment (a)). As 
ERMA is a specialised body designated to perform risk analysis, MFE suggests it will 
be difficult for local governments to offer any legitimate reasons for GM not to 
proceed if approved by ERMA. Such a viewpoint is contradicted by findings from the 
interviews within this thesis, which suggest that individuals will hold unique 
knowledge on how animal biopharming could affect their particular local 
environment. For example, soil type, vulnerability to flooding and grazing practices 
will all inform the safety of animal biopharming. Thus, local governments may have 
better access to relevant knowledge of the land and social practices within a region 
than would ERMA.  
 
Several interviewees assumed that the RMA would be available to settle local 
complaints. The following participants’ comments illustrate a need to clarify the role 
of the RMA in relation to animal biopharming before commercial applications are 
considered or approved: 
 
                                                 
45
 These cities are Nelson, Napier and Waitakere. The general Northland area has been declared GE 
free by the Northland Regional council and local mayors.  
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We are covered by the RMA anyway. Because [with] the Resource Management [Act], I 
wouldn’t be allowed downstream effects, it shouldn’t have [an] effect on me. The Resource 
Management Act will protect you there because there has got to be a tolerable land use. (Dairy 
farmer participant 5). 
 
Conclusion: Who Benefits? 
Most farmers pointed out that given the considerable costs of containment and 
controls, it is most likely that an animal biopharming operation will not be owned by 
dairy farmers. There are potential benefits to this situation, particularly because the 
farmer is shielded from negative economic impacts and may be less likely to be 
influenced by economic pressure to cut corners46. However, it is useful to question 
who benefits from this arrangement, and whether such an arrangement can really be 
considered to provide a potential dramatic increase in farmer returns as some of the 
previous interviewees and literature have suggested. One farmer spoke of the 
reluctance farmers would have to simply manage operations: 
 
A] farmer in general, wants to be part of it… in general you want to be in control of your own 
environment. And I think in general once you have sort of a lease agreement type thing, you are 
not in control of your own destiny anymore, you just become an employee of that company. 
(Dairy farmer participant 5). 
 
As an employee of a company it seems unlikely that farmers will share in the 
purported potentially large profits of biopharming that a company could make. 
Perhaps there can be a higher wage offered for the added work to ensure safety, but 
beyond that, there may be no incentive for the larger company to offer further benefits 
to the farmer.   
 
This also raises questions about the extent to which New Zealand as a whole would 
benefit from such an arrangement.   If the bulk of the profits accrue to a foreign-
owned pharmaceutical or biotechnology company while New Zealand bears the cost 
of any market devaluation suffered by its conventional and/or organic production, or 
absorbs the liability from unanticipated harms to others or to the environment 
                                                 
46
 However, this is debatable, it is perhaps no less likely that larger companies will be influenced by 
economic factors to cut corners or, inadvertently or not, put pressure on the managers to do so.  
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resulting from the operation, there may be reason to question whether this can be 
considered a ‘benefit’ to New Zealand. 
 
Size of operation 
As it is reported that relatively few cows are needed to produce the world’s demand 
for certain pharmaceuticals, it is also questionable how many farmers will be involved 
in animal biopharming operations. Unless New Zealand runs multiple farms 
producing many different pharmaceuticals, it is difficult to see how this technology 
can benefit dairy farmers dramatically, as otherwise only a very small percentage of 
farmers are likely to be involved in any way. Again, it may be useful in this light to 
question claims that animal biopharming can revolutionise farmer returns.  
 
Characteristics of the Land 
The interviewees note that the type of land and soil will be crucial to avoid flow-on 
effects to other farms, dangers such as flooding and off-farm grazing because of DDT 
or winter conditions. Therefore, the option of animal biopharming will again be 
limited to a small number of farmers with the appropriate land type. It is questionable 
whether it can be claimed that the dairy farming industry will benefit from animal 
biopharming if only a small number of dairy farmers, and perhaps the even smaller 
numbers supplying the specialist infrastructure required, can benefit.   
 
Risk/Cost/Benefit analysis in Risk Assessment 
The limited benefit that animal biopharming is likely to hold for dairy farmers means 
it is useful to reconsider current assessment processes. As stated in an earlier chapter, 
ERMA undertakes a risk/cost/benefit analysis when considering applications to 
conduct animal biopharming. ERMA has stated that it will consider the distribution of 
these benefits, distinguishing between public and private economic benefit (New 
Zealand. Environmental Risk Management Authority 2005 (b)). The findings from 
this chapter suggest that using local knowledge may be useful for considering who 
benefits from an application, and whether these benefits are relevant to New 
Zealanders. These interviews have highlighted that local knowledge can offer useful 
information in determining the answers to such questions. In the case of animal 
biopharming, it is likely that overseas companies will benefit from these operations if 
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they are successful, while it appears there will be fewer benefits for New Zealanders 
managing the operations. 
 
It is not claimed that these interviews are a representative sample of dairy farmers, 
and the interviews have not been intended to canvass “New Zealand dairy farmers’ 
views” on biopharming. Rather they have been used to explore the usefulness of the 
approach to risk assessment outlined in this thesis. In fact, they have been remarkably 
productive in raising a diversity of potential risk factors relevant to animal 
biopharming.  This suggests that focusing on what has here been called ‘local 
knowledge’ may enable the identification of areas of risk that may go unidentified in 
traditional risk assessment processes.  Whilst few of the interviewees had prior in-
depth knowledge of animal biopharming, they were able to adapt their environmental 
and social knowledge of dairying to the topic. Such a finding is worthwhile in itself, 
as it suggests that it is not only policy makers and scientists who are ‘experts’. It may 
be important in this light to offer some avenue of participation for people such as the 
interviewees to discuss future technologies and their risks, before they reach the level 
of application. Beyond that, a tool for locating and eliciting different types of social 
expertise should be adopted by ERMA when assessing applications. Such knowledge 
is too valuable to rely on participant initiative; it must be identified and sought after if 
risks are to be adequately assessed.   
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has analysed some of the social dimensions of animal biopharming. In 
doing so, it has taken a different approach to current risk assessment processes, which 
limit the ability of members of the public to contribute practically. Under the current 
model, the public is isolated as value holders, where the experts are left to define the 
bounds and nature of risk. Such an approach ignores the complexity of the social and 
environmental world animal biopharming will enter in its commercialised form.  The 
findings from this thesis suggest that people outside the traditional bounds of 
expertise hold valuable information on the social context the technology will enter. 
They can help practically in identifying risk, but also serve as a reminder of the 
complexity of risk within uncontrolled environments.  
 
In this concluding chapter, I will summarise the findings of this research. I will then 
explore the implications of these findings for the concept of local knowledge, the 
nature of risk assessment and the role of the public within it. Following this, general 
recommendations will be made for how risk assessment should proceed in New 
Zealand. Lastly, the limitations of this thesis will be discussed, as well as 
opportunities and avenues for further research. 
 
Summary of findings  
Through scoping relevant literature and in-depth interviews with policy makers, 
regulators and developers, it was possible to identify several areas in which animal 
biopharming in New Zealand was likely to develop in the future. On this basis, it was 
possible then to interview experts in the field of dairying on the risks that animal 
biopharming might hold for them, and what risks their practices might hold for animal 
biopharming. These interviews proved highly informative.  
 
Firstly, it became clear that farmers viewed human error and flexibility in rule-
following as a reality of their social world. Although they did not suggest that farmers 
held rules in disregard, the environmental and social elements that influence 
behaviour were stressed within most interviews. For example, economic pressure, 
social disorganisation and general elements of human error were considered by 
farmers to be influential on the future safety of animal biopharming, but also a fact of 
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everyday life as a farmer. Multiple examples were offered to illustrate mistakes 
occurring on the farm due to these factors. 
 
Other practical areas of risk were also identified. Both farming practices and 
environmental factors will affect the containability of animal biopharming according 
to the interview participants. For example, normal grazing management is likely to 
affect the viability of containment of animal biopharming if not controlled. The 
common practice of off-farm grazing may need to be restricted, which in turn would 
limit the number of farmers for whom this technology is feasible. Other individuals’ 
behaviour will also have to be monitored, for example, hay bailers and those who 
apply ground fertiliser may have to change their practices also. Regarding 
environmental factors, the chance of floods or the characteristics of soil were all 
raised as factors to consider when analysing animal biopharming. Thus, the thesis 
found that in-depth knowledge of local environment and farming practices would be 
important in the risk assessment of animal biopharming.  
 
Economic factors were also mentioned as both a risk in themselves and an influence 
on rule-following behaviour. The limited flexibility of production was considered a 
danger of animal biopharming, and the high turnover rates of farmers and farms as a 
risk to its safety. It was also suggested that the costs of animal biopharming and the 
amount of controls this would require, for example, the culling of excess cows or the 
building of unique milking facilities, may leave ownership out of the reach of most 
farmers. Farmers were also concerned beyond their immediate environment to the 
international markets, which could be hostile to milk produced in proximity to 
biopharm milk or require safety procedures beyond what ERMA may mandate that 
could add significantly to the cost of production. In isolation, these factors can be 
considered of risk to the farmer; however, farmers also pointed to the possibility that 
economic pressures would lead some farmers to ‘cut corners’ in a way that could 
undermine ERMA’s mandated risk-minimisation rules. This focus on behaviour 
marks a contrast between technological approaches to risk and the social perspectives 
of the farmer informants.   
 
Thus, beyond the practical implications, for instance, the need to consider the 
practicalities of likely controls, such findings suggest a different worldview between 
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risk assessors who look to control environments and behaviour within 
risk/cost/benefit equations and forms of local knowledge that accept and adapt to 
ambiguity within their everyday world. In this sense, the findings further validate and 
support the writings of Wynne (1996), and others who stress the differences between 
local and expert approaches to uncertainty. With the case study of Cumbrian sheep 
farmers, Wynne illustrated the implications of attempting to standardise unique 
environments, as the scientists did. The solutions scientists devised were found to be 
impractical when entering the sheep farmer’s social and environmental world. On the 
other side, farmers were shown to be more willing to adapt their knowledge to the 
ever-changing environments that technology enters (Wynne 1996, p.40). As Wynne 
suggests, and these interviews illustrated, “ambiguity and contradiction are not so 
much of a threat [to farmers], because control and manipulation are not being sought 
or expected” (Wynne 1996, p.41). Therefore the challenge for those introducing a 
new technology into particular environments is to balance universality of the product 
and the demands of a particular context or locality (Wynne 1988, p.153). Those who 
emphasise or promote the benefits of animal biopharming may be similar to the 
scientists in the Cumbrian case, who assumed that their standardised knowledge was 
adequate and applicable to the unstable social and environmental world of sheep 
farmers. Animal biopharming may have the potential to yield great benefits, however 
the interviews suggests this will require a highly controlled environment. Thus, the 
conditions required for success may conflict with the environments animal 
biopharming is to enter.  
 
Implications 
This thesis has reflected many of the concepts and principles found in Wynne’s 
Cumbrian study. For example, as stated, the adaptability of local knowledge, and the 
willingness to apply this knowledge to new situations was well demonstrated by 
interview participants. However, as Wynne studied hazardous materials that had 
already dispersed into the environment, an important implication of the research 
conducted here is that it illustrates the benefits of applying local knowledge before a 
technology or hazard has entered the social environment. Although animal 
biopharming is not yet commercial or widely used in New Zealand, the interview 
participants were able to offer practical information on potential future risk. The 
findings suggest that local knowledge is in this way applicable to risk assessment 
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situations, rather than merely useful for after-the-fact analysis. A more proactive 
approach than is currently used by risk assessors, or explored in the local knowledge 
literature, may be required to identify and extrapolate local knowledge earlier. Instead 
of passively waiting for those with valuable local knowledge to lobby for their own 
representation, typically after they feel their knowledge has already been ignored (for 
example, popular epidemiology), this approach would actively seek out local 
knowledge to use as a tool to avoid hazard, rather than merely reflect on the causes of 
hazard.  In other words, studies should not only seek to prove the absence of 
recognition of local knowledge, and the negative effects of this, but also explore 
whether and how relevant local knowledge can be elicited or mobilised to prevent 
such negative effects. Likewise, risk assessment processes should not rely on the 
initiative of those holding local knowledge to come forward through public 
submission (particularly as often those holding this knowledge are unaware of its 
relevance) but actively seek out this knowledge.  This study has shown that such pro-
active research can yield practical and useful results.    
 
As well as supporting the concept of local knowledge as a tool for risk assessment, the 
findings from the interviews also reflected other themes of local knowledge discussed 
in the literature review. For example, the literature suggests local knowledge does not 
necessarily relate specifically to a physical environment. Interviewees for this thesis 
did offer considerable knowledge on physical location and its implication for animal 
biopharming, but a large amount of the interviews stressed non-physical factors which 
could be of implication and risk. Attitudinal, behavioural and economic factors were 
all cited as potential areas of implications, drawn from the interviewees’ own 
experience and knowledge. 
 
 In terms of the character of local knowledge, such findings support the view that 
local knowledge is more specific than common knowledge, reflected earlier in the 
literature review, and thus must be used pragmatically rather than simply as a tool to 
enable mass public involvement. For example, some farmers recommended that truck 
drivers could offer more knowledge on milk transportation given their day-to-day 
experience, and in doing so, implicitly acknowledged the experiential and contextual 
nature of local knowledge. Whilst the farmers did hold knowledge that was 
traditionally passed down, the findings also suggest a more adaptive and complex 
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form of local knowledge than a conception of traditional and homogeneous 
knowledge allows. Each farmer offered differing and unique forms of knowledge 
based on their own experience and perception of social environments. This suggests 
that risk encompasses a wide spectrum of factors for farmers, and perhaps offers an 
avenue to better assess social risk practically.  
 
As stated in Chapter Four, ERMA has struggled to find practical ways to measure 
social impact; these interviews suggest an avenue toward achieving this. Local 
knowledge will not only help risk assessment in locating the practicalities and 
implications of physical controls and technologies, but can also help us understand 
how social networks interacting with these controls and technologies will affect and 
be affected by them. By including social factors within the conception of risk, 
interview participants were able to identify areas of risk that may normally go 
unnoticed under traditional risk assessment. For example, the likely factors 
contributing to human error should be accounted for when assessing the risk of 
technology, even though these factors are not exclusive to the technology itself. It is 
often the combination of the technology with these factors that constitutes risk. Thus, 
although not technically detailed, this flexible and pragmatic approach to risk, shown 
by the interview participants, may be more useful than an exclusively scientific-
technical approach. The approach also shows that, contrary to the deficit model, a lack 
of knowledge regarding ‘scientific fact’ involving the technology did not disqualify 
the participants from making a significant contribution to its evaluation. This finding 
should further support the literature of the ‘public understanding of science’ which 
discredits the arguments purported by the deficit model.  
 
At the very least, the findings suggest that risk should not be compartmentalized 
into purely technical and social categories, but that both these factors impact on 
each other. Local knowledge can be used as a useful tool for identifying this 
connection. For example, the technical risk of gene transfer will be influenced by 
the social behaviour of farmers, including off-farm grazing and farmer attitudes to 
rule-following. Such findings suggest a re-conceptualisation of risk may be 
required of risk assessors. The current system limits the majority of public 
participation to normative questions and site-specific applications, falsely 
compartmentalizing areas of risk. Submissions from the public on field-tests have 
 124 
been rejected as ERMA interprets public concerns more in the light of ethical 
concerns or “firmly held beliefs” than concerns over the practical considerations 
and safety issues regarding commercialisation. . This conclusion by ERMA, that 
concerns from the public are values, and general in nature, ignores that the public 
may have more than merely values to offer the debate. As Levidow and Carr (1997) 
suggest, official discussion of ‘ethics’ often allows an exclusion of other views and 
problematic concerns from the public. It is a similar demarcation of the public and 
science world that Wynne and Irwin (Irwin & Wynne 1996; Wynne 2001) point to 
as oversimplified:   
 
…the relationship between science and the public may not be so straightforward as suggested in 
the conventional treatment which assumes a clear boundary between ‘facts’ and ‘values’ (Irwin & 
Wynne 1996, p.3) 
 
 The findings suggest that members of the public should be able to contribute 
practically to technical decisions about a technology because the dimensions between 
technical areas of risk and social areas of risk are blurred. Decisions over field-test 
applications should be able to utilise local knowledge of potential future social 
implications. This will not only better include the public, but also, allow for better 
decision making.   
 
There may, however, be political difficulties in utilising local knowledge in risk 
identification and regulation. Beyond the politics involved in gaining recognition for a 
legitimate role for local knowledge in risk assessment, local knowledge itself can 
become politicised. As the interviews and the literature on local knowledge suggest, 
the views amongst individuals holding local knowledge is neither homogenous nor 
automatically useful. Farmers interviewed had different opinions on the risks involved 
in animal biopharming: for example, some felt that farm managers would be 
inappropriate to run the operation, whereas another felt them ideal. It is for this reason 
that local knowledge could potentially be used as a political tool within the debate 
over animal biopharming. If local knowledge is considered legitimate expertise, it 
may then be used to add legitimacy for both sides of the debate, much as other forms 
of expertise are, and focus could be pulled away from risk assessment. A scenario 
similar to the one Beck (1992) describes in Risk Society could encompass the pursuit 
of local expertise, in which competition amongst those claiming access to ‘legitimate’ 
local knowledge leaves no clear answers, and further disillusions the public. A 
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challenge for risk assessors will be to identify ways of identifying relevant local 
knowledge, without creating this scenario.  
 
Recommendations 
Whilst identifying practical areas of concern, the findings also suggest the general 
point that policy makers and scientists are not the only legitimate ‘experts’ within risk 
assessment. It is in this light that risk assessment and policy within New Zealand 
should move forward. Public participation need not be limited to normative 
discussion, nor does risk analysis need to be limited to scientific input. As this thesis 
has illustrated, local knowledge can be useful practically in decisions and assessment 
regarding technologies, even if this knowledge does not relate specifically to scientific 
details of the technology. It is important that risk analysis takes an active role in 
identifying ‘experts’ outside the traditional realms of science and policy in order to 
conduct accurate risk assessment. The approach adopted by this thesis may be a useful 
tool for risk assessors to accomplish this. Such an approach offers an avenue to more 
accurate assessments of risk, and perhaps allows for better risk minimisation.  
 
This does not require a radical reshaping of the current Methodology, by which 
ERMA is currently bound. The Methodology allows for expert consultation, but does 
not offer a definition of what constitutes expertise. For example, Section 17 of the 
Methodology states, “The chief executive of the Authority or the Authority may 
appoint experts to review the information contained in applications, including the risk 
assessments and proposals for risk management”. In fact the Methodology suggests 
that ERMA must consult experts when considering decisions; Section 2(c) states: 
 
[ERMA m]ust review and verify information contained in applications and submissions from 
the public or, where appropriate, engage expert bodies to conduct the review and verification or 
to provide additional information so that the Authority may be expertly informed for the 
purposes of decision-making. 
 
 In this sense, including local knowledge may only require a widening of ERMA’s 
understanding of ‘expert’, and perhaps a more proactive approach toward both 
identifying ‘experts’ outside of the traditional areas and eliciting information from 
them. Relevant holders of local knowledge could then be included in decisions over 
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risk and may be able to offer useful information on controls designed to manage risk 
as ERMA is required to do.   
 
This study has also pointed to the need to involve the public earlier in practical 
discussions over risk assessment and new technologies. As the only avenue currently 
available for participation is through public submissions regarding specific 
applications, or normative participation, there is a gap in research that points to future 
risks at a practical level. By identifying these risks earlier a better level of 
preparedness may be achieved. Although it may not be ERMA’s place to provide this 
service, some organisation should be set up to actively identify relevant local 
knowledge on the potential implications of technologies. However, ERMA’s Public 
Awareness Group may be qualified to perform this function. Currently their role is to 
conduct: 
 
 Public awareness programmes, corporate communications, Website management and the 
overview of stakeholder relationships (New Zealand. Environmental Risk Management 
Authority (a)). 
 
As the Public Awareness Group is responsible for an ‘overview of stakeholder 
relationships’, a similar function of identifying the social environments likely to 
interact with the new organism or substance may also be possible. From this it would 
be possible to identify holders of local knowledge in those particular areas of 
interaction. Some findings from these types of investigations will inevitably be 
speculative and perhaps eventually redundant (if, for example, the technology does 
not proceed as expected); however the results of the approach employed by this thesis 
has suggested it is possible to project general directions in which a technology is 
headed, and then to identify possible risk implications associated with those 
directions.  
 
As applicants are responsible for conducting their own assessment of risk, it may be 
unlikely that relevant local knowledge will be considered in their equation. A more 
formal methodology for applicants to conduct risk assessment may need to be 
provided. Identification of local knowledge before pre-application stage may be 
useful, as well as a provision of guideline questions to be asked. This would be 
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similar to the proposed ethical framework, in which applicants would be required to 
“[i]nitiate early discussions with stakeholders who may have significant ethical 
concerns or questions” at a pre-application stage; in this case,  early consultation with 
holders of relevant ‘local knowledge’ could be required (New Zealand. 
Environmental Risk Management Authority 2005 (a), p.9). This would enable 
applicants to conduct earlier assessment of social implications and risks of the 
technology and of proposed risk management procedures than is currently conducted.  
 
It is also important to take on board the complexity and ambiguity that accompanies 
commercial applications of animal biopharming and other lab-developed 
technologies. The interviews suggested that risk will be contingent upon 
immeasurable factors, for instance attitude and human error. Thus, risk should not be 
presented as entirely controllable or quantifiably measurable. Risk assessment within 
New Zealand should allow for unknown variables: whilst this need not mean a 
complete ban on new technologies, a certain level of acknowledgement of the 
unknown and uncontrollable could allow for better planning. For example, the current 
liability laws are contingent upon someone violating ERMA approval conditions; any 
costs resulting from an unexpected (or uncontrolled for) problem will be borne by 
society as a whole. To avoid this, liability laws and risk assessments should reflect the 
understanding shown by the interview participants of the complexities and 
uncertainties of interactions between technologies and their social and environmental 
contexts. Terry et.al (2001) suggests several viable options for legislation to achieve 
this. For example, they suggest that strict liability should be enforced. Strict liability is 
defined as: 
 
Anyone who sells or uses any genetically modified organism is subject to liability for physical 
harm, damage or economic loss to property caused by that organism. This principle extends to 
pure economic loss, including where an organic farmer loses accreditation with an industry 
representative body. (Terry et.al 2001, p.9) 
 
Such an approach would require those expecting to benefit from the technology to 
assume its risks, and would avoid unexpected, and uncontrolled for, liability being 
borne by society. They also suggest that insurance should be mandatory for applicants 
to ERMA, as well as a bond, to cover possible liability claims (Terry et.al 2001, p.9). 
This once again ensures that unexpected liability claims can be paid, and do not fall to 
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society. These measures would build into the regulatory process a shift away from a 
paradigm that assumes controllability and predictability, toward an acknowledgement 
of the complexities and uncertainties embodied by the technologies and their social 
interactions.  
 
Finally, as suggested in the conclusion of Chapter Six, a reworking of the conception 
of benefit analysis may be needed. While it is undoubtedly true that animal 
biopharming has the potential to benefit some people, it is not clear that significant 
benefit will accrue to New Zealand or New Zealanders. Including local knowledge 
within risk assessment processes will better illustrate who is to benefit, and result in 
more adequate assessment of the claims of those seeking to develop new 
technologies. In the interviews, several farmers gave practical reasons why animal 
biopharming may not be of benefit to the average New Zealand dairy farmer, or 
indeed, to the general dairy industry within New Zealand. This illustrates that benefit 
can be analysed at a micro level, involving the practicalities of the everyday and of 
ownership structures, rather than purely at the macro level of consumer demand for a 
product, or a normative level of ethical consideration from the public. Such an 
approach would better meet the requirement stated in Assessment of Economic Risks, 
Costs and Benefits: Consideration of impacts on the Market economy (2005 (b), p. 9), 
that ERMA must consider distribution of costs and benefits across society, and would 
enable an analysis of  whether such costs and benefits are relevant to New Zealanders 
or merely overseas interests.   
 
Limitations and areas for further research 
In seeking to identify the social dimension of the risks of animal biopharming, this 
thesis has several limitations. This next section will briefly discuss these. 
 
The focus of this thesis has been on the implications of production processes rather 
than end uses of the product. For example, it did not view the social implications of 
animal biopharming from a perspective of the patient who may use biopharmaceutical 
health products. It may be useful to study the knowledge of patients in regards to 
whether the use of animal biopharming would affect them in any way.  It also did not 
explore in detail the risks to consumers of inadvertently consuming biopharmaceutical 
milk. Other social implications relating to end uses of the biopharmed product may 
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develop from a move toward medical foods or nutraceuticals; for example, milk as a 
nutraceutical, or functional food, is a possible product of animal biopharming. It is 
possible that the focus on engineering new ‘health properties’ into foods could have 
larger economic, distributional, or public health implications related to public 
behaviour towards eating, consuming and health care. This may be an interesting area 
of further research.  
 
This study also did not focus on the multiple issues of animal welfare that arise in 
relation to animal biopharming, nor did it investigate the changing social dynamic 
between animals and humans that may develop using animals for medical purposes. 
This could be of particular concern when the boundaries between human and animal 
genetics become blurred due to modification. Although this is a potential social 
implication of animal biopharming, it is not considered within the scope of this thesis, 
and perhaps lies more within the normative arena of study. However, it may be 
important to investigate this change in the future.  
 
As a result of the time and resource constraints on the research (typical of a Masters’ 
thesis), areas for further research and investigation suggested in the interviews could 
not be followed up.  Interview participants identified several more individuals and 
communities that would be useful to research in order to understand the implications 
of animal biopharming. Meat workers, milk transporters, share milkers and organic 
farmers may hold useful knowledge that may differ from or add to the knowledge 
offered by dairy farmers. Meat workers and milk transporters may be able to discuss 
the practicality of working with and separating GM products from non-GM products, 
and whether their everyday practices would pose risks in this regard. This could be 
vital knowledge if culled GM animals will be allowed to be used for food in any way. 
For milk transportation, useful information on transporting smaller amounts of milk, 
or keeping milk separate could be obtained.  One interview participant suggested that 
organic farmers might hold valuable sources of knowledge. Organic farmers hold 
useful information in maintaining separation of organic produce from non-organic 
produce and following reasonably strict procedures. Although they themselves would 
not operate a biopharming system, parallels exist between the practices of organic 
farming and animal biopharming practices that may be conducted. Further risks, 
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implications or practical difficulties could be highlighted through conducting 
interviews with organic farmers.  
 
Farm owners were interviewed because scoping of the literature identified that animal 
biopharming would benefit dairy farmers through increased returns. However, by 
interviewing only owners, a valuable area of knowledge has been missed. Share 
milkers and farm managers will hold a different perspective and knowledge on 
farming practices than the farm owners who were interviewed for this thesis. As 
animal biopharming may be operated by farm managers, this is a particularly 
important area for further research. For example, farm managers’ knowledge may be 
helpful in identifying attitudes toward and practices of rule-following from a non-
owner perspective. Many of the participants in this study made statements about farm-
manager and share-milker behaviour, from their experiences; however, it would be 
useful to understand these factors from non-owner perspectives.  
 
Dairy farming within New Zealand differs in attitude and practice between regions 
and provinces, as well as within them. While this thesis did interview farmers with 
various experiential backgrounds from Waikato, Taranaki and Canterbury, it may be 
worth researching how animal biopharming could influence each different region, 
specifically and uniquely, in more detail. This would be of particular value given the 
potential for conflict between local governments and ERMA identified in Chapter Six. 
If different risks are identifiable depending on region, it may point to a legitimate role 
for local governments in making decisions about risk. 
 
Finally, factors that will affect animal biopharming in New Zealand will not always 
originate from within New Zealand but from international forces, including economic 
drivers and law. Whilst the interviews briefly discussed this point, further research 
into this area may be beneficial in understanding the implications of animal 
biopharming. For example, the implications of animal biopharming in New Zealand 
will in large part be dependent on attitudes, regulation and risk assessment of 
consumers, intermediaries (such as large retailers or audit systems) and government 
agencies overseas. Likewise, as it is almost a certainty that animal biopharming will 
be developed through foreign investment, knowledge about international investment 
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forces and multinational organisational behaviour may shed light on the implications 
of animal biopharming in New Zealand.  
 
Conclusion 
Animal biopharming is not yet in commercial production; in the event that it never 
reaches this stage, many of the practical findings of this thesis could be considered 
redundant.  That is, as they seek to anticipate risk, they are necessarily speculative. 
Whilst this is a limitation, it is a limitation of risk assessment in general. It is better to 
think about risk earlier, than to be unprepared for negative effects when they arrive. In 
addition, the public would be better served by discussing social risks earlier, so they 
can make more accurate assessments when an application is presented for public 
comment. In the case of animal biopharming, this thesis has identified several areas 
which need to be addressed before it can be considered a safe or worthwhile 
investment for either New Zealanders in general or dairy farmers. Perhaps more 
importantly, the findings have supported the contention that local knowledge can 
contribute practically to risk assessment and decisions over new technologies.  
 
Thus, a new approach to risk assessment must be undertaken. In order to do this, a re-
conceptualisation of risk may be required. Knowledge of local environments and 
social practices should be pursued and valued as much as technological and policy 
‘expertise’ that is currently considered. This does not suggest a wholesale change in 
current processes that analyse risk, for instance scientific investigation and normative 
discussion, but an overall enhancement of these techniques through combination with 
relevant local knowledge. It is an apparently simple premise, that those who will use a 
technology may hold useful information on its implications; however, it is also one 
that may allow for a better understanding of the complexities of risk, and better 
decision making in the future.   
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APPENDIX 1 
David Shamy  
School of Political Science and Communication 
University of Canterbury 
Private Bag 4800 
Christchurch 
 
Date 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Project name:  “The Social Implications of Animal Biopharming in New Zealand” 
 
I have read and understood the description of the above-named project.   On this basis 
I agree to participate as a subject in the project, and I consent to publication of the 
results of the project with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved unless I 
explicitly consent to waive anonymity. 
 
I understand also that I may at any time withdraw from the project, including 
withdrawal of any information I have provided. 
 
When data I have provided (through an interview) is used in the project, I wish the 
source of the data to be referred to in the following way (please tick ONE): 
 
__  completely anonymously (e.g., Participant 3) 
 
__  by general occupational or functional description (e.g., scientist, researcher, 
science manager, farmer, etc.) PLEASE SUPPLY 
 
  ______________________________________________________________ 
 
__ by specific position title, where applicable; PLEASE SUPPLY 
 
 _____________________________________________________________
__ 
 
__ by name or name and position; PLEASE SUPPLY 
 
 _____________________________________________________________
__ 
 
 
 
 
NAME (please print): ……………………………………………………………. 
 
Signature: 
 
Date: 
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“The Social Implications of Animal Biopharming” 
 Information Sheet 
 
You are invited to participate as a key informant in the research project “The Social 
Implications of Animal Biopharming in New Zealand”. 
 
The aim of this project is to increase understanding of the potential social implications of 
animal biopharming technologies in New Zealand. This will be done by exploring, first, the 
likely trajectory of development of animal biopharming in New Zealand, and, second, the 
working environments with which animal biopharming technologies are most likely to 
interact.  Interviews with knowledgeable people will be a major source of information in these 
areas.   
 
Your participation in this project will involve an individual or group interview.  It is your 
decision whether the interview will occur individually or in a group setting.  It is expected 
that the interview will take between one and two hours.  
 
You are not obliged to answer questions and you have the right to terminate the interview at 
any time.  You also have the right to withdraw from the project at any time, including 
withdrawal of any information provided.   
 
You will be asked to consent to the audio-taping of the interview.  If you consent to the audio-
taping of the interview, you will be offered the opportunity to check the transcript of the 
interview. 
 
The results of the project may be published, but you may be assured of the complete 
confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation: the identity of participants will not be 
made public without their consent. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality, data will be held 
in locked filing cabinets.  Data may be held on password-protected individual computer hard-
drives, but will not be held on shared servers, due to the possibility of unauthorised access. 
 
The transcripts of the interviews will be analysed and the findings will be written up for 
completion of a M.A thesis in Political Science and the data will be available to the 
biopharming subproject within the Constructive Conversations/Whakaaetanga Korero 
research programme. 
  
If portions of your interview transcript are included in such presentations or publications you 
will not be identified in any way, unless you explicitly choose to be named.  
 
This research is being carried out by David Shamy, in order to fulfil the requirements for the 
M.A. degree.  The project is part of FRST contract UOCX0221 (Constructive conversations: 
Biotechnologies, dialogue and informed decision-making), led by Rosemary DuPlessis and 
Dr. Joanna Goven (University of Canterbury).  Should you have any questions, please contact 
Joanna Goven at 03 364 2106 or joanna.goven@canterbury.ac.nz.   
 
 
College of Arts 
 
 
 
School of Political Science and Communication 
Political Science Programme 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Project Description  
The Social Implications of Animal Biopharming in New Zealand 
University of Canterbury M.A. project in conjunction with the Constructive 
Conversations Programme (FRST contract UOCX0221)  
David Shamy 
 
 
New Zealand’s government has identified biotechnology as an extremely important 
area in which economic growth can be maintained or increased.  New Zealand’s 
strong agricultural experience, freedom from animal disease and emphasis on 
developing a knowledge economy may offer an attractive environment in which to 
explore some aspects of biotechnology. One such opportunity that has been identified 
is animal biopharming.  
 
The aim of this project is to increase understanding of the potential social implications 
of animal biopharming technologies in New Zealand. This will be done by exploring, 
first, the likely trajectory of development of animal biopharming in New Zealand, 
and, second, the working environments with which animal biopharming technologies 
are most likely to interact.  Interviews with knowledgeable people will be a major 
source of information in these areas.   
 
The Royal Commission report in 2002 on biotechnology recommends that research be 
carried out on the socio-economic and ethical effects of biotechnology within New 
Zealand. Such research both builds trust between the general public, policy makers 
and science researchers, and increases understanding for both the public and science 
researchers alike. This project aims to build upon this understanding by interviewing 
both experts in the field and local members of the public who may interact with the 
technology. By expanding our knowledge of how animal biopharming will affect New 
Zealand, particularly those likely to interact with the technology, we can be better 
prepared for its implementation.  
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APPENDIX 4 
Question guide for farm interviews: 
Can you envision any risks of animal biopharming given the background material 
provided? 
 
Would you be concerned if a neighbour of yours decided to start farming bioreactors? 
What would you be concerned about? 
 
What would be the practical implications of upholding the cows’ separation, and the 
separation of their milk, given how dairying practices work now?  
 
What might have to change in dairy practices now, to make it safer? 
 
Do you think that the different management scenarios outlined could affect the safety 
of biopharming?  
 
Would different scenarios effect your decision to produce or not produce 
pharmaceuticals through animal biopharming? 
 
How would you keep milk at a higher level of cleanliness?  
 
How would you maintain a secure milk transportation system?   
  
There will need to be counting and monitoring of the animals each day, is this 
achievable? 
 
What are the practical issues for dairy milk owners to cull excess animals, without 
selling them?  
 
What are the practical implications of working with smaller or larger herds of 
animals? What does this mean for the safety of the operation?  
 
Do you think farmers will be able to separate animals on the one farm?  
 
If animal biopharming affected soil, how would you contain this soil?  
 
In your mind is animal biopharming worth pursuing given the issues we have 
discussed?  
 
